
DON VEXUSTLANO CARRA>rZA 

AXD GENERAL I. L. PESQUEIRA 

First Chief and Minister oi W'lr 



CARRANZA AND 
MEXICO 

BY 

CARLO DE FORNARO 



[WITH CH.'MTERS BY COLONEL L C 
ENRIQUEZ, CH.-\RLES FERGUSON AND 
M. C. ROLLANT)] 




NEW YORK ' MITCHELL KENNERLEY - 1915 



11^^ 



COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY 
MITCHELL KENNERLEY 



^^M 0^ 



PRINTED IN AMERICA 



Mil/? -6 1915 

©CIAo9T184 
"^1 



TO 

PRESIDENT WOOBROW WILSON 

who discovered 

real Mexico to the Americans 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I The Life of Don Venustiano Carranza 9 

II Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 34 

III The Madero Revolution, Its Aims and Fail- 

ures 50 

IV Plotting Which Overthrew Madero 60 
V Huerta in Power. The Landing of American 

Marines in Vera Cruz 77 

VI Financial Organization of the Revolution 86 

VII Civil Organization of the Revolution 96 

VIII Diplomatic Work in Washington 99 

IX The Constitutionalists in Paris 102 

X Investigation Work in the United States. By 

M. C. Rolland 106 
XI General Outline of Campaign Against Huerta 114 
XII Campaign of General Obregon in the West. 

By Col. I. C. Enriquez 118 

XIII Villa and His Campaign in the North 132 

XIV Campaign of Gen. Gonzalez in the East 142 
XV Zapata and His Campaign in the South 146 

XVI One Hundred Years' Struggle for Land and 

Democracy against Clericalism 157 

Attempts at the Solution of the Land Question 166 
Behind the Scenes of the Carranza- Villa Im- 
broglio 176 
XIX The Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico. 

By C. Ferguson 184 

XX The Foreign Policy of Carranza 192 

XXI President Wilson's Mexican Policy 205 

Reflections 214 

Appendix 219 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

Don Venustiano Carranza and General I. L. 

Pesqueira Frontispiece 

FACING PAGE 

Don Rafael Zubaran Capmany 99 

Modesto C. Rolland io6 

War Map of Mexico "4 

General Alvaro Obregon ii8 

General S. Alvarado 132 

General Pablo Gonzalez 142 

General Benjamin Hill 176 



CHAPTER I 

LIFE OF CARRANZA 

T\ON VENUSTIANO CARRANZA! 
■*-^ Who is this man, practically unknown to 
the American public a year and a half ago, who with 
the help of the Mexican Constitutionalists, over- 
threw the most cynical, murderous, grafting and 
powerful military dictatorship that ever existed in 
Mexico? 

Concentration of power in Mexico City, the sup- 
port of the foreigners, of the church, the bankers, 
the landowners, the militarists, of foreign bankers 
and most foreign nations, with the exception of the 
United States Government, were at the disposal of 
General Huerta and his regime, but Carranza and 
the Constitutionalists eliminated this nefarious rule 
after eighteen months of unbroken victories, sweep- 
ing finally Into Mexico City in a peaceful, orderly 
manner. 

The American public is beginning to realize that 
such a thorough victory could never have been 
achieved without a popular movement, directed by 
a fearless, statesmanlike chief. 

Venustiano Carranza, with the exception of Don 
Fernando Iglesias Calderon, is the oldest of all the 
Constitutionalists, who have fought for the last year 

9 



lO Carranza and Mexico 

and a half, with every means in their power, against 
the rule of General Huerta and his governmental 
camorra. 

Don Venustiano Carranza was born in the State 
of Coahuila in 1859, and is therefore, fifty-five years 
old. In spite of the assertion of one of the corre- 
spondents who interviewed him six months ago for 
the Metropolitan magazine, Mr. John Reed, we 
claim that Carranza is anything but a " senile old 
man," for he rode over 1,500 miles on horseback, 
through the States of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Du- 
rango. Chihuahua and Sonora, visiting the military 
camps, organizing all the state and federal govern- 
ments, and finally settling down in HermosUlo, State 
of Sonora, as his capital. Later, after Torreon 
had been captured from the Federals, Carranza with 
his staff and soldiers again crossed the State of 
Sonora into Chihuahua on horseback, a distance of 
nearly 300 miles. 

We must admit that unless Carranza had lived a 
greater part of his life on his farm, he would not 
have been able to stand the hardships and rigors 
of that famous ride. 

His mental training was that of a lawyer, for he 
studied in the schools of Coahuila and finished his 
law course in Mexico City. 

A certain weakness of the eyesight prevented him 
from practising law, so he retired on his farm, dedi- 
cating his time to improving his " hacienda " and 
studying history and political economy. 



Life of Carranza li 

Like the President of the United States, Carranza 
is one of the greatest authorities on the history of 
his own country. 

Just as all student-statesmen, Carranza is the 
type of man which makes no direct appeal to the 
imagination of the public by a strenuous, romantic 
life — it is the quiet, clear, thinking, organizing 
brain which creates, commands and achieves, without 
the blaze of trumpets, or the help of well-salaried 
press-agents. 

One incident In his Hfe stands out glaringly like 
a solitary facet of a diamond struck by sunlight. 
Very few Mexicans, and it can be safely said even 
a lesser number of Americans, know that Carranza 
was the only man who started a local revolution 
against General Diaz, during the rule from 1876 
to 19 10, and succeeded; — that is to say, continued 
to live in Mexico, without sacrificing his life to his 
bold attempt. 

This strange and seemingly incomprehensible in- 
cident happened in the year 1893, when Don Venus- 
tiano was only thirty-four years old. 

At that time there ruled over the State of Coa- 
huila a governor named Garza Galan. With the 
exception of Mucio Martinez and General Cravi- 
oto, he was the worst governor in Mexico. Garza 
Galan used his great power to rob, expropriate 
lands by all manner of tricks and stratagems, im- 
prison, kill those who stood in his way, and went 
so far as to kidnap respectable girls. 



12 Carranza and Mexico 

Everybody expected that Garza Galan would be 
eliminated after his two years of governorship, but 
when it was discovered that Romero Rubio stood 
sponsor for another two years of Garza Galan as 
Governor of Coahuila, the inhabitants of that State 
were in utter dismay and protested to the President. 

At that time Romero Rubio, the father-in-law of 
President Diaz, was one of his closest advisers. 
He is the originator of the party which later was 
called the " Cientifico " party, and of which Liman- 
tour became the successor. 

As Romero Rubio insisted on the candidacy of 
Garza Galan for a second term, and as protests 
were of no avail with General Diaz, Don Venusti- 
ano Carranza arose in arms with the assistance of 
his brother, Don Emilio, and started on the war- 
path against Garza Galan. General Diaz sent 
some federal troops to quell the revolt, but Don 
Venustiano and his brother took particular care to 
avoid coming into armed conflict with the federal 
troops, while they attacked Garza Galan's state 
troops and defeated them repeatedly. This strange, 
three-cornered fight lasted longer than was ex- 
pected; very soon, other wiser counsellors of Gen- 
eral Diaz pointed out to him that a continuation of 
this armed revolt might communicate itself to the 
other border States with disastrous effects to the 
Federal Government. General Diaz then recalled 
the candidacy of Garza Galan, and it was trans- 
formed into the one of Senor Musqulz. 



Life of Carranza 13 

Peace followed, but strangest of all, was the im- 
munity of Venustiano Carranza and his brother to 
persecutions and attempts on their lives. 

Carranza was not a novice in the politics of his 
country; he served as a member of the legislature 
of his native State, as Senator of the Federal Gov- 
ernment in Mexico City and even as a governor of 
his State. 

Maybe the wily old dictator, Don Porfirio Diaz, 
made a mistake in the case. of Carranza. For six- 
teen years after the revolt against Garza Galan, 
Carranza gave further proof of his strength of 
character, by accepting the gubernatorial candidacy 
offered to him by the people of Coahuila and re- 
fusing to renounce it in the face of the opposition 
of the " cientifico " group in Mexico City, because 
Carranza stood for the candidacy of General Reyes 
as Vice-President, as against Ramon Corral who 
was the Mephisto of the " cientifico " party. 

The answer of Carranza to the emissary of Diaz, 
who suggested the advisability of his refusal to run 
for Governor, was as follows : " Tell General Diaz 
that as long as there is a single person, who will 
propose and work in favor of my candidacy, I shall 
not renounce it, and I shall accept all the conse- 
quences of my conduct." 

After such an unequivocal answer, everybody ex- 
pected that either the door of the penitentiary would 
close upon the bold candidate, or that he would mys- 



14 Carranza and Mexico 

teriously disappear, in accordance with the policy of 
General Diaz. 

What saved Carranza from either of these fates, 
was the pubhcity given to this incident in the Amer- 
ican press, especially a letter of protest against the 
meeting which was to take place in El Paso, be- 
tween General Diaz and President Taft. The pas- 
sage referring to this incident says: 

" Even as I write these lines, the report is wired 
from Mexico that General Diaz has ordered the de- 
mission of the Governor of Coahuila, as the latter 
showed a marked tendency in favor of General 
Reyes' candidacy. Imagine the Republican Presi- 
dent of the United States asking for the resignation 
of Governor Johnson of Minnesota, because of his 
democratic leanings." ^ 

It is quite logical that a man of the stamp of 
Carranza should view with great interest the move- 
ment which culminated in the overthrow of General 
Diaz in 1911. 

Francisco I. Madero wrote his famous book 
"The Presidential Succession of 1910," and pub- 
lished it in San Pedro, Coahuila, in December, 1908. 

F. I. Madero, because of his Innocence or his 
fearlessness, tried to create a working candidacy, 
with himself as presidential candidate and Dr. Vas- 
quez Gomez as Vice-President, in opposition to 
General Diaz and Ramon Corral. There was how- 
ever no intention of rising to arms against the gov- 

^ Full text of letter will be found in Index. 



Life of Carranza 15 

ernment of Diaz, but the policy of the President 
made the opposing candidate realize the futility of 
his efforts. 

F. I. Madero was placed in jail twice for his dar- 
ing, and after the second time, he was informed that 
a third imprisonment would mean his complete elim- 
ination. Madero took the tip, and fled to San 
Antonio, Texas. The slogan of the Madero revo- 
lution was " Effective suffrage and no re-election " 
and not, as many Americans believe, " the land ques- 
tion." 

If any one will take the trouble to peruse the long 
document of San Luis Potosi, of October 5th, 19 10, 
signed F. I. Madero, which contains 2,500 words, 
it will be noticed that the land question takes up 
very little space, in comparison to the rest of the 
Plan.2 

General Carranza never hesitated for one mo- 
ment, and was soon over the border to join Madero, 
and formed part of his revolutionary junta. He 
was appointed chief of the Military Division of the 
States of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas, 
and later Secretary of War in the provisional cab- 
inet of F. L Madero. 

The premature cessation of hostilities and the In- 
stallation of the clerical candidate, L. de la Barra, 
was strenuously opposed by Carranza, who said to 
F. L Madero, " You are delivering to the reac- 

2 Full text of the Plan of San Luis Potosi will be found in 
Index. 



1 6 Carranza and Mexico 

tionaries a dead revolution, which will have to be 
fought over again." These prophetic words were 
not heeded, so Don Venustlano went back to his 
native State, and calmly awaited the course of 
events, while he offered himself as a candidate and 
was elected as Governor of Coahuila. 

One of the accusations which was published in the 
American papers by the Huerta press agents was 
that F. I. Madero, as President, had sent several 
hundred thousand dollars to Governor Carranza, 
for the purpose of arming and Increasing the state 
militia against the Orozco rebellion. About the 
time of the overthrow of F. I. Madero, Don Venus- 
tlano had been supposedly asked to give an account- 
ing of the expenditure of the money furnished from 
Mexico City. As he could not account for it, it 
was said, he had decided to start a revolution against 
President Madero. When the Huerta treachery 
took place and Madero was murdered, Carranza 
took the opportunity to rebel against the provi- 
sional presidency of General Huerta. 

This story may sound plausible to the Huerta 
type of man, but the facts in the case dispose of it. 
A few months before the plot which overthrew Ma- 
dero, Don Venustiano Carranza paid a visit to the 
President. His watchful eyes and ears detected a 
very complicated net of plots and counterplots brew- 
ing against Madero. The President did not believe 
that there were any plots, and doubted any one's 



Life of Carranza 17 

ability to overthrow him. Carranza went back to 
his State and communicated his suspicions to a few 
intimate friends. As soon as he heard of the re- 
lease of Felix Diaz and General Reyes from their 
jails, he at once sent several hundred of the Coa- 
huila volunteers to the assistance of Madero. They 
took part in the assault against the citadel, and the 
reason why General Huerta lingered so long before 
turning traitor is now clear. 

Besides the Coahuila riflemen, there were several 
hundred Madero volunteers who were loyal to the 
President. General Huerta could not arrest Ma- 
dero and Suarez, and make peace with Felix Diaz 
until the loyal Madero troops had been eliminated. 

So he cautiously kept his own federal regiments 
back, and sent the Madero volunteers and the Coa- 
huila riflemen tci charge the citadel, manned by ma- 
chine guns, in close formation. The Coahuila vol- 
unteers who were mostly mounted, and numbered 
about 1,150, bravely attacked the guns, but none of 
them came back alive; the same happened to the 
Madero volunteers. 

As soon as Huerta had disposed of the volun- 
teers, he made his peace with Felix Diaz. What 
remained of the Madero and Coahuila volunteers 
fled to the standard of Zapata after Huerta came 
into power. 

On the 1 8th of February, 19 13, Madero and 
Suarez were arrested by order of General Huerta. 



1 8 Carranza and Mexico 

On the 19th of February all Mexico had heard the 
fateful news, and nobody doubted the outcome of 
the imprisonment. 

Don Venustiano Carranza never hesitated one 
hour, one minute; he convened at once the legisla- 
ture of the State of Coahuila, and the following 
decree was the result: 

Venustiano Carranza, Constitutional Governor of the free 
and Sovereign State of Coahuila of Zaragoza, informs its 
inhabitants: That the Congress of the State has decreed 
the following: 

The Constitutional Congress of the free, independent and 
sovereign State of Coahuila of Zaragoza decrees: 

No. 1421 : Article i. 

We disavow General Victoriano Huerta in his character 
of chief of the Executive power of the Republic, which he 
claims was conferred to him by the Senate, and we like- 
wise disown all the acts and resolutions which he may dic- 
tate under such authority. 

Article 11. Extraordinary powers are transmitted to the 
Executive of this State in all the branches of Public Ad- 
ministration, so that he may suppress what he may deem 
convenient and that he shall proceed by the force of arms 
to sustain the Constitutionalist order of the Republic. 

To arouse the Governments of the other States and the 
Chiefs of the Federal, Rural and Auxiliary Forces, so that 
they may assist the stand taken by the Governor of this 
State. 

Decreed in the room of the Congress of the State, in 
Saltillo, on the 19th of February, 191 3. A. Barrera, Presi- 



Life of Carranza 19 

dent of the Legislature. J. Sanchez Herrera, Secretary. 
Gabriel Calzada, Secretary. 

Let this be printed, communicated and observed. 

V. Carranza. 
E. Garza Perez, 

Secretary. 

Saltillo, 19 de Febrero de 191 3. 

After the Imprisonment of President Madero 
and Vice-President Suarez in February, 19 13, a year 
and a half ago, there were twenty-seven governors 
in Mexico, who had the same opportunity to pro- 
test against the usurper Huerta, and refuse to recog- 
nize his " coup d'etat," his dictatorship and his cow- 
ardly murders. None of the governors dared pro- 
test. Had all the governors In Mexico arisen to- 
gether with their legislatures and refused to recog- 
nize the authority of the czar In Mexico, Huerta 
with all his money, all his soldiers, all his greed and 
ruthlessness, could not have lasted more than three 
months. 

Don Venustlano Carranza was the only governor 
In Mexico who had the audacity and patriotism to 
challenge the great pirate In Mexico City, who had 
raised the black flag with the skull and the cross 
bones over the national palace. 

The chiefs of the States were too terrorized, 
cowed and frozen by the brutality, the cynicism, the 
power of the man In the provisional presidency, and 
were aghast at the suddenness of the events which 



20 Carrauza and Mexico 

led to Madero's downfall. They had not found out 
what had happened behind the scenes, the horror 
of the events and their natural consequence had not 
dawned upon their paralyzed minds. Carranza as 
a real leader and chief never faltered an instant. 
Those are the rare and precious moments which 
create the national hero. 

As soon as Felix Diaz and Victoriano Huerta 
heard of the stand taken by Don Venustiano Car- 
ranza as Governor of the State of Coahuila, they 
realized that a formidable enemy had arisen to 
spoil their crooked game. They put their heads 
together and penned the following epistle to Car- 
ranza, signed it together, and sent a trusted friend 
as emissary to find him and convince him : 

Mexico, D. F. 27 de Febrero 1913. 
Don Venustiano Carranza, 

Gov. of the Free and Sovereign State of Coahuila, 
Dear Sir — 

By letters of recent date we have informed you of the 
plausible reasons which have inspired the army against the 
dissolving regime of Don F. Madero, and we have like- 
wise justified the acts which placed General Huerta in the 
office of President of the Republic. 

We have been informed that it was your intention to rebel 
against the legal authority of the Government. We beg 
to insist, in the name of the country and for its exclusive 
benefit, that you change your announced attitude not to col- 
laborate with us in the work of peace which we intend to pur- 
sue to the end, at any price. If for some personal reason 



Life of Carranza 21 

you wish to leave the office which you occupy, and if that can 
be done without offending or hurting our patriotic end, the 
Government will give you all sorts of guarantees and will 
pay your salary up to the end of your term. 

This letter, as you understand, must be absolutely of a 
particular and private character. On this basis we beg to 
inform you that on our part there will be no obstacles that 
could arise between ourselves, which cannot be solved in 
the manner most suitable to you. It would be advisable 
for you to retire into the United States (for your greater 
safety). We shall make all sorts of sacrifices (should you 
demand them) so as to satisfy all your wishes and demands. 
Our envoy (agent) will bring you instructions on the sub- 
ject. He is empowered to arrange matters on the spot. 

We beg you to accept our assurance of admiration and re- 
spect. 

(Signed) Victoriano Huerta. 



Felix Diaz. 



Carranza's answer follows; 



nth March, 1913. 
Messrs. V. Huerta y Felix Diaz : 

My only answer to the despicable proposals offered to me 
in your letter dated February 27th, is that I want to in- 
form you that men like myself do not betray, do not sell 
themselves; that is your function, you who have no other 
objects in life than the shameful satisfaction of ignoble am- 
bitions. 

Raise the black flag of your tyranny, and over the country 
the voice shouts : " Treason and Death." 

On my part, with the help of the Mexican people, I shall 
lift from the mud into which you have thrown it, the flag 



22 Carranza and Mexico 

of the country. Should I fall defending it, I shall have ob- 
tained for my small action in life, the greatest prize which 
we honest men can. aspire to. 

(Signed) Venustiano Carranza. 

In the month of March, 19 13, not satisfied with 
having defied the powers in Mexico, General Car- 
ranza published the " Plan of Guadalupe," so called 
from the fact that the revolutionary plan was 
signed by the officers at the " hacienda " farm of 
Guadalupe. The plan is the following: 

DECLARATION TO THE NATION 

Considering that General Victoriano Huerta, to 
whom the Constitutional President, Francisco I. 
Madero, had confided the defence of the institu- 
tions and the legality of his government, on uniting 
with the rebel enemies in arms against that same 
government, to restore the latest dictatorship, com- 
mitted the crime of treason to reach power, arrest- 
ing the President and Vice-President, as well as their 
ministers, exacting from them by violent means the 
resignation of their posts, which is proven by the 
messages that the same General Huerta addressed 
to the Governors of the States, advising them that 
he had the Supreme Magistrates of the nation and 
their cabinet prisoners. 

Considering that the legislative and judicial 
powers have recognized and protected General Vic- 
toriano Huerta and his Illegal and anti-patriotic pro- 
ceedings, contrary to the constitutional laws and pre- 



Life of Carranza 23 

cepts, and considering, finally, that some governors 
of the States of the union have recognized the il- 
legitimate government, imposed by the part of the 
army which consummated the treason, headed by the 
same General Huerta, in spite of the fact that the 
sovereignty of those same States whose governors 
should have been the first in disowning it, had been 
violated, those who subscribe, chiefs and officials, 
in command of constitutional forces, we have ac- 
corded, and shall sustain by arms the following: 

PLAN 

1. General Victoriano Huerta, as President of the 

republic shall be disowned. 

2. The legislative and judicial powers of the fed- 

eration shall also be disowned. 

3. The governors of the states who still recognize 

the federal powers forming the actual admin- 
istration, 30 days after the publication of this 
plan, shall be disowned. 

4. For the organization of the army in charge of 

seeing that our purposes are carried out, we 
name as first chief of the army, which will be 
called Constitutionalist, Venustiano Carranza, 
Governor of the State of Coahuila. 

5. The Constitutionalist army on occupying Mex- 

ico City, the executive power will be provi- 
sionally in charge of Venustiano Carranza, 
first chief of the army, or in charge of that 
person who might substitute him in command. 



24 Carranza and Mexico 

6. The provisional President of the Republic will 

convene general elections as soon as peace may 
have been consolidated, handing the power to 
the citizen who may have been elected. 

7. The citizen who may act as first chief of the Con- 

stitutionalist army In the States whose govern- 
ment might have recognized that of Huerta, 
will assume the charge of provisional governor 
and will convoke local elections, after the citi- 
zens elected to discharge the high powers of the 
federation may have taken possession of their 
office, as provided for In the foregoing basis. 

The plan was signed at the Hacienda of Guada- 
lupe, Coahuila, on the 26th of March, 19 13. 
Sixty-four officers of the state troops affixed their 
signatures to the protest. Among the most famous 
on the list was Lieut. Col. Lucio Blanco, who 
fought in Tamaullpas and Initiated the sale of lands 
belonging to Felix Diaz, among Constitutionalist 
soldiers, and Major J. B. Trevino. 

As Don Venustiano Carranza was leaving Saltlllo 
to take the field against the federals, he said to a 
friend : " We are going to fight the three years' 
war over again." 

A coincidence in atavism Is that Don Venustlano's 
father. Colonel Carranza, fought in the north dur- 
ing the three years' war under the leadership of 
Benito Juarez (1857-60) and assisted him finan- 
cially as well as pohtically In the struggle. Later, 



Life of Carranza 25 

after the Constitutionalist government had placed 
Benito Juarez in the presidency through the elec- 
tions, Colonel Carranza was offered the reimburse- 
ment of the sixteen thousand odd dollars which he 
had contributed to the liberal cause. He refused 
the money saying that the victory of the party was 
sufficient payment to him. 

A further coincidence, amusing to students of his- 
tory, is found in the case of Gen. Victoriano Huerta, 
whose father. Gen. Epitacio Huerta, fought under 
the same banner as Colonel Carranza. The history 
of the three years' war mentions the name of three 
generals: The Constitutionalist Generals Rocha, 
Huerta and Arteaga. . . . After the clericals had 
been defeated by the Constitutionalists under Benito 
Juarez in i860 they invited foreign intervention, 
which ended in the courtmartial and shooting of 
Emperor Maximilian and Generals Miramon and 
Mejia. 

In the present instance, Don Victoriano Huerta, 
when he perceived an early defeat, heaped indigni- 
ties and insults upon American citizens so as to in- 
vite an intervention and a quick march of the Amer- 
ican troops into Mexico City. The clericals which 
he represented preferred the presence of Americans 
to that of the Constitutionalists in Mexico City. 
Luckily for Mexico, the Chief Magistrate in Wash- 
ington foresaw the move and wisely refused to pull 
the chestnut out of the fire for a Mexican monkey. 

The first battle of the revolution was fought be- 



26 Carranza and Mexico 

tween Saltillo and Monclova in a small place called 
*' Anhelo," which, translated from the Spanish, 
means a vehement desire. 

The reason for going into certain details of the 
march of Carranza across the northern States, is for 
the purpose of showing the physical endurance, the 
mental activity, as well as the profound and implicit 
faith that Venustiano Carranza had in the people 
of Mexico. 

The personality of Carranza does not seem to 
have been sympathetic to foreign newspapermen 
who have visited him. His presence and manner 
seem utterly cold, intellectual; extremely polite, 
non-committal. When talking, his speech is devoid 
of all the superlatives and amenities which made 
New York reporters say of L. de la Barra, " He 
talked incessantly for fifteen minutes without saying 
one word for copy." 

Carranza's talent as a good listener made him 
the despair of journalists, who preferred the gen- 
erals who fought, talked, gave orders to shoot a 
few prisoners, and between snatches of food, dic- 
tated incidents from their lives or told what their 
plans were for the future of Mexico. Carranza is 
more subtle if not sufficiently romantic. The care- 
ful observer must read between the lines, when the 
personality grows on one, like the taste for olives 
or the magnitude of the Chief Magistrate in Wash- 
ington. Some leaders are unattractive because of 
their very uprightness, their justice, their integrity, 



Life of Carranza 27 

their polish; their flawlessness offers no purchase to 
a sly attack. Aristides asked an Athenian citizen, 
who had voted to ostracize him, if Aristides had 
personally offended him, " No, but I am tired of 
hearing him called the Just! " 

Enemies of Carranza have accused him of being 
too much of an aristocrat and a puppet in the hands 
of his lawyers' cabinet, or again a jingo for effect 
and a rebel for power. His conduct towards his 
general staff, his generals, his enemies, his attitude 
towards the United States and the foreign powers, 
his promises or silence on the question of interior 
policy, — his words, speeches, letters and decrees 
are his best witnesses to judge him by. 

After the defeat at Anhelo, Carranza went to 
the border, passing through Cuatro Cienegas, which 
is famous as his birthplace, to Eagle Pass. 

In the month of July, 19 13, when the Arrietas 
and Contreras were attacking Torreon, Carranza 
joined them in the hope of success, but even the sec- 
ond time when Villa attacked Torreon, the victories 
were empty, except for the arms, ammunition and 
money captured. 

Disconsolate but not discouraged, Carranza, ac- 
companied by about two hundred men, slowly 
wended his way across the State of Durango. Gen- 
eral Huerta was at that period on the highest crest 
of success and power, — orders had been telegraphed 
all over the north, to the federal and counter-guer- 
rilla chiefs, to capture Carranza, dead or alive, and 



2 8 Carranza and Mexico 

be rewarded with a bonus of $150,000. Abraham 
Gonzalez, Governor of Chihuahua, had been ar- 
rested and assassinated by order of Huerta. Venus- 
tiano Carranza, therefore, travelled at night and 
rested during the day; his only pilots were the stars, 
a small compass and a pocket edition of " Mexico- 
Atlas." The chief himself recounts how often dur- 
ing their night ride, they espied coming towards 
them in the distance, the vaguely outlined forms of 
peons, men and women carrying their children in 
their arms. Scouts were sent ahead to discover if 
the peasants were only disguised federals in a des- 
perate attempt to assassinate the brain of the revo- 
lution, and capture a kingly reward. 

The phantom shadows were " pacificos," who had 
walked for miles to greet the chief who was going 
to battle for their rights and their lands. They 
only wanted to touch his hands, the hem of his coat, 
to hear the voice of the great " Jefe," and then they 
turned their weary way sending back a salutation : 
" May God protect you ! " or " May God be with 
you ! " which rang in the silent night like the voice 
of the people, the voice of God. 

As Carranza kept his itinerary secret, the first 
encounter might have been accidental, but it hap- 
pened so frequently that it seemed almost uncanny 
and supernatural, this triumphant procession accom- 
panied by the blessings, the wishes, the yearnings 
of the Mexican peons. Carranza himself confessed 
that no incident in his life made a more profound 



Life of Carranza 29 

impression on him, and gave him a deeper insight 
of the tremendous faith of the Mexican people in 
their champions, pathfinders, and saviors. 

Across the mountains in Durango to Tepehuanes, 
into Parral in Chihuahua, where he came in con- 
tact with General Chao, and from there across the 
Sierra Madre, a mountain range, dividing Chihua- 
hua from Sonora, into the small city of Fuerte, 
where Carranza met for the first time General Obre- 
gon and his soldiers. 

He reached Guaymas, in Sonora, about the mid- 
dle of September, 19 13. The little band was tired, 
and their clothes were in rags, their shoes in tat- 
ters, but the goal was reached and they began the 
work of organizing the capital of the Constitutional 
government. 

In Mexico thje presence of Carranza was known 
only to the revolutionists, and as the federals could 
not discover the whereabouts of the Chief at that 
time, they heralded his disappearance and death. 
Everywhere that Carranza had passed with his band 
of followers in the small cities, away from the fed- 
erals who cautiously kept within the city limits and 
near the railroads, he invariably organized small 
local governments until he was able to communicate 
with his chiefs in the middle and east. In the State 
of Coahuila, his brother Don Jesus, and Gen. Don 
Pablo Gonzalez, had come to an understanding as 
to the great strategic outline of the campaign in 
combination with General Villa In the north and 



30 Carranza and Mexico 

General Obregon on the west. In Guaymas a pro- 
visional cabinet was organized with Don Rafael 
Zubaran Capmany, one of the keenest intellects of 
the revolution, a lawyer from Campeche, with Fran- 
cisco Escudero as Minister of Foreign Affairs, as 
Minister of Finances F. I. Villareal, Engineer G. 
Bonilla as Minister of Communications, and Gen- 
eral Angeles as Minister of War. 

Gen. J. B. Trevino was the chief of the general 
staff of Carranza; the chief secretary was G. Espi- 
nosa Mireles; there was also a staff of officers at- 
tached to his person. It was in Hermosillo that the 
great strategic campaign was outlined with the help 
of General Angeles and the general staff. The or- 
ders to the three chiefs, Obregon, Villa and Gon- 
zalez, came from Hermosillo. 

After the northern States were conquered slowly, 
all the city and rural governments were organized, 
and although the work was arduous and continuous, 
it was not quite as strenuous as the classic ride across 
the sierras and the deserts. The daily routine at 
headquarters was very simple but efficient. The 
chief usually got up between five and six in the morn- 
ing, and except when he rode across the mountain 
took his bath and attended at once to the most im- 
portant work of the day. At 7 A. m. there was a 
light breakfast with whatever could be had, milk, 
crackers with peach preserves, or honey and butter. 
On the march everybody had to be satisfied with the 
national tortilla, made of cornmeal and beans. 



Life of Carranza 31 

Sometimes they could get fresh eggs, sometimes not. 

In Hermosillo they fared better; Carranza had 
two Indian attendants, one who did the cooking and 
the other who attended to his horses and those of 
the general staff. The Mexican cooks have the 
most wonderful capacity for being able to light a 
fire and cook anywhere under the most distressing 
conditions. 

Thus they were able to get meals and a few lux- 
uries like boiled and fried meal, vegetables, and the 
famous chile with cheese, and a powdered coffee 
called " Washington coffee," with milk. Sometimes 
they drank a red wine which Is grown In the north 
of Mexico. Carranza Invited at almost every meal, 
some friends who had travelled many miles to see 
him, or soldiers or civilians belonging to his Im- 
mediate surroundings. 

Between the hours of 7 130 and i p. M. the whole 
staff was again busy taking orders from the chief, 
— writing, telegraphing and conferring. At one 
o'clock there was a light luncheon and the work was 
resumed until six, when the chief took his daily ride, 
accompanied by an aide or a friend. Ten o'clock 
was usually the time to retire, unless the " Jefe " 
had been Invited to a fiesta or a dance, which hap- 
pened quite frequently as Mexicans are very fond 
of dancing, theatricals, speech-making, and are In 
general very sociable. Unlike most Mexicans, the 
chief does not smoke, or favor the national drink 
" tequila," or the Mexicanlzed cognac, or the ex- 



32 Carratiza and Mexico 

cellent Monterrey and Toluca beer which was ad- 
vertised in Mexico as " the beer that made Milwau- 
kee jealous." 

By February the chief and his staff packed their 
belongings, and the state papers, and crossed the 
State of Sonora into Sinaloa in Culiacan, the cap- 
ital, which had been captured by General Obregon. 
After the organization of Sinaloa, the peripatetic 
government moved back to Hermosillo and towards 
the border, to Nogales. By that time, Torreon had 
been captured and Carranza, accompanied by 300 
cavalry and 400 infantry, crossed the Sierra Madre 
range into Chihuahua, to Juarez, an excursion which 
lasted twenty-five days and covered over 400 miles. 
They had come from the tropical heat of the deserts 
of Sonora to the snow on the Sierra Madre. 

From Juarez on, the procession of the Chief 
rolled downward to Chihuahua, Torreon, Saltillo, 
Monterrey, Tampico, down to Tepotzotlan near 
Mexico City. The details of his slow organization 
of the civil government of all the conquered States, 
of his foreign attitude and of the other details of 
ihis revolutionary rule, will be discussed in separate 
chapters. 

Carranza at first sight makes the impression more 
_of a Saxon personality than of a Mexican type. The 
Spanish blood, which flows in his veins three or 
four generations back must have been of Basque 
origin, which is pure northern European. He is 
about five feet, eight inches high, proportionately 



Life of Carranza 33 

built, neither too thin nor too stout, and he carries 
liimself erect and in a dignified manner. His white 
hair and beard contrast with the very dark brown 
complexion which Is the result of an active, out-of- 
door life. The eye-glasses give to his appearance 
a slight professional mien. The professorial air is 
rather disconcerting at first, for one expects to be- 
hold a type of a man different from the quiet, un- 
assuming, very polite, gentleman farmer, and instead 
of a deep, sonorous voice, a rather high and clear 
tone of speech. His eyes are hazel, very open, — 
his nose straight, his forehead very high, and he has 
the high brow of an intellectual, rather than of a 
fighter, his ears are quite large, denoting a strong 
constitution and a long life. The whole impression 
is of self-restraint, gentleness; nevertheless, the keen 
observing eyes prove an alert intelligence, always 
watching, weighing, judging and carefully registering, 
all the impressions for future use. As all men deal- 
ing with people politically, Carranza has a very re- 
tentive memory for faces and names. Being a com- 
prehending and patient listener he always hears a 
great deal more than he says, but when an answer 
Is required, the words come out slowly, as if chosen 
with extreme care to express a thought with as few 
words as possible. While speaking in public, the 
use of simple language denotes a clear mind which 
can express Complicated problems in first principles, 
and Carranza makes himself understood by cultured 
Mexicans as well as by peons. 



CHAPTER II 

CONDITIONS IN MEXICO DURING DIAZ' REGIME 

TT would appear after all that has been written 
^ in the United States and Europe concerning 
Mexico, that the people ought to possess a clearer 
conception of the conditions which brought about 
the Madero and the Constitutionalist revolutions, 
especially when the latter is nothing more than a 
continuation of the former. But the words of the 
late Joseph Pulitzer, when he said that to instil 
facts into the minds of the people there must be 
constant repetition, seem undeniably true. It is not 
sufficient to reiterate certain facts; the correlation 
of these facts must be understood and explained. 

People heard about the peonage system in Mex- 
ico, about the great power of Porfirio Diaz, about 
the abuses of this power, but it was not realized 
how vital, how deep, how intimate the solution of 
the political problems was to the Mexicans them- 
selves. To foreigners the Mexican problem was 
only interesting in so far as it affected their inter- 
ests, — no more. 

After all the cruelties perpetrated by the Diaz- 
Huerta regimes, I have heard intelligent Amer- 
icans exclaim that the Mexicans needed a strong 

34 



Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 35 

man like Huerta, and that Diaz after all had 
brouglit railroads, schools, higher wages, money, 
improvements and progress. It makes one almost 
despair of human intelligence to hear such super- 
ficial prattle, but it proves the axiom of Joseph Pu- 
litzer to be very profound and that Porfirio Diaz 
had used it to its fullest extent. 
/^ Known by few people, Porfirio Diaz used for 
years a secret fund amounting to millions solely for 
the purpose of advertising to the world that Diaz 
was the creator of modern Mexico, that " peace " 
and " progress " were his two watchwords, with 
which he had put Mexico on a permanent basis of 
greatness. Many small newspapers near the bor- 
der as far as San Antonio were paid as much as 
$5,000 a year to speak in good terms about Diaz 
and never to mention any trouble or agitation which 
might be started along the border by anarchists who 
might call themselves Mexican revolutionists. 

Great newspaper proprietors in the United 
States were given concessions, others were offered 
special inducements to publish special Mexican num- 
bers, which brought from $25,000 to $30,000 
worth of advertising; well-known individuals, such 
as judges, congressmen and senators, were invited 
in an indirect way to visit Mexico, were received 
like princes, feted, dined and were offered mining 
or other concessions as one gives cigars to a guest 
after dinner. When the concessions were not 
needed or available, Don Porfirio took particular 



36 Carranza and Mexico 

care to impress his famous visitor with a set of well 
chosen phrases most apt to impress him favorably 
as to his greatness, his patriotism and his de- 
mocracy. 

One incident, which was related to me, illustrates 
the Machiavellian talent of Diaz. A nationally fa- 
mous librarian paid his visit to General Diaz, who 
received him very graciously. No concessions were 
asked or wanted and the President did not mention 
the great battles he had fought, which were un- 
known to the gentle librarian, but he spoke at great 
length of the extensive school system in vogue since 
his ascension to the presidency, and ended the con- 
versation by declaring: " It is my greatest ambi- 
tion to be known as the great schoolmaster of Mex- 
ico." The phrase impressed the scholar and many 
people heard the phrase^ and many newspapers re- 
peated it until everybody believed it. 

Pearson's Magazine printed six years ago a ful- 
some life of Diaz. What General Diaz thought 
of it Is told In an interview between Ireneo Paz, a 
Mexican newspaperman and the President who were 
friends for more than sixty years. Don Ireneo Paz 
asked the President: " I have been wanting to ask 
you if that interview which the papers published a 
few months ago was authentic; that one which is 
said to have taken place between yourself and one 
Creelman, an American journalist?" 

" What surprises me Is that sagacious men like 
you should have been capable of giving credit to 



Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 37 

such folly (a semejante paparrucha)," replied 
Diaz. 

" Because I did not believe it, I asked you if it 
was authentic." 

" It's as true as a dead child. You know me 
too well to beheve that I could stroll for hours upon 
the terrace of Chapultepec, exhibiting the white of 
my eyes and opening my nostrils excessively in order 
that the Yankee reporter may be able to give wings 
to his fancy. What happened was this : A friend 
of mine, a member of my cabinet, came to read me 
the article which was already manufactured (con- 
feccionado) for an American publication. It 
didn't seem bad to me, or rather It seemed very 
good, because without compromising me much it lent 
a lustre to my antecedents, and put me on a good 
footing for the future, so that it gave me all the 
facilities which I desired, whether to continue sac- 
rificing myself for the Fatherland, or to shake off 
the dust thereof (zafarme) in time if things should 
blow into a whirlwind (a ponerse turbias). I ac- 
knowledge to you that I thought the writing was 
so well dressed up, so much in conformity with what 
are not but should be my profoundest thoughts, so 
seemly for our luckless proletariat, that I accepted 
it unhesitatingly as if it had been inspired by myself, , 
not making more than a very few modifications on 
some entirely Yankee points of view which would 
have put me in a very ridiculous position, and I gave 
my consent to two things : — that it should be pub- 



38 Carranza and Mexico 

lished in English and Spanish, and that it should 
be amply paid for." 

" About how much was the cost of this work? " 
"Some fifty thousand pesos." (Como unos cin-y 
cuenta mil pesos.) ^ 

Toward the end of the Diaz regime and in an 
effort to refute the attacks made in a book by the 
present writer called, " Diaz, Czar of Mexico," the 
cientificos inspired James Creelman to write " Diaz, 
Master of Mexico"; whole chapters were also 
dedicated in an effort to discredit the expose by 
J. K. Turner in his " Barbarous Mexico." Several 
books published in the United States and England 
were bought by Diaz. One was " Porfirio Diaz," 
by R. de Zayas Enriquez, and the other " Yucatan, 
the American Egypt," by Tabor and Frost. The 
Mexican government inspired their consul in Cuba, 
J. F. Godoy, to write a book, " Porfirio Diaz," 
which had " seventy pages of endorsements of Diaz 
written by prominent Americans." Here we have 
the case of a man, Mr. Godoy, who actually went 
about — or sent about — ^ among senators, congress- 
men, diplomats and cabinet oflicers, soliciting kind 
words for President Diaz.^ Porfirio Diaz and his 
cientifico supporters thought that they could keep 
the Mexicans, peons, and the middle class working- 
men down if public opinion in Europe and in the 

1 From " Mexico the Land of Unrest," by Henry Baerlein. 

2 " Barbarous Mexico," J. K. Turnei-. 



Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 39 

United States was misinformed about the real con- 
ditions in Mexico. 

The great reputation of General Diaz in Amer- 
ica and Europe was essentially manufactured 
through laudatory articles in the press, magazines, 
weeklies and daily papers, by the publication of 
books, interviews of prominent Americans who came 
back from a visit to the " Great Old Man " in 
Chapultepec, who could have said as Macbeth, 
" And I have bought golden opinions from all sorts 
of people." Judges, congressmen, senators, gov- 
ernors, members of cabinets, even presidents, princes 
and kings spoke in reverence and admiration of 
Don Porfirio Diaz. 

What chance had any patriotic, democratic, and 
free loving Mexican against the avalanche of lies, 
deliberate and unconscious falsehoods? Whoever 
heard in the United States of the Massacre of 
Papantla where ^JiQ,oo.o_Mexicaii - peasants, men, 
women and children were shot down in cold blood, 
and as a result half a dozen villages wiped off the 
map of Mexico? 

What newspaper in America published the story 
of the revolution of Tomochic, when 15,000 moun- 
taineer peasants in Chihuahua were destroyed and 
only forty old men and women were left to tell the 
tale? And the murder of 15,000 men, the whole 
male population of Juchitan, State of Oaxaca, in 
revenge for the death of Diaz's brother, and the as- 



40 Carrauza and Mexico 

sassination of 750 workingmen of the Orizaba cot- 
ton mills? 

Workingmen in Mexico were killed if they at- 
tempted to unionize or to strike, the peasants were 
slaughtered to take away from them their rights 
under the law; the Yaqui Indians were deported 
and sold into slavery in Yucatan to permit the great 
landowners in Sonora to sell their land to American 
syndicates. Anybody who protested orally or in 
writing was thrown into jail, where imprisonment 
was worse than death. We reproduce the descrip- 
tion by a Mexican of a night passed in the prison 
of Belem, Mexico City. 

May 16. 

I dare not credit the testimony of my senses. I cannot 
yet believe all that I have suffered in that horrible night 
which has just passed ; a night of horrible dreams, a suc- 
cession of repugnant nightmares, terrific, phantastic, de- 
moniacal, impossible, inconceivable and nevertheless perfectly 
and completely real. I thought the night would be end- 
less. I fancied mj'self in the infernal regions, in a hell as 
the heated phantasy of the poet of maniacal brain never con- 
ceived it. 

The prison is a sort of a room of 50 yards in length by 
6 broad and 5 in height, that is to say 1500 cubic yards. 
Within its walls sleep 800 individuals according to my cal- 
culation. The hygienists claim that 12 by 14 cubic yards of 
air are necessary in a dwelling for each person: in that space 
we did not even have 2 cubic yards each. 

All the ventilation consists in an iron grating at the en- 
trance at one extremity and a window at the other end. 



Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 41 

How could 800 persons stay in that small space? It is a 
mystery to me; I have seen it and still I cannot explain it, 
and I am almost willing to admit the penetrability of the 
bodies. 

The men lie down In two rows, feet to feet and the head 
against the wall. Those who arrive first or the strongest 
lie on the ground, those who follow do as best they can by 
lying between two bodies cradle-wise. Everybody must per- 
force sleep sideways. For this reason quarrels and fights 
are frequent and occasionally they end in wounds and some- 
times in death. 

In this prison there are some revolting W. C.'s. They 
are cleaned in the morning, but as the night advances they 
are used constantly and as there is no running water, the 
fecal matter and the urine run over onto the ground soak- 
ing those who sleep near them. Some wretches even sleep 
seated on those barrels, and bitter fights take place when 
somebody wants to use them and for that purpose they are 
forced to disturb the sleepers on top of the barrels. Others 
prefer to commit nuisance where they happen to be, against 
the companions who happen to be near them and that occa- 
sions new fights. 

The atmosphere is so fetid that it almost chokes and 
asphs^xiates you. It is so dense that you can almost cut it 
with a knife. 

This dungeon is lighted by some electric lamps whose rays 
can barely penetrate the atmosphere. Eight hundred men 
habitually dirty, clad in pestilential rags, the respiration of 
all those lungs, the emanations of all these bodies, the filth of 
those barrels. ... I am horrified at the remembrance of it 
all and I am wondering that I am still alive. 

Soon after the prisoners have settled to sleep, from the 
different walls there starts a downward immigration of 



42 Carranza and Mexico 

myriads of parasitical insects. One cannot possibly conceive 
the innumerable number of bed-bugs, some of enormous size, 
lice of all classes, fleas, mosquitoes and cock-roaches. They 
assure me that the prisoners become accustomed to all these 
parasites and they do not heed them. The truth is that be- 
sides myself I did not notice anybody paying any attention 
to them. 

Only three persons were privileged to use cots; the head 
keeper and two head men. I could not find a place to lie 
down. The head keeper saw me standing and understood 
the reason of my perplexitj^ and authorized me to sleep under 
his cot. At first I took this oiler as an insult; later I un- 
derstood the full value of that concession which was not 
gratis but cost me 25 cents. 

It had just struck nine at the prison clock when suddenly 
and accidentally all the electric lights went out. The dark- 
ness was absolute. Immediately a formidable roar arose 
from that mob and a fearful struggle began. There were 
heard shouts of hatred, fearsome lamentations, blasphemies, 
the voices of the head men trying to impose order and shout- 
ing to the prisoners to keep silent, but without avail. It 
was undescribable uproar. 

Soon afterwards footsteps of soldiers were heard nearing 
the door. An employe arrived with the escort bringing 
a lantern along. He opened the grated door with a great 
deal of noise and gave order to the soldiers to fire in case 
of further disorder. Then everything was silent as if by 
incantation. The turnkey asked for the oil lamps hanging 
on the walls, lighted them and distributed them to the head 
men to place them in their corresponding places. From 
time to time the silence was interrupted by some stifled 
groans. 

The turnkey ordered the formation of rows to make ready 



Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 43 

for the roll call. They brought the register and the prison- 
ers going into the corridor after their names being called. 
Some did not appear, others answered in a dying voice. All 
the prisoners able to do so went back to rest. There were 
three dead and seventeen wounded. Who are the authors 
of these crimes? They have so far not discovered them, and 
those who know the way of the prison claim that they 
never will be found. The prisoners no matter how strict 
the vigilance and how often they search them succeed in 
hiding pieces of bones which form part of the meat rations, 
and these bones they sharpen against the stones of the floor 
until they become as sharp and pointed as daggers. 
Those are the weapons used in their fights. They also em- 
ploy scissors, and spoons and other instruments which 
are used in their different trades and which they manage to 
steal. 

Every time that there is a riot as happens when the lights 
go out then some of the most hardened prisoners take ad- 
vantage of this fact to revenge themselves or to wound those 
nearest to them, without any provocation, and it is very 
difficult to discover the author of the crime as many are 
spattered with blood owing to the crowded conditions of 
the dormitory. 

Many of the wounds result from the indiscriminate use 
of the stick in the confusion and darkness by the head men, 
who do so in self-defence or in fear. 

After the dead and wounded had been taken to the hospital 
they locked us up again calling the names anew and leav- 
ing two guards at the gate to fire at the first sign of dis- 
order. I went back to my place under the cot of the head 
keeper thinking to myself that the solitary cell in spite of 
the " incommunicacion " was preferable to this dangerous and 
filthy galley. I did not sleep a wink all night long. At 6 



44 Carranza and Mexico 

o'clock in the morning they opened the gate and all this sick- 
ening lee contained was vomited forth. 

I was one of the first ones to go out and I nearly fainted 
when I felt the fresh air of the morning. Mr. H. . . . 
was waiting for me and he invited me to breakfast with him 
in the department of distinction. Later he asked to see the 
warden so as to get me a permit to go over to his department. 

Meanwhile I jotted down those notes although I did not 
know how I managed to do so as my head seems to be a 
vacuum. I think I have a beginning of fever. 

Not only were Mexicans persecuted in their own 
country, but when Mexican liberals fled across the 
border into the United States, thinking that they 
could tell the truth and publish it in the American 
press, they were persecuted and imprisoned through 
the orders of the Mexican Ambassador in Wash- 
ington to the Attorney Generals under Theodore 
Roosevelt, and William H. Taft. Some of the lib- 
erals were even kidnapped across the Mexican bor- 
der and sent to rot in the fortress of San Juan de 
Ulloa In Vera Cruz. Manuel Sarabia, F. Flores 
Magon, L. Rivera and Antonio I. Villareal were 
the pioneers of Mexican agitation against Diaz. 
"Mother" Jones by suggestion of the writer be- 
fore his Imprisonment for libel against a Diaz of- 
ficial. Induced Congressman W. B. Wilson of Penn- 
sylvania (Secretary of Labor In the Cabinet of Wil- 
son), to Investigate the persecution of Mexican lib- 
erals In the United States by American officials in 
19 10. The result was a cessation of these perse- 



Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 45 

cutlons and a renewal of agitation in the southwest 
and along the border. 

The agitation against the blood and iron rule of 
Porfirio Diaz was begun over six years before the 
Madero revolution; it was the preliminary work of 
untold numbers of martyrs who died unknown, 
crushed by the ruthless hand of the half-breed Czar. 

In every State governors, jefes politicos, and cien- 
tificos robbed the Indians of the land in their pos- 
session. By the year 1892 all the great bodies of 
agricultural land had passed from the possession of 
more than a million small farmers into the hands 
of less than fifty rich families and corporations of 
the Diaz clique. 

The Slate of Morelos (2,734 square miles) and 
a population of 179,614 inhabitants, became prac- 
tically the property of half a dozen families. In 
the State of Chihuahua one family alone, the Ter- 
razas, owned as much land as the combined ter- 
ritory of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. 
Towards the end of the Diaz regime nearly 3,000,- 
000 Indians had been despoiled of their native land 
and General Diaz had sold over 83,000,000 acres 
for the paltry sum of $3,000,000. 
p^h.Q policy of General Diaz was to eliminate the 
Mexican Indian peons from valuable land and from 
an independent economic life into peonage in great 
haciendas, in great mines and factories where they 
could be more easily controlled by the rurales and 
the soldiers. At the height of Diaz's rule, in 1908, 



46 Carranza and Mexico 

when all the world was singing the paeans to the 
glory of Porfirio Diaz, the writer found out by per- 
sonal investigation that the average salary for un- 
skilled labor In the mines near the city of Pachuca 
(inh. 40,000) was three cents gold a day, and in 
the haciendas six cents gold. 

What was the result of this policy of despolia- 
tion and oppression? Simply that wages in the 
great haciendas, mines, and factories were kept as 
low as possible, while prices of food stuffs and neces- 
sities went up by the help of a rigid system of high 
tariff. The great haciendados, the foreign owners 
of mines and Industrial concerns, the same ones who 
were reaping a golden harvest and singing the 
praise of Diaz's rule were buying labor In Mexico 
at a very low Mexican silver rate and were selling 
the result of this labor at a gold rate. 

The press agents of Diaz spoke of the perfect 
school system inaugurated at the beginning of his 
rule. General Diaz never could have crushed Mex- 
ico in the Iron grip of his hand if education had 
been as general as was claimed. The percentage 
of Illiteracy in the thirty-five years of the czar's 
rule was lowered from ninety to eighty-six per cent, 
but only In the cities. The rural school system was 
almost completely neglected, or was turned over to 
the care of priests and nuns. 

It was this fourteen per cent, of the people who 
could read and write, which organized the agitation 



Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 47 

in Mexico under tremendous difficulties and by un- 
heard-of sacrifices. 

The political advisers of Diaz never dreamed 
that every Indian who was expatriated, every work- 
ingman who saw the murders of his companions, 
every Mexican who suffered from an unjust impris- 
onment, became an incipient rebel, only awaiting the 
time that a leader would show them their strength 
and the way to break the chains of their economic 
and political slavery. 

It could never be imagined by the rich foreign 
Investors in Mexico who had observed the patient 
and Ignorant peons, that no matter how pacific, how 
miserable and subdued a race, the day would come 
when they must rebel and evolve Into a daring and 
independent race. 

The same happened in France through the revo- 
lution. Read the description written by Mirabeau's 
father of the savage-looking, long-haired, barefoot 
peasants who came down from the mountains, and 
the older Mirabeau's prophetic reflections on the 
subject. 

The worst offenders and the greatest enemies to 
Mexican political and economic freedom were the 
foreigners; they always stood by the oppressors 
with their financial and moral Influence In Mexico, 
in the United States and In Europe. Without this 
powerful help Diaz would never have lasted thirty- 
five years. Foreigners in Mexico were treated with 



48 Carrafjza and Mexico 

a deference and were allowed privileges unknown 
to the average Mexican. Porfirio Diaz always 
raised the spectre of American intervention when 
he wanted to frighten restless Mexicans. 

The only friends of liberal Mexico were the So- 
cialists and the organized workingmen in Europe 
and especially in the United States who understood 
from the beginning the danger of an enslaved, ill- 
paid proletariat across the border. The great agi- 
tation which exposed the iron rule of Diaz was 
helped by Socialists and the proletariat in the 
United States, and made It easy for Madero and 
his friends to plot and organize a revolution across 
the border. 

The foreign bankers, concessionaires, " friends 
of the friends " of General Diaz, wanted a con- 
tinuation of peace at any price, even at the price of 
subjugation of all Mexican liberties, or if that 
failed, by American Intervention, and as a result of 
it either American conquest or of American police 
rule as In Cuba. 

The successor of Diaz had been chosen by the 
invisible rulers of Diaz, everything about it was cut 
and dried, and even the list of members of the Cab- 
inet of the successor had been drawn up. When a 
foreigner was asked about the economic and polit- 
ical rights of the Mexicans, he shrugged his shoul- 
ders and answered that Indians and niggers were 
not fit to rule themselves. The self-same Ameri- 
cans who would have started a revolution in their 



Conditions in Mexico During Diaz' Regime 49 

own country if political conditions had been as op- 
pressive as in Mexico, spoke contemptuously of the 
valiant struggle of the middle class Mexicans. To 
my utter amazement I heard an American clergy- 
man inform me after he had listened to a lecture 
of mine in favor of the Constitutionalists and the 
prophecy of a speedy downfall of Huerta, that he 
nevertheless believed Mexico needed strong men 
like Huerta and Diaz. 

Americans who invest money in Mexico cannot 
be blamed for being ignorant of Mexican conditions, 
but how about foreigners who live years in Mexico 
and come in daily contact with the people? Is it 
a wonder that Mexicans are suspicious of for- 
eigners ? 

Porfirio Diaz sold out his country to foreigners 
for a pittance, he made them rich and prosperous, 
and he used Mexican labor, freedom, and their suf- 
fering to raise himself on a pinnacle of fame un- 
heard of to any other man of his times. Mexico 
was only Mexico, but Diaz was its prophet, its 
savior, its creator, its superman, and demi-god. 
The Mexicans were an unknown, negligible quan- 
tity and quality, and the fatal pseudo-greatness of 
Diaz was trumpeted across the world by an army 
corps of foreign concessionaries, exploiters and 
grafters. But the great Diaz myth like a mon- 
strous Frankenstein destroyed itself in time. 



CHAPTER III 

THE MADERO REVOLUTION, ITS AIMS AND FAILURES 

TN the summer of 1908, when the writer was in 
"■' Mexico he had heard that a man called F. I. 
Madero was writing a book, in which he discussed 
the advisability of contesting the seventh presiden- 
tial election of General Diaz. The book was sup- 
posed to have been written in collaboration with a 
journalist who later was rewarded with the Gover- 
norship of Chiapas. 

"The Presidential Question of 1910," the title 
of the book, had about ninety thousand words of 
written matter, and began with the War of Inde- 
pendence down to General Diaz's regime when he 
tried to analyze the future political conduct of Diaz. 

Of the Interview of General Diaz in Pearson's 
Magazine of 1908, he said: "We judge a study 
of his declarations to Creelman useless, as we do 
not believe they are sincere, for they are In mani- 
fest contradiction with his past acts, as General 
Diaz has always made promises which were never 
kept, from the Plan of la Nona down to the last 
one." 

Although few Intelligent Mexicans took General 
Diaz at his word, they nevertheless caught him for 

so 



The Madero Revolution 51 

the first time in a flagrant political " faux pas " 
for not having denied the interview. They saw a 
chance to take him at his own words and start the 
work of organizing an agitation of the political con- 
science of Mexico. 

Madero's book was a powerful factor in this 
propaganda, which was followed by a national or- 
ganization of political clubs and speechmaking by 
a few daring young men of the middle class. This 
fearless, open propaganda copied the campaigning 
methods of the United States and Madero was the 
head of the movement. 

At first, Diaz, his political supporters and even 
the foreigners laughed at their rash, foolish crusade 
which they thought would soon be crushed and de- 
stroyed. 

The Diaz clique, the cientificos and the old sup- 
porters of the czar, men like General Reyes, Gen- 
eral Naranjo, General Trevino, General Izabal, 
General Torres, General Terrazas, Gen. Mucio 
Martinez, T. Dehesa, R. Corral, J. Y. Limantour, 
E. Creel, Gen. G. Cosio, O. Molina would all 
have liked to be president, but they were too much 
in awe of the power of the old man in Chapultepec. 
Their political work was all done underground, they 
were all getting ready for the moment when Gen- 
eral Diaz should step down gripped by the hand 
of death. None of them imagined that any Mex- 
ican, no matter how daring, could shake the founda- 
tion of the Diaz throne without the help of the mid- 



52 Carranza and Mexico 

die class of Mexico. When the old guard ob- 
served the impunity of the Madero propaganda 
they guessed that it was going to be a repetition of 
the events in the presidential elections of 1903-04 
when Diaz allowed his foolish enemies to come out 
in the open and then destroyed them wholesale and 
in detail. 

The great strength of Madero consisted in his 
peaceful methods of propaganda and his constant 
advice to Mexicans to be patient under the perse- 
cutions of the government agents. He advised 
them to suffer even imprisonment and death so as 
to awaken the interest of the majority who would 
soon follow their example. 

Madero was assisted in his campaign by his 
brother Gustavo and a young lawyer Roque Es- 
trada, and was accompanied everywhere by his wife, 
even in jail. Roque Estrada wrote about the evo- 
lution of the Madero revolution and divided it into 
four parts: 

1. The Awakening of the Mexican political soul. 

2. The Concentration of the revolutionary prop- 
aganda. 

3. The Destruction of the Diaz regime. 

4. The Reconstruction of the new government.^ 
The campaign continued under difficulties, when 

the supporters of Diaz awakened to the fact that 
Madero was growing popular. Then on the 6th 
of June, 19 10, came the news of his arrest. 

^ " The Revolution and F. I. Madero," Roque Estrada, 1912. 



The Madero Revolution 53 

It must be added that one of the reasons for the 
indifference of the authorities to the Madero prop- 
aganda was the firm conviction that F. I. Madero 
was a fool, an idiot, who was being used by power- 
ful enemies to initiate a counter campaign against 
Diaz. A second reason was the fact that Madero 
belonged to a wealthy and politically influential fam- 
ily of which the head, Don Evaristo, had been Gov- 
ernor of Coahulla during General Gonzalez' term 
(1880-84). Moreover, the Maderos had finan- 
cial connections in New York, Paris and Lon- 
don. 

Besides the head of the family, every member of 
the Madero clan had disowned Francisco I. Ma- 
dero's political activities with the exception of his 
wife and Don Gustavo. It was a repetition of the 
story of Joseph in the Old Testament: F. I. Ma- 
dero like Joseph was sold out by this brother's fam- 
ily. There was a radical wing in the Madero move- 
ment headed by Gustavo Madero which believed 
that all the peaceful methods of agitation were use- 
less and that the only successful method of over- 
throwing the dictator was to be effected in the same 
way by which he had come into power — by revo- 
lution. 

F. I. Madero insisted on peaceful methods, so 
Gustavo without informing his brother went to 
Paris ostensibly to organize a Mexican Railway of 
the Centre. As soon as he cashed the first instal- 
ment of the moneys for the construction ($375,- 



54 Carranza and Mexico 

ooo) ^ he used it to buy arms and ammunition for 
the revolution which was certain to burst out in a 
few months. 

In San Luis Potosi, October 5th, 1910, Don F. I. 
Madero, who by this time had become convinced 
of the futility of peaceful propaganda, wrote the 
famous Plan. A few days later he was advised 
that there was an order for his arrest which would 
be followed by the application of the " Ley Fuga." 
Disguised as a common laborer he fled into the 
United States on October 7th, and went to San An- 
tonio. Some New York papers had long accounts 
of his flight and plans, sent by their correspondents 
but the news was not published. 

The Plan of San Luis Potosi was a direct chal- 
lenge to Porfirio Diaz, and it used almost the same 
slogan which General Diaz had written on the Plan 
de la Noria against Juarez and later his Plan de 
Tuxtepec and Palo Blanco which was : " Effective 
suffrage and no re-election." 

A great deal has been published about the great 
promises of land reform and distribution of great 
estates by F. L Madero and which he could or would 
not fulfil. 

The exact wording of that famous Article 3d of 
the Plan has either been forgotten or misinter- 
preted. We reproduce the Article : 

Article ^d: " As a result of the abuses of the 
lands, numerous small proprietors, mostly Indians, 

2 "The Political Shame of Mexico," E. I. Bell, 1914. 



The Madero Revolution 55 

have been despoiled of their lands by common con- 
sent of the ministry of Fomento or by the decisions 
of the Mexican courts. In justice to the old pro- 
prietors, they should be given back lands which 
have been taken away from them in such an arbi- 
trary manner. The decisions of the Ministry of 
Fomento and of the courts will be subject to revi- 
sion and it will be demanded of those who acted in 
such immoral fashion, to return the land to their 
original owners, besides paying them an indemnity. 
Only In case that the lands should have passed to a 
third party before the publication of this plan, will 
the original owners receive an indemnity from those 
whose spoliation benefitted them." ^ 

Thus it will be seen that the Plan of San Luis 
Potosi aimed first of all to destroy the regime which 
had made the land robbery possible. 

After the capture of Juarez the whole Diaz Gov- 
ernment was practically destroyed as a political 
force and the Reconstruction would have been easy 
with a new government. But the reactionary, forces 
were at work to arrest the impetus of the revolu- 
tion. LImantour came back from Paris and pre- 
pared the way to an entrance of the reactionaries 
by threatening to arrest Gustavo Madero for the 
misappropriation of money to the use of the revo- 
lution. 

Madero's father and brother had to accept his 
conditions and went post haste to confer with F. I. 

8 See Plan in Index. 



^6 Carranza and Mexico 

Madero at the border. Limantour's conditions 
were the cessation of hostilities and a constitutional 
transfer of the presidential power on the shoulder 
of the clerical L. de la Barra. Limantour's clever, 
strategic movement arrested the radical impulse, put 
a few Maderistas in the Cabinet, and others in the 
Governorship, but the inexperience of the new men 
and the conscious inertia of ministers, like Ernesto 
Madero, Secretary of Finance and Rafael Hernan- 
dez, Secretary of Fomento, checked all effective at- 
tempts at reforms. The two radical brothers, the 
Vasquez Gomez, were eliminated. Limantour 
went back to Paris to watch from a distance and 
to direct the tactics of the policy of inertia. 

Meanwhile plots were hatched against the life 
of Madero. One almost succeeded at this time. 
While L. de la Barra was provisional President they 
sent F. I. Madero to confer with Zapata who 
agreed to meet him on condition that no federal 
troops should accompany Madero in Cuautla. Gen- 
eral Huerta, who was in charge of the federal troops 
in Morelos broke the promise, and attacked 
Cuautla in hopes that Zapata would kill Madero for 
his supposed treachery. The common sense of 
Zapata saved Madero's life. 

The first conspiracy against Madero happened 
when he was in Juarez and the cientificos had plot- 
ted his destruction by inciting the suspicious anger of 
men like Orozco and Villa against him. But Ma- 
dero's bravery saved him again. The cientifico 



The Madero Revolution, 57 

plotters were said to be T. E. Obregon, F. Carbajal 
and Oscar Braniff. T. E. Obregon later became a 
member of Huerta's cabinet and Carbajal the pro- 
visional president following the flight of General 
Huerta. As soon as Madero was elected the cien- 
tificos captured Orozco with money and started him 
as the head of a counter revolution before the Presi- 
dent had been seated a month. Then they pushed 
General Reyes and later Felix Diaz and Vasquez 
Gomez to revolt against Madero. 

These movements although they failed, were 
kept up so as to show the world the incompetence 
and lack of popularity of the Madero regime. 
Zapata started on the war path incited by the cruel- 
ties of the federal generals and all over the country 
rich haciendados (ranchers) gave money to guerrilla 
leaders to keep up the anarchy and by attacks on 
American property and American citizens to invite 
American intervention. 

Twice the Taft regime attempted or threatened 
an invasion of Mexico and once they almost suc- 
ceeded. The failure was due to the expose of the 
little plot which resulted in the resignation of Dick- 
inson, then Secretary of War.* 

It must be remembered that the Attorney General 
under Taft was a lawyer who had been a personal 
representative of Diaz in the United States, and 
among some of the lawyers who had been his part- 

* The New York Call published the first article of the expose, May 
5, 1911. 



58 Carranza and Mexico 

ners was a brother of the President of the United 
States. All were interested in Mexico financially 
and politically. 

The threats of invasion by the Taft regime had 
a disastrous effect on the reorganization of the new 
government. Madero was surrounded by enemies 
at home and abroad. The army, the cientificos and 
the clericals were plotting at home. The Mexican 
Ambassador Calero had formed an alliance with the 
American Ambassador, hoping to step into the 
presidency as L. de la Barra had done. Calero 
went so far as to telegraph to some French bankers 
who were negotiating a loan to Madero, to stop 
until further orders; the further orders were sup- 
posed to come from the new government which 
Calero hoped to head. 

But meanwhile there should not come any finan- 
cial assistance to Madero. In Congress men like 
F. Bulnes, Q. Moheno, J. M. Lozano headed the 
opposition which interfered with any plans of re- 
form, by cutting off all financial help. Madero was 
just beginning to reap the fruit of his policy of con- 
ciliation. 

With few exceptions all the old Diaz appoint- 
ments in the courts, in the States, in the consular 
and diplomatic service were kept in their places, and 
as a result the old methods were kept in vogue. All 
the army officers who had ruthlessly fought the revo- 
lutionists were left in their positions and the rebel 
chiefs were dismissed with thanks. 



The Madero Revolution 59 

With the new interests created by the Madero 
ascension to power there sprang up a hungry crowd 
of office seekers and a neo-cientifico regime headed 
by Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez. It 
would not be supposed even as a fantastic flight of 
a poetical imagination that the neo-cientificos would 
sincerely attempt a reform of the government. E. 
Madero is reported as having said that the financial 
system left by Limantour worked like a Swiss watch. 
The only reform to men of great interests can be 
achieved in their favor, not against them. 

Zapata could only be induced to stop his rebellious 
activity by a solution of the agrarian problem in 
Morelos. The Cabinet Minister under Madero 
only incited the exasperation by sending men of 
Huerta's stamp in their midst. 

It can be safely asserted that all the government 
officials in Mexico were inimical to reforms begin- 
ning with the Madero clan (excepting F. I. and 
Gustavo Madero), down to the lowest officials. 
The men who had fought for the revolution watched 
in disgust and dismay the disintegration of the revo- 
lutionary ideals. 



CHAPTER IV 

PLOTTING WHICH OVERTHREW MADERO 

"IX 7" E have seen in the foregoing chapter the mis- 
^^ takes which had been made by Madero. 
Being surrounded by enemies, he was too lenient 
with them, and it proved disastrous. 

Orozco, one of his chiefs of guerrilla, should 
have been court-martialled and shot in Juarez ac- 
cording to military rule. The same drastic penalty 
could have been applied without injustice against 
two other high officers in the Mexican army, who 
had rebelled against the authority — Felix Diaz and 
General Reyes. But Madero, besides being too hu- 
mane for such methods, sincerely believed that 
leniency was a sign of strength. Assuredly it was, 
but only in case the cabinet and the government in 
general had been loyal to him. Some cabinet mem- 
bers plotted quite openly against him — A. G. 
Granados, for instance. The headquarters of the 
plotters were in Paris and Geneva, with a branch 
office in the New York Consulate. In Mexico Ro- 
dolfo Reyes was the soul of the movement. In 
Paris, Limantour and L. de la Barra worked to- 
gether with General Mondragon to unravel the 

60 



Plotting which Overthrew Madero 6i 

threads of the conspiracy in favor of Fehx Diaz, 
who would represent the old Porfirista crowd, with 
the assistance of the clericals and the great land- 
owners, and bankers, Americans as well as Mexican 
and French. 

In New York the plotters supported General 
Reyes as representing the army, especially the 
younger element. To all appearances the con- 
spiracy was essentially a military mutiny backed by 
the cientificos, the landed interest and the clericals. 
The most prominent army plotters were General 
Mondragon, General Reyes, General Blanquet, Gen. 
Felix Diaz, General Beltran, General Navarrete and 
General Huerta. Among the civilians were: M. 
Calero, A. G. Granados, T. E. Obregon, Vera Es- 
tafiol, A. R. Gil, L. de la Barra, J. M. Lozano, Q. 
Moheno and Dr. Urrutia. The political and mili- 
tary heads, exemplified in the above mentioned 
names, represented the army, the cientificos, the 
clericals, the landed aristocracy, — in fact, all the 
reactionary powers and none of the liberal or revo- 
lutionary tendencies of the people. 

In utter blindness, innocence and optimism, call 
it what you please, Madero scoffed at the idea of 
a plot which could overthrow him. He firmly be- 
lieved that the Mexican people were behind him 
and would support him. He forgot that all the 
powers of reaction were well organized and that the 
Mexican people who supported him were not or- 
ganized, — that they were at the mercy of a few 



62 Carranza and Mexico 

political bandits without principles and without 
country. 

These unpatriotic politicians knew from experi- 
ence that the foreign bankers, the foreign corpora- 
tions, the American government and especially the 
American ambassador, were inimical to Madero, 
and hostile to liberal Ideas, and would help them to 
resist any attempts to reform the land question or 
change the financial " status quo " as left over by 
J. Y, Limantour. 

When Gustavo Madero discovered the plot on 
February 4th, and learned of the conspirators, he 
took It to his brother, who laughed at him. The mu- 
tiny started on Sunday morning, the 9th of February. 
During five days Madero continued playing with 
fate, and when the rebellion, which was dated for 
the 1 6th of March, burst out on the 9th, he was 
taken by surprise. The plotters were scared Into ac- 
tion six weeks before the date set, because they sus- 
pected treachery in their own ranks. On one side 
there existed the ambition of General Reyes, who 
was under the political management of his son Ro- 
dolfo, on the other side the ambition of Felix Diaz, 
whose mentor was General Mondragon. General 
Huerta's ambitions were always latent, but were 
kindled and managed by his political tutor, Dr. Ur- 
rutia, who represented the clerical interests, as far 
back as the Diaz time. 

In the year 1908 a young painter, Dr. Atl, had 
to undergo an operation and went to the sanatorium 



Plotting which Overthrew Madero 63 

of Dr. Urrutia. There he found General Huerta, 
who was then unknown to anybody except his own 
officers and soldiers. Dr. Atl was a " compadre " 
of Dr. Urrutia, and although a radical of the ex- 
tremest type, Dr. Urrutia and General Huerta only 
laughed at him, humored him, but took him into 
their confidence. One afternoon as they were dis- 
cussing political events, Dr. Urrutia exclaimed that 
ambitious and able men should prepare the way for 
the presidency after the death of General Diaz. 
Finally Dr. Urrutia said to General Huerta : " Gen- 
eral, you look like presidential timber, you are 
capable and fearless and you control half of the 
army. Why don't you begin to get ready? " Gen- 
eral Huerta looked at Dr. Urrutia and Dt. Atl 
through half closed eyes, expressionless as a graven 
image, and after a long pause he said: " It is diffi- 
cult, but it is not impossible." 

During the Reyes-Diaz mutiny in Mexico City, 
General Huerta was in charge of the troops. He 
was making a great noise and killing off as many 
volunteers of Madero and non-combatants as pos- 
sible. His ambition was to sap the strength of the 
Maderists and to terrorize the population of the 
city into acquiescence to any future pact. 

During these strenuous ten days Dr. Urrutia was 
seen going back and forth constantly between the 
house of the Bishop of Mexico and General Huerta. 
He was advising the soldiers and tying the strings 
which would lift the less experienced Huerta Into 



64 Carranza and Mexico 

the presidential chair, backed by the money and the 
prestige of the Church. During the ten days of 
constant bombardment, the citadel where Felix Diaz 
was entrenched was touched but twice by the Huerta 
guns, and the National Palace only twice also. An 
American officer who happened to be in Mexico 
City, backed the claim of General Angeles, that the 
citadel could have been taken in a few hours if 
Huerta had really been sincere in his attack. Gen- 
eral Angeles proposed to carry the citadel if F. I. 
Madero would only place him at the head of the 
government troops. Madero refused for fear of 
hurting Huerta's vanity, and hoped thus to prove 
that he had faith in his loyalty. 

We publish the account of events which followed 
the arrest of Madero and Suarez, by Mr. Marquez 
Sterling, who tried his best to save Madero's life. 

DECLARATION made by the Minister of the Re- 
public of Cuba in Mexico, Mr. Manuel Mar- 
quez Sterling, to the Herald. 

It was exactly twenty-nine days after I presented 
my credentials to President Madero, when the re- 
volt in the City of Mexico started. I shall not re- 
fer to the tragic scenes which took place during the 
struggle in the city, from the 9th of February to 
the ruin of the government, as the same are now 
well known to all the world; I shall only refer to 
the fall of Mr. Madero, after ten days of terrible 



Plotting which Overthrew Madero 6^ 

disorder, during which, automobiles of diverse lega- 
tions constantly crossed the streets of the city. 

On the morning of February i8th, in a confer- 
ence which I had with the Secretary of Foreign Re- 
lations, Pedro Lascurain, he assured me that in the 
afternoon the revolt would receive a decisive blow, 
and that the city would return to the hands of the 
government. Precisely at two o'clock in the after- 
noon, I received notice that General Blanquet had 
made the President and his cabinet prisoners. A 
short time later we were called to the American 
Embassy by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson and informed 
of this extraordinary event. 

General Blanquet verified the arrest by order of 
General Huerta, and as a consequence, the sharp- 
shooting in the streets ceased. In the evening, the 
Ministers of Chile, Brazil and I visited the Amer- 
ican Embassy, looking for further news. We there 
met General Huerta and Gen. Felix Diaz, who for 
several days had fought in the streets of Mexico. 
They were accompanied by other persons, such as 
the actual Minister of Justice, Lie. Rodolfo Reyes. 
Reyes then read in a loud voice, in our presence, a 
document in which both Generals agreed upon the 
ceasing of hostilities. Huerta and Diaz later 
signed this document, embracing immediately after- 
wards, while their companions applauded; the diplo- 
mats did not applaud, remaining as mute witnesses 
of a scene which was unexplainable to us. 



66 Carranza and Mexico 

On the 19th, in the morning, I left the Cuban 
Legation and went through several streets, in order 
to get an idea of the popular sentiment. I heard 
the death of Gustavo Madero discussed, of whose 
capture I had already heard, they saying that he 
had been assassinated in the arsenal, and that in the 
afternoon Huerta would execute the president him- 
self. They also stated that the Vice-President, 
Pino Suarez, had tried to escape. While I listened 
to all this, a distinguished Mexican gentleman, whose 
name I shall not state, detained me and said : " You 
and the members of the Diplomatic Corps are the 
only ones who can save Madero." 

On returning to the Legation, this idea had taken 
possession of my mind, and for that purpose I im- 
mediately sent a note to the American Ambassador, 
communicating the matter to him and proposing to 
him that the Diplomatic Corps should take charge 
of the same. In the name of my government, I of- 
fered the services of the Cruiser Cuba (which some 
days previous I had requested from my government, 
and which was anchored in Vera Cruz) to save them 
from danger, taking them away from the country, 
in case they should obtain their liberty. I immedi- 
ately went to the Japanese Legation to see the par- 
ents of the President, who had heard of the death 
of their son, Gustavo, and which they did not credit. 
They begged me therefore, to go to Mr. Wilson and 
beg him to aid us with General Huerta, to save the 
lives of their two sons. The Charge d' Affaires of 



Plotting which Overthrew Madero 67 

the Japanese Legation accompanied me to the Amer- 
ican Embassy and we made our proposition known 
to the Ambassador. 

We there met the Spanish Minister, and he and 
I agreed that the situation was more serious than 
we had thought, and therefore determined to per- 
sonally see General Huerta, asking him for the lives 
of the prisoners. We went in my automobile, flying 
the Cuban flag, but we were not able to see Huerta. 
Instead, we were received by General Blanquet, who 
treated us with great courtesy, assuring us that they 
would respect the lives of the prisoners, and while 
this was passing the Minister of Chile arrived, tell- 
ing us that Madero had consented to resign as 
President of the Republic, and that the Secretaries 
of State and other persons who had been made pris- 
oners with Madero and Pino Suarez, had been set 
at liberty. 

On the morning of the 19th nevertheless, a rep- 
resentative of Huerta urged Madero to resign. 
Madero replied to this messenger that he was 
now resolved to resign, provided that he who had 
usurped his place should govern according to the 
Constitution. While they were explaining this, 
Mr. Lascurain went to see Madero, as a mediator, 
to whom Madero expressed the conditions under 
which he would resign. Lascurain, In Huerta's 
name, accepted. These conditions were: that the 
resignation should be delivered to the Minister of 
Chile, who would retain it in his possession until 



68 Carranza and Mexico 

Madero and Pino Suarez should be safely aboard 
the Cuba in Vera Cruz. Madero stipulated also 
that in the trip to Vera Cruz, they should be ac- 
companied by the Charge d'Affaires of Japan and 
myself, Madero insisting principally in that, before 
delivering the resignation to Congress, Huerta 
should sign a letter, in which he would promise to 
comply with the terms of same. 

That same afternoon Madero signed his resig- 
nation, and further, as Lascurain was present, he 
granted, at his indication, that the affair should be 
ventilated among Mexicans, handing the resignation 
to Lascurain, instead of delivering it to the Min- 
ister of Chili. It was then stipulated that at ten 
o'clock that night Madero and Pino Suarez would 
leave for Vera Cruz in a special train, together with 
their families, and accompanied by myself and an 
official of the Japanese legation, and escorted by a 
powerful guard. 

Having communicated this arrangement to the of- 
fice of General Blanquet, I ascended to General 
Huerta's department to see him, but I was informed 
that he was sleeping, I immediately returned to 
the office of General Blanquet, where the Ministers 
of Chile and Spain awaited me. We then asked 
for permission to see Madero and same was im- 
mediately conceded to us, going to the four first 
rooms, in which he was confined. 

Madero warmly expressed his gratitude to me. 



Plotting which Overthrew Madero 69 

begging me to accompany him to Vera Cruz, which 
request I was pleased to accede to. 

" When you are ready," he told us, " come to the 
palace in order to go to the station. It would be 
well if you could come at eight, but at any rate I 
shall wait for you until ten o'clock." 

I then left, and immediately went to telegraph 
to the Commander of the Cuba that he should ex- 
pect us, being ready to sail from Vera Cruz, and 
that he should do what was necessary in order to 
receive aboard the Heads of the Government and 
their families. 

At eight o'clock I was punctually at the Palace, 
making my proposition known to General Blanquet. 
He ordered one of his aides to accompany me; the 
four rooms occupied by Madero and Pino Suarez 
were connecting. The door of one of the rooms 
faced the yard, and there were many soldiers and 
officials In the entrance ; there were also sentinels in 
the interior of the sparsely furnished rooms, sen- 
tinels who, according to what I knew were replaced 
each moment. General Angeles, one of the offi- 
cial favorites of Madero, was also a prisoner in 
these rooms. Ernesto Madero was there visiting 
his nephew. 

Receiving us affectionately, Madero asked me If 
I knew anything about his brother Gustavo, and it 
could be seen that he did not know of his death. I 
evaded the question to the best of my ability. Sud- 



70 Carranza and Mexico 

denly, Madero asked about the letter that he had to 
give to Huerta. None of us had it, and then Er- 
nesto Madero said that he would go and get it from 
Huerta. Almost immediately he returned without 
it, but with the news that Lascurain had gone to 
present Madero's resignation to Congress. 

On knowing this, Madero became very excited, 
and from that moment lost all hope of salvation. 
" I have fallen into a trap for the second time," 
he said, indicating to his uncle that he should go and 
tell Lascurain that he wished him to come immedi- 
ately. Then Ernesto Madero confessed the truth 
to him, telling him that the resignation had already 
been presented and accepted by Congress. " This 
is a felony of Lascurain," said Madero. " The 
agreement was that the resignation should not be 
presented until I was aboard the Cuba.'' 

In those moments, we knew by the conduct of 
an official that Huerta had just been designated as 
Provisional President by Congress. 

" This has been the second trap into which I have 
fallen," Madero finally said to me. " I am now 
convinced that I shall not leave Mexico alive. They 
will conduct me to prison this same night, and on 
the trip, they will shoot me, or else they will assas- 
sinate me right here, as soon as we are alone." 

Ernesto Madero begged me to remain with him, 
telling me that if they succeeded in surviving that 
night, that probably the Diplomatic Corps would 
be capable of saving them. I decided to accom- 



Plotting which Overthrew Madero 7 1 

pany them, for how could I have the heart to take 
my hat and leave them, being persuaded that these 
men would be dead as soon as I was in the street? 
Ernesto finally left us, Madero, Pino Suarez and 
I remaining in these gloomy rooms. 

At one o'clock in the morning he invited me to 
rest, indicating to me that he was very sleepy, and 
without the least agitation, this man who had just 
been deposed from the Presidency, commenced to 
prepare two beds with chairs, one for himself and 
the other for me. 

He had finished his labor, when an official sent 
by General Huerta arrived, he having ordered him 
to tell us that the train arranged to conduct the pris- 
oners out of the country was conveniently ready, but 
on account of circumstances which he would explain 
later, it had been impossible to despatch it. The 
same official invited me to retire and wait. And 
as, previously, something had been said in regard 
to the train being ready to leave at five o'clock in 
the morning, I asked the official if this was in the 
programme, but he replied that he did not know 
anything. As soon as I saw Madero sleep, I went 
to keep company with Pino Suarez, first giving a 
glance at Madero, who slept like a child. At this 
moment, the guards entered and turned out the 
lights. 

From the upper crevices of the windows some 
rays of light penetrated, but they did not molest 
us. We were so closely guarded, that any phrase 



72 Carranza and Mexico 

which passed between Pino Suarez and myself had 
to be spoken in a very low voice. 

At 9 130 in the morning breakfast was served to 
us. Pino Suarez did not wish to take the coffee, 
fearing that it might be poisoned, but Madero and 
I took it Then Madero gave the boy who had 
served us a dollar, and told him to bring us the 
morning papers. We did not permit this, fearing 
that he might find out about Gustavo's death. Ma- 
dero became resigned, lying down on his bed of 
chairs, where he slept for twenty minutes. 

When he awakened, he said he was prepared for 
everything that might happen, but he indicated to 
me that I should approach the diplomats in order 
to save him, which I promised to do with pleasure. 
He also asked me if his wife had also made any 
petition personally to Huerta. 

About ten o'clock in the morning, the wife of 
Pino Suarez arrived, accompanied by a gentleman, 
and I then took leave of them. 

The balance of that day, February 20th, and the 
two following days, we worked to save Madero. I 
asked Huerta why he had not given his consent in 
this respect, to which he replied that he did not 
dare send Madero to Vera Cruz, until he could have 
confidence in the military authorities of that place. 
I, in turn, indicated to him that he might be sent to 
Tampico, where I could have the Cuba sent. He 
further showed himself irresolute. Almost all the 



Plotting which Overthrew Madero 73 

foreign ministers saw Huerta personally that day, 
and interceded for the life of Madero. 

On the morning of the 2 2d, the ministers thought 
the lives of Madero and Pino Suarez to be out of 
danger, although we had heard the rumor that they 
schemed to place Madero in an insane asylum. At 
night all the ministers approached the American Em- 
bassy to celebrate the anniversary of the birth of 
Washington. Huerta and all the Ministers in his 
Cabinet were present and they all appeared very 
calm. 

On the morning of the following day, Sunday, 
I was very urgently called to the telephone. It 
was Mrs. Madero, who was very excited on account 
of the news she had received that her husband had 
been wounded. I answered that this could not be 
true, but a little later I read in the morning papers 
the event of the death of Madero and Pino Suarez 
at 11:15 the previous night, on being taken to the 
penitentiary. 

Ambassador Wilson finally tried to obtain per- 
mission for Mrs. Madero to see the body of her 
husband. We then believed that the balance of the 
family were in danger, and I hastily proposed to 
take them from the country. I personally sent in 
a secret manner to Vera Cruz, Francisco Madero, 
father of the assassinated president, and his brother 
Ernesto, and they embarked on the Cuba. 

I later conducted the mother, widow and sister 



74 Carranza and Mexico 

of the President to the Cuba, leaving Vera Cruz 
on February 25th. 

Mr. Marquez Sterling has belonged to the Diplo- 
matic Corps of the Republic of Cuba several 
years, and has occupied the post of Minister in Ar- 
gentine, Peru and Brazil. During the administra- 
tion of President Palma, he was counsellor of the 
Department of State. He presented his resigna- 
tion as Minister of Mexico after the murder of Ma- 
dero and Suarez. 

In the account of the events leading to the mur- 
der of Madero and Suarez, Mr. Marquez Sterling 
mentions the excitement of the prisoner-president 
when he discovered that Don Pedro Lascurain had 
turned over the written resignation of Madero into 
Huerta's hands. 

What happened was told by Lascurain himself. 
As soon as General Huerta heard that Pedro Lascu- 
rain had Madero's resignation in his possession, he 
asked to see him and begged him with great insist- 
ence to give him the valuable paper. Don Pedro 
Lascurain was obdurate, so the cunning old Indian, 
knowing that Lascurain was a devout Catholic, 
fished out the holy medallion hanging by a chain to 
his neck. " See this medallion," said Huerta. " It 
is the most precious thing I possess; it was given 
to me by my mother when I was a little boy. I 
promise you on all that is holy and sacred to me, I 
swear on the white head of my sainted mother, the 



Plotting which Overthrew Madero 75 

memory of this holy image, that if you give me the 
President's resignation, I shall guarantee his life," 
and as he finished the sentence he kissed the holy 
medallion. 

Don Pedro Lascurain, convinced, handed him the 
paper with the resignation of Madero and Suarez. 
The next day General Huerta was visited by the 
Belgian, Spanish and Japanese Ministers who asked 
him to guarantee the Hfe of the ex-President and 
Vice-president. Huerta answered: 

" Gentlemen, will you guarantee to me that if I 
permit Madero and Suarez to go out of Mexico, 
that they will not start another revolution against 
my government in the United States? " The three 
diplomats declared that they could not give such 
promises. 

" Then," he exclaimed, " gentlemen, how can I 
be made responsible for their lives?" The diplo- 
mats left the general without answering. 

As the price of blood, the generals and the civil- 
ians demanded the heads of Madero and Suarez; 
the most insistent of all was Don Rodolfo Reyes, 
who called for victims to avenge the death of his 
father in front of the National Palace. Adolf o 
Basso's life was also sacrificed with that of Gustavo 
Madero's. The Huerta Cabinet went into power 
like a Black Hand Cabinet, after the assassination 
of its enemies. This infamous list should be re- 
membered by all who are interested in the recon- 
struction of Mexico, and who speak of amnesty. 



76 Carranza and Mexico 

General Huerta, Provisional President. 

L. de la Barra, Foreign Affairs. 

A. Garcia Granados, Interior. 

Rodolfo Reyes, Justice. 

T. Esquivel Obregon, Finance. 

General Mondragon, War. 

J. Vera Estanol, Instruction. 

A. Robles Gil, Fomento. 



CHAPTER V 

HUERTA IN POWER THE LANDING OF AMERICAN 

MARINES IN VERA CRUZ 

XXT'HEN we speak of revolutions we must con- 
^^ sider three facts. First, that in Mexico's 
history there have been only three real revolutions : 
the revolution which overthrew Spanish rule, the 
three years' war (1857-60), and the Madero revo- 
lution, which began with the overturning of the 
Diaz regime and was continued by the Carranza 
revolution and the flight of Huerta. Secondly, it 
must be remembered that all other political and 
military upheavals, of long or short duration, can- 
not be called revolutions but are In fact either muti- 
nies or revolts or coups d'etat or as the Mexicans 
call them " cuartelazos." And lastly, that no revo- | 
lutlon can hope of success unless it Is backed by the ^ 
majority of the middle class, and no successful revo- 
lution can be organized with foreign and especially l 
American money with concessionary strings attached 
to It. 

General Huerta with a soldier's training and tem- 
perament, and an unsympathetic knowledge of his 
country's history, thought that for the sake of get- 
ting and staying in power the control of the army 

77 



78 Carranza and Mexico 

was the only possible road. Not only Huerta, but 
his most prominent supporters made the mistake of 
confusing cruelty, brutality and treachery with 
power. 

( Huerta's cunning was believed to be statesman- 
' ship, but very soon his Machiavellian " double 
crossing " of Felix Diaz, Rodolfo Reyes and Gen- 
eral Mondragon, pointed to his methods of pro- 
cedure. The elimination of his more powerful ene- 
mies and the mysterious disappearance of the less 
known enemies, showed that wholesale assassina- 
tions were as frequent as under Diaz's rule. Never- 
theless, if Diaz was ruthless he was at least more 
careful of public opinion. The foolish excuse that 
a rescuing party had been responsible for the acci- 
dental death of Madero and Suarez, laid bare to 
the world the inner circumvolution of Huerta's po- 
litical brain. 

A simpleton could have advised him that Madero 
murdered was much more to be feared than Ma- 
dero alive. Madero the martyr was remembered 
through his virtues and ideals, and all his faults, 
weaknesses and blunders were forgotten. What 
Madero alive could not achieve, Madero dead, 
united under one idea, one effort, one banner. 

Huerta's supporters lacked what Is essential In 
politics, psychological perception of public opinion. 
Huerta, the double-edged sword of the clericals, de- 
stroyed by his blunders the last vestige of clerical 
power which supported the militarists and reaction- 



Huerta in Power 79' 

arles. Terrible sacrifices were enacted to strike ter- 
ror into the hearts of political opponents. Secret 
agents lured the political victims Into automobiles 
to a solitary spot near Mexico City, close to Guada- 
lupe; then they were stabbed to death and hastily 
burled on the spot. 

The Huerta executioners were themselves in dan- 
ger of being murdered for knowing too much, but 
their suspicion enabled them to escape death, and 
during Carbajal's short rule they were caught and 
lived to tell the details of their gruesome work. 

Dr. Urrutia, once minister of the interior in 
Huerta's cabinet was the chief executioner of the dic- 
tator. Senator Domlnguez because he had at- 
tacked Huerta in the Senate and accused him of the 
murder of Madero and Suarez, and Mr. Rendon 
were driven gagged to Dr. Urrutia's sanatorium in 
the suburbs. They were put to sleep under the in- 
fluence of ether, their bodies were atrociously muti- 
lated and when awakened to consciousness, they 
died of the loss of blood and the tremendous nerv- 
ous shock. 

Such savage methods accelerated the disruption 
of the reign of terror and drove all elements into 
active co-operation under the leadership of Car- 
ranza. Secret agents were also sent to murder Car- 
ranza, Villa, Obregon, Gonzalez, but the game was 
too risky. The federal General Rabago succeeded 
in catching Abraham Gonzalez, governor of Chi- 
huahua under Madero, and he was murdered by 



8o Carranza and Mexico 

being pushed under the wheels of a moving train. 

A supporter of General Huerta when he foresaw 
the end of his friend went into exile. He claimed 
that he had escaped two dangers by leaving Mex- 
ico, one was a term in jail and the other a portfolio 
in Huerta's cabinet. 

There was never a period in the history of Mex- 
ico when such a congregation of incompetents, of 
grafters, and murderous fools held sway; even in the 
world's history there is difficulty in finding a paral- 
lel. We have to go back to Nero and Caracalla 
to find such a depth of infamy, cowardice and 
Sadism. 

Victoriano Huerta appeared as a demoniacal 
clown let loose on the political circus of Mexico 
City, In an infernal saturnalia of gore, drunken- 
ness and prostitution. Huerta was the Avatar of 
greed, lust and alcoholism, a moral hyena laughing 
diabolically at the amazed world, a white-livered sol- 
dier pickled in cognac, a mental baboon grinning 
inanely at his own political antics. 

His own cabinet was chosen from among the best 
saloons, in the houses of prostitution and from the 
prisons. A meeting of the Cabinet was like a con- 
fab between maniacs, idiots and drunkards. A 
prominent Mexican who asked to be heard by the 
members of the Cabinet reported that he was In- 
terrupted by a minister before he could finish: 
"This is no time for reforms," said he; " we must 
drown the whole country In blood." Another sug- 



Huerta in Power 8i 

gested American intervention as the best method 
of uniting the warring revolutionary elements. 
" Then," he added, smiling, " the fool gringos will 
do the dirty work for us and our lives and property 
will be respected." A third member advised a 
repetition of the system of reconcentration as was 
inaugurated in Cuba by General Weyler. 

Cabinet meetings took place in a house several 
miles from Mexico City and later in the red light 
district and the famous Cafe Colon, whose proprie- 
tor was made a general. All the ministers were 
also made generals and had to appear in their uni- 
forms. Everybody in the employ of the govern- 
ment was created an officer in uniform, even the 
teachers and clerks. Bartenders were made ser- 
geants and it was reported that Dona Lupe of the 
Salto del Agua was appointed honorary Rear-Ad- 
miral of a squadron of cruisers. The sons of the 
ministers, especially those of General Blanquet and 
the sons and relatives of General Huerta received 
concessions for running gambling houses, for the 
sale of human beings Into the army at so much per 
head, and contracts for the sale of arms, ammuni- 
tion, uniforms and victuals to the War Department. 
' A naturalized American named Ratner was indi- 
rectly responsible for the landing of the marines in 
Vera Cruz. Ratner was the president of the Tam- 
pico News Co. ; during Madero's time he was caught 
selling arms to Zapata and was deported under Ar- 
ticle 33 of the Constitution. 



82 Carranza and Mexico 

When General Huerta became dictator Ratner 
came back. Being fertile and unscrupulous in ex- 
pedients, he became a favorite of the general. One 
day he advised the dictator to buy all the arms and 
ammunition for sale then In the United States, and 
for six months ahead so as to prevent the Consti- 
tutionalists from getting any at any price. It was 
discovered that the sum required for the purpose 
was too great so the order was limited to machine 
and field guns and ammunition. Twenty-five mil- 
lion dollars in gold was the price for this corner 
in war engines. Ratner engineered the whole 
scheme and shipped the material to Odessa in Rus- 
sia. From Odessa they were sent to Hamburg and 
there reshlpped for Vera Cruz. 

The United States secret service agents, who had 
been watching closely the sales of American manu- 
facturers, did not at first understand the meaning 
of the elaborate and expensive shipping and reship- 
ping. 

When the Y-piranga headed for Vera Cruz the 
whole matter became clear. Huerta's Idea was to 
get first all the field guns in the United States so 
as to prevent the revolutionists from getting them; 
thereupon to force the United States to Intervene 
in Mexico, counting on the patriotism of the Mex- 
icans to fight the Invaders. His idea was to con- 
centrate all the revolutionary chiefs in the battles 
against the Americans and to eliminate them one 
by one when they could be reached more easily and 



Huerta in Power 83 

without arousing suspicion. If that plot did not 
succeed, he had decided to permit the Ameri- 
cans to occupy Mexico City, knowing that they 
would respect the lives and properties of all fac- 
tions. 

The Huerta conspiracy fell through because the 
Constitutionalists believed in the word and friend- 
ship of President Wilson and they mistrusted the 
word and patriotism of Huerta. It was soon after- 
wards that the dictator made up his mind to resign. 
By the acceptance of the A.B.C. mediation, the game 
was ended and he had decided to retire before it 
was too late. Ratner had succeeded in his under- 
taking and his commission was a million and a half 
in gold. 

Sefior Don Fernando Iglesias Calderon related 
that while he was a prisoner in the castle of San 
Juan de UUoa he heard that an order had been 
telephoned from the Commander of Vera Cruz to 
the Commander of the fort, to release, arm and 
dress about 300 convicts in civilian clothes. They 
were landed in Vera Cruz the night before the 
landing of American marines. In the morning 
General Maas, his officers and soldiers hastily re- 
treated to the hills near Soledad. 

The blue jackets found no Federals, but the Mex- 
ican snipers who made such a desperate resistance 
were mostly ex-convicts who were promised their lib- 
erty if they fought the Americans. The shooting 
which emanated from the Naval Academy was di- 



84 Carranza and Mexico 

rected by ex-prlsoners and a few cadets who fought 
very bravely. 

Two days after the landing of the marines Gen- 
eral Navarrete of the staff of General Maas passed 
through the American lines into the fort of Ulloa, 
where he tried to induce F. Iglesias Calderon to 
join Huerta in Mexico City and publish a manifesto 
uniting all factions against the hated Americans. 

Don Fernando Iglesias answered that he could 
not believe any promises made by Huerta and that 
he was quite certain that the Constitutionalists 
would not join the dictator even if they were forced 
to resist an American invasion In the north. A few 
days later the Commander of the fort under the ad- 
vice of Don Fernando Iglesias released all the po- 
litical prisoners. 

The Vera Cruz incident showed up the Federals 
as a despicable, cowardly lot, — they had to arm a 
few hundred ex-convicts and civilians to do the fight- 
ing for them. 

The retirement of the Federals to Soledad like- 
wise proved that there was no serious intention to 
resist an advance of American soldiers to Mexico 
City, as the general line of march could never have 
been taken by way of Soledad, but only through the 
Cerro Gordo on the road to Jalapa by the Inter- 
oceanic Railroad, the same itinerary used by Scott 
In 1847. ^y advancing through the Cerro Gordo, 
Jalapa, Perote and Puebla, the American troops 
could have ignored or driven the Federals at Sole- 



Huerta in Power 85 

dad Into the mountains and by the capture of 
Esperanza cut off their communications in the rear. 
That would automatically have forced them to 
evacuate Soledad, Cordoba, and Orizaba. The 
whole campaign would have been a repetition of 
the treachery of Santa Anna in 1847. Fortunately 
for the Americans and Mexicans, President Wilson 
was too wise to fall into such a trap, and the Con- 
stitutionalists were too patriotic to play into the 
hands of Huerta. 



Note. — ^The details about the arming of prisoners in Ulloa and 
the landing of American marines in Vera Cruz were given to the 
writer by Don Fernando Iglesias Calderon. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE 
REVOLUTION 

INTERESTED observers among the Americans 
and foreigners were wondering how the Consti- 
tutionalists could keep up a revolution against an 
organized military dictatorship Yike Huerta which 
had millions at its disposal; and strange to relate 
instead of getting weaker the revolutionists grew 
stronger and better organized; they seemed to have 
money to buy arms and ammunition, to run their 
local governments and even to send representatives 
to the United States, and Paris, London, Madrid 
and Barcelona, as well as social and political inves- 
tigators into America and Europe. The Huerta 
Government was as surprised as the foreigners; 
they were certain that after a year of fighting, the 
backbone of the revolution would be broken, but 
instead, the offensive became so dangerous that Gen- 
eral Huerta invited American intervention so as to 
save himself as well as his partisans from complete 
political annihilation. 

The Huerta agents in America accused the Con- 
stitutionalists of having borrowed money from great 
trusts or syndicates, and a New York paper pub- 

86 



Financial Organization 87 

llshed stolen letters to prove that Carranza had 
succeeded in getting loans from corporations. The 
letters served no other purpose than to advertise 
the lawyer who had been in the service of the Ma- 
dero revolution, but as far as the source of financial 
support, it was as mysterious as ever. 

" How can they fight, eat and dress without 
money? " was asked. " How can they get the fight- 
ing material across the border when it is patrolled 
by American soldiers ? " Everybody asked the 
question and nobody could answer it satisfactorily. 
But the suspicion was in the air that the revolution- 
ists with their agents in the United States had re- 
ceived millions at a high rate and bartered in return 
for it oil, mining and railroad concessions. The 
senatorial investigation which had labored for 
months and published its results in a voluminous re- 
port did not prove that Madero had financed the 
revolution of 19 10 with the help of American 
money. The money used by Gustavo Madero to 
finance his brother's revolution seemed so small that 
the senators looked for greater sums borrowed from 
the United States to convince them in their suspicion 
that all Central American revolutions were started 
in Wall Street. But they forgot that Madero's 
revolution was not initialed in New York's financial 
centre, and that no great movement can succeed un- 
less the lower or middle class fight for it. 

The fact is clear that no Mexican political leader 
or military chief could afford to be linked in any 



88 Carranza and Mexico 

shape or manner with any foreign corporation, as 
that would have discredited him forever in the eyes 
of his countrymen. 

As a convincing example Illustrating this asser- 
tion, the Madero revolutionary loan can be referred 
to. When Francisco I. Madero came into power 
his brother, Gustavo, put In a bill for 750,000 pesos 
($375,000) for expenses incurred by him during 
the revolution. As no vouchers or explanations 
were offered as to the origin of the money, accusa- 
tions were made against Gustavo Madero that he 
had borrowed money at a high rate of Interest from 
an American oil company and given in exchange val- 
uable oil concessions to the detriment of a British 
oil company. After Gustavo's death it was discov- 
ered that he had misappropriated $375,000 from 
the funds of a railroad company, organized in Mex- 
ico and financed in Paris to build a railroad from 
Camacho to Gomez Farias, and instead of using 
the money for railroad construction he had sunk it 
to buy arms and ammunition for his brother's revo- 
lution. By his desperate and bold action, Gustavo 
Madero had risked his reputation and liberty and 
was saved in the nick of time from extradition pro- 
ceedings by the success of the revolution. 

Later, instead of telling the truth, Gustavo Ma- 
dero kept silent and in Mexico his enemies went so 
far as to accuse him of having practically delivered 
his brother's government into the hands of a Yankee 
corporation. Those accusations cast a shadow on 



Financial Organization 89 

the whole Madero regime and were a great handi- 
cap to its success. 

Carranza, who is an older man of political and 
financial experience, realized from the beginning 
that he could not borrow money from American or 
foreign companies and decided to rely entirely on 
the resources of his own country. Impoverished as 
Mexico was by two successive revolutions, the work 
was slower and entailed great loss of lives and for- 
eign property. Nevertheless, Carranza reasoned 
that if Mexico could not organize a revolution with- 
out foreign help it might as well give up the task 
and bend under the yoke of the dictator. The faith 
of Carranza in the resources of his country proved 
that he was right. 

It demonstrated first, that Mexico would go to 
any length rather than submit to the murderous 
regime of Huerta; secondly by forcing his adher- 
ents to organize local governments in every con- 
quered state and city for the purpose of contribu- 
tion and order, Carranza facilitated and accelerated 
the final political reconstruction of the government 
when his troops should enter Mexico City, and third 
and last he would create for himself and his sup- 
porters an Impregnable position from the foreign 
as well as the Mexican enemies of his cause. 

Carranza is fifty-five years old, young enough 
to take the field personally and wise enough 
not to walk into pitfalls and mistakes excusable but 
not pardonable in a younger man. The blunders 



90 Carranza and Mexico 

of the Madero regime were not lost upon him. Two 
of the most grievous mistalces committed by the 
Madero revolutionist leaders were the acceptance of 
foreign financial assistance and a compromise with 
the power which was being overthrown. 

As revolutions cost money and none was forth- 
coming or could be had after the murder of Presi- 
dent Madero and Vice-president Suarez, Carranza 
convened the state legislation of Coahuila demand- 
ing from it the refusal of allegiance asked by Gen- 
eral Huerta, and a vote to turn over to him the 
money of the state treasury for revolutionary pur- 
poses. Then he rode with a few followers on 
horseback through the federal lines across the 
mountains of the States of Durango and Sinaloa 
into Sonora, a State not connected directly by rail 
with Mexico City. Being more free there from mo- 
lestation by federal soldiers than the other border 
States he helped to organize the government and 
made his headquarters for a while in Hermosillo, 
Sonora. The seizure of the border towns of No- 
gales and Agua Prieta opened the way to the im- 
portation of arms and ammunition and to the re- 
ceipts of the custom houses. As the revolutionary 
troops on the border States captured more custom 
houses, as happened in Juarez, Ciudad P. Diaz, 
Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros and finally the seaport 
of Tampico, the revenues increased as well as the 
facilities for the importation of foodstuffs, clothing 
and ammunition. 



Financial Organization 91 

Carranza and his sub-chiefs had five different 
methods of acquiring financial support in northern 
Mexico. 

1. The Interior war tax, which was paid by Mex- 
ican and foreign commercial mining and industrial 
firms doing business in the northern States, besides 
the taxes paid by the " haciendados " or land own- 
ers, farmers. 

2. Custom house duties at all the border towns 
on Imports and exports, that Is to say on foodstuffs, 
cattle, ore, metal, clothing, etc., which were paid 
In gold as arms and ammunition bought by the rebels 
had to be paid in gold. 

3. Forced loans from the enemies of the Consti- 
tutionalists. 

4. Voluntary loans by the friends of the revolu- 
tion such as rich Mexican landowners, capitalists 
and miners. 

5. The creation of an Interior debt by the Issue 
of paper money to be circulated In all the territory 
under the power of the revolution and the prohibi- 
tion to circulate the bills issued by the Banco Na- 
cional of Mexico City on February i8th, 19 13, at 
the order of General Huerta. 

In a pamphlet of recent date there will be found 
the decrees and other transactions of the Constitu- 
tionalist army. The official publication born in 
Chihuahua, 19 14, prints the date of each one of the 
decrees permitting the printing of paper money. 
The first Issue of paper money was emitted for 5,- 



92 Carranza and l\Iexico 

000,000 pesos on the 26th of April, 19 13, the sec- 
ond one for fifteen millions on February 28th, 19 13, 
and the third one for ten millions on February 12th, 
19 14, for bills of five, ten, fifty and hundred pesos 
denominations. As the circulation of those three 
Issues tended to raise prices in general by paralyzing 
the transactions with fractional money, Carranza au- 
thorized three more issues of paper money. One 
for two hundred thousand, the second for eight 
hundred thousand and the third for one million, for 
five and ten cents denominations, on the 26th of 
April, 28th of December, 19 13, and on February 
I2th, 1914. 

Up to May, 19 14, altogether thirty-two million 
pesos in paper money were issued to cover the ex- 
penses of the revolution. 

The governors and military chiefs were empow- 
ered to do the same in the States under their juris- 
diction: Generals Villa and Chao in the State of 
Chihuahua, Governor RIveros in Sinaloa, General 
Caballeros in Tamaulipas and Vlllareal in Nuevo 
Leon. 

When it is considered that the Constitutionalists 
had almost 100,000 men under arms, the Madero 
revolution by comparison will seem an amateurish 
and insignificant affair. 

General Obregon was supposed to have 20,000, 
General Villa another 20,000, General Gonzalez 
22,000, General Carrera 20,000, General Natera 



Financial Organization 93 

and the Arrletas 6,000, without counting the Zapa- 
tistas with over 20,000 men. 

On an average and in fairly round figures the 
revolution cost about $200,000 a week or $800,000 
a month. For a revolution which has lasted over 
a year and three months the performance is quite 
wonderful and shows remarkable organizing quali- 
ties in Carranza and the amazing vitality of Mexico. 

When General Huerta waded through Madero's 
blood into the dictator's chair he was able to get 
over fifty million dollars in gold from American and 
French bankers, besides voluntary and enforced con- 
tributions from the Catholic clergy, foreign corpora- 
tions and commercial and industrial concerns with 
headquarters in Mexico City and unwilling loans 
from Mexican haclendados. Huerta had all the 
power of the government concentrated in Mexico 
City In his hands, the support of all the foreign 
powers with the exception of the United States, and 
in spite of all he failed. 

American bankers who had hastily but unwisely 
loaned several millions to General Huerta In the 
forlorn hope that he could prove a second Diaz to 
subdue Mexico, lost faith In the dictator's ability 
and sent an agent to offer six million dollars to Car- 
ranza if he would promise to guarantee Huerta's 
loans. It goes without saying that the offer was 
rejected. 

Another committee of American bankers sent an 



94 Carranza and Mexico 

emissary to Mexico City to offer General Huerta 
three million dollars if he would only resign and 
get out. In the first case the aforementioned 
banker learned to his surprise that the revolution- 
ary chief was a man of principles and could not be 
bought; the mistake would have been avoided if 
the American financier had read the answer of Car- 
ranza to Felix Diaz and General Huerta offering 
him a huge bribe to retract his challenge against 
the dictatorship. In the second instance they of- 
fered Huerta three millions when he had decided 
to throw up the sponge, and instead of accelerating 
his exit from Mexico, only retarded It long enough 
for Huerta to pocket their money. 

In both cases the American bankers have shown 
a fundamental lack of knowledge of the Mexican 
situation and of Mexican ways. 

The Mexican revolution was essentially a Mex- 
ican affair and even a superficial review of Mexican 
history would have revealed a great similarity be- 
tween it and the Three Years' War. It took the 
name of Constitutionalist Revolution from the Con- 
stitution of 1857, for which the Liberals of that 
period were fighting as against the clerical dicta- 
torship. 

Even if General Huerta had been able to borrow 
150 million dollars In Paris as he expected to do, 
he would have been defeated in the end; it would 
have taken longer to destroy his power, but the 
result would have been the same. It would pay 



Financial Organization 95 

American bankers to seek the advice of unbiased 
observers, men who are in sympathy with Mexican 
aims and ambitions, who have a thorough knowl- 
edge of the people and their history, and not from 
agents or individuals who are interested concession- 
aires and foreigners or Americans who in spite of 
their long residence in the country are as ignorant 
of Mexican conditions as on the first day of their 
arrival in Mexico. 



^ 



CHAPTER VII 

CIVIL ORGANIZATION OF THE REVOLUTION 

/^NE of the causes which defeated the work of 
^^ the Madero revolution, was the lack of or- 
ganization of civil governments within the States 
conquered by the Maderistas. Rebel bands wan- 
dered hither and thither, taking anything they 
needed and signing vouchers to be repaid at the end 
of the revolution. 

The Judges, " Jefes Politicos " and minor offi- 
cials, with the exception of marked men, stayed in 
office during the revolution, and after Madero came 
into power. The machinery of Diaz remained, the 
army and all the officials, with the exception of 
the President, cabinet members and the governors. 

Carranza learned a lesson and decided to or- 
ganize the local government wherever he went and 
wherever the Constitutionalists were masters of 
States. As the chief of the revolution, Carranza 
directed the movement of the three army divisions, 
that is to say, the great strategic lines, and the gen- 
erals took care of the tactical movements. Thus 
was the first chief able to devote his energy to the 
creation of civil government, instead of personally 
directing or fighting battles. Many critics have 

96 



Civil Organization of the Revolution 97 

wondered what Carranza had done in the Revolu- 
tion. It is quite comprehensible that the patient, 
unremitting task of organizing the civil government 
of conquered States, does not appear in the same 
romantic light as the attacking and storming of a 
city, although it is as important and useful, and 
more enduring work. 

In many States in the south — Morelos, Guer- 
rero — where the Huerta officials had all fled and 
the only rulers were the Zapatista soldiers, the In- 
dians had instinctively organized a patriarchal and 
tribal rule of their own. Very significant of the 
patience, and law-abiding sentiment of the average 
Mexican, is the fact that in those regions, where 
for over two years no government existed, crimes 
were less frequent than where the government held 
sway. 

Carranza began to organize the postal and tele- 
graph systems in Durango, Sinaloa and Sonora. 
Headquarters were in Hermosillo, as the federals 
always kept either to border towns or seaports, — 
the rest of the State was under the control of the 
Constitutionalists. Wherever possible the trains 
were run on schedule time, — telegrams and mail 
were sent and received. Judges and all the munici- 
pal governments of the larger and smaller cities 
were created. When the border towns were taken, 
a simple system of tariff was enacted working both 
ways, for exports as well as imports. The Minis- 
ter who helped Carranza as Secretary of the In- 



98 Carranza and Mexico 

terlor, was Rafael Zubaran Capmany, who after- 
wards was sent to Washington as a confidential 
agent for the Constitutionalists. 

Those who have had an opportunity to follow 
the operations of Carranza through the official 
paper, El Constitucionalista, and the pamphlet 
which contains his decrees, can pursue step by step 
all his official acts and his reconstructive policy. 

Don F. Iglesias Calderon, after escaping from the 
fortress of San Juan de Ulloa, told the writer that 
he crossed the border at Juarez for Chihuahua, 
Torreon, Saltillo, Monterey, and back to the bor- 
der, and very much to his surprise he travelled on 
schedule time. At that time the whole north was 
in the hands of the Constitutionalists. 

The foreign press could not understand why Car- 
ranza did not hasten at once to Mexico City after 
the flight of Huerta. Carranza could not leave a 
single State between Mexico City and the border 
unorganized, that is to say, without placing Consti- 
tutionalist officials in charge. Otherwise the Huerta 
officials would later have created local strife. The 
first Chief had to put new wine in new bottles, 
in order to succeed in any future reform which 
might be enacted by Congress, 

With Carranza it was not only a question of 
conquest. His idea was to rebuild, reconstruct 
Mexico, not merely conquer it. 




DON RAFAEL ZUBARAN CAPMANY 

Minister of Foreign Affairs with Carranz,a, also Representative 
of Carran2,a in Washington 



CHAPTER VIII 

DIPLOMATIC WORK IN WASHINGTON 

T?ROM the Inception of the Constitutionalist revo- 
-*• lution, Carranza appreciated the necessity of 
having a representative in Washington. Alberto 
Pan! and Roberto V. Pesqueira organized a junta 
which would counteract the campaign waged against 
the Constitutionalists by the Huerta agents In con- 
junction with the American Interests, In the vain 
hope of a recognition of the Huerta regime by the 
Democratic administration. Pesqueira paid the ex- 
penses of the office out of his own pocket until Car- 
ranza was able to devote some of the money at the 
disposal of the revolution, to other purposes besides 
the buying of arms and ammunition. 

The Intelligent and effective work done by the 
two constitutionalist ambassadors concentrated the 
attention of the American public upon a struggle 
which had appeared one-sided and hopeless. 

After a succession of defeats by the federal gen- 
erals in the north, Huerta recognized that the great 
army at his disposal was swiftly crumbling to pieces, 
and the three divisions under the Constitutionalist 
generals were determinedly closing in upon him, he 
became afraid, and with the same unscrupulousness 

99 



lOO Carranza and Mexico 

of former reactionary despots in Mexico, he plucked 
a leaf from the history of Mexico, attempting to 
repeat the feat successfully carried out by the cler- 
icals in 1847, when American intervention was 
forced, and in 1861 when French intervention was 
deliberately invited, to save clericalism from utter 
annihilation. 

Carranza foresaw the move, as the members of 
Huerta's cabinet had openly boasted to bring about 
American intervention to save their interests and 
their lives. With Carranza in Hermosillo was a 
Mr. Rafael Zubaran Capmany, a young Mexican 
lawyer from Campeche, who acted as his Secretary 
of the Interior in the Provisional Cabinet. Car- 
ranza picked out Mr. Zubaran as the one man in 
Mexico to play the diplomatic game in Washington 
which would ward off American intervention, even 
after the American troops had occupied Vera Cruz. 

It is quite true that the landing of American ma- 
rines meant intervention, but President Wilson had 
declared that it was done against General Huerta, 
the Dictator, and not against the Mexican people; 
that American soldiers would be satisfied to occupy 
the Mexican port until the usurper was driven out. 

To make the average Mexican understand this 
complicated situation, and to convince the Amer- 
icans that Carranza's protest was not only neces- 
sary but was the only manly and patriotic act pos- 
sible for any Mexican leader, was the task which 
befell Sr. Zubaran. 



Diplomatic Work in Washington loi 

The lifting of the embargo on arms and am- 
munition at the border, without arousing the hos- 
tility of the War Department in Washington, was 
another difficult mission. 

To prevent the Mexican constitutionalists from 
crossing the American border, thereby playing into 
the hands of Huerta, was as perilous and risky a 
game as putting out a lighted fuse near a powder 
magazine. 

A talented writer and lawyer, Don Luis Cabrera, 
ably assisted Rafael Zubaran. The sympathetic at- 
titude of President Wilson and Secretary Bryan 
helped to crown the efforts with success. Also, the 
unofficial and friendly co-operation of ex-Governor 
Lind was of incalculable value to the Mexican dip- 
lomats. 

But any other less experienced and less discreet 
personality, a mind less acute, keen and masterly, 
would have failed ignominiously. Americans as 
well as Mexicans are discovering that diplomatic 
victories, although silent and modest, are as effec- 
tive and useful as military achievements. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS IN PARIS 

A LTHOUGH the diplomatic and financial bat- 
"*■ ^ tie for great loans of the Huerta regime was 
', waged and lost In the United States, as a result of 
the attitude of the Wilson administration, Huerta 
was nevertheless enabled to make a loan in Wall 
Street, ostensibly to pay the interest on the Rail- 
road Merger. The real battle for financial assist- 
ance, however, was fought in Paris. 

The Parisian bankers were always favorably in- 
clined to the existing governments of Mexico. Diaz 
had always been considered financially solvent, with 
Limantour at his side. 

The French and English bankers, who had made 
fortunes on Mexican loans, always spoke with re- 
gret and almost pique at the overthrow of " the 
grand old man." Foreign bankers not being by 
nature sentimental or radical, had no sympathy or 
understanding for the tremendous popular upheaval 
in Mexico. The whole great libertarian move- 
ment was quite misuhderstood or ignored. The 
Huerta regime seemed like a reversion to the good 
old fat times under Limantour. Huerta exhibited 
all the ear-marks of the strong man on horseback. 

102 



The Constitutionalists in Paris 103 

To the superficial bankers, the Mexican Caracalla 
was bound to stay and ask for more loans, and offer 
more profits. 

In London, the press did not pay much attention 
to the Constitutionalists, as the English oil interests 
saw to it that stories were circulated about the ban- 
dits, cut-throats and robbers who were infesting 
Mexico under the excuse of fighting against the de 
facto government. 

As the English oil interests were closely connected 
with the English government, they having signed a 
contract to supply the British navy with oil, Huerta 
gladly gave all the concessions asked for, and con- 
firmed the previous ones. Although the English 
oil interests denied in the press that they were in- 
volved in politics, certain facts came to the notice 
of the Constitutionalists in Paris, which proved the 
contrary. Dr. Atl, who was living in Paris, vouches 
for the data furnished. 

Dr. Atl had been very friendly to Dr. Urrutia 
years ago, as the famous surgeon politician had 
saved his life. While Dr. Atl was in the hospital, 
he became intimate with General Huerta, and being 
a " compadre " to Dr. Urrutia, there were no se- 
crets between them. After the assassination of 
Madero and Suarez, Dr. Urrutia bethought him- 
self of the friendship and gratitude of his friend, 
and without much ado telegraphed Dr. Atl that one 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars were at his dis- 
posal at the Mexican legation in Paris: he was to 



I04 Carranza and Mexico 

use It to Influence the French press. Although Dr. 
Atl was broke, as befits a sincere artist, he sent an 
answer which Is not fit for publication, but which 
does credit to his patriotism and his integrity. 

Dr. Atl discovered that in spite of the fact that 
he was considered almost a confrere among the 
French journahsts, owing to the fact that he pub- 
lished an art paper In French, and wrote for most 
literary magazines and papers in Paris, — when it 
came to offering material on the subject of the Con- 
stitutionalist cause of Mexico, the pages of the peri- 
odicals were without exception closed to him. 
Finally reporters admitted to him that the English 
oil Interests had been paying enormous sums of 
money, aggregating the sum of seven million francs. 
He was even pointed out an agent of the same oil 
interests, who had left to the editor of the paper the 
sum of one hundred and fifty thousand francs as 
a friendly reminder. 

After the refusal of Dr. Atl to work for the 
Huerta regime, a brother of de la Barra took up the 
task. Not a word could slip into the French papers 
about the defeats of the Federals, and strenuous 
efforts were being made to finance a loan of one 
hundred and fifty million dollars for Huerta. Dr. 
Atl had heard that the loan would be effected within 
a week. In despair he walked from one oflSce to 
the other and succeeded only in getting snubs and 
rebuffs. To make matters worse, it rained cats and 
dogs. Our peripatetic artist, soaking wet, tired and 



The Constitutionalists in Paris 105 

hungry, not having eaten a morsel of food for two 
days, was on the point of giving up the struggle, 
when he decided to try the only newspaper in Paris 
which was above venality, the socialist paper, 
L'Humanite. He presented himself at the office, 
and Insisted on speaking to Monsieur Jaures, who 
was the editor. The veteran socialist finally con- 
sented to see him. " I am not representing any 
financial interests," spoke up Dr. Atl, " I am only a 
poor Mexican artist, who expects you to tell the 
truth about a matter of interest, not only to Mexico, 
but especially to French Investors. Huerta Is ex- 
pected to wind up a loan of 750 million francs; I 
want to Inform you that Carranza, Chief of the 
Constitutionalists, has communicated a letter to the 
press In the United States, and to us, that If the 
revolution Is successful, the French loan to Huerta 
will not be recognized by the successful Constitu- 
tionalists. As I know that you are honest and do 
not want to see the French investors risk losing their 
money, I beg of you to publish the statement made 
by Carranza." 

Jaures published the letter the next day. Mex- 
ican bonds went down ten points, and the loan fell 
through. Dr. Atl Is now Director of the National 
Art School In Mexico City. 



CHAPTER X 

INVESTIGATION WORK INTO THE MUNICIPAL CITY 
GOVERNMENTS AND THE RURAL SCHOOL SYSTEM, 
FACTORIES AND INDUSTRIAL CENTRES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 

BY MODESTO C. ROLLAND 

pUTTING aside my humble personality, not of 
■^ much importance to the reader, I am going to 
relate my life since the Mexican revolution, for in 
this manner I can more clearly place in relief some- 
thing of the history and social conditions in Mex- 
ico, which should be known by all who desire in- 
formation on what has taken place and what we 
wish to do. 

Convinced as we were of the tremendous social 
inequality that has existed in Mexico under the au- 
thority of the capitalists and of the clerical party, 
before the apparition of Madero, the idea was 
launched of not permitting a re-election with a view 
to compelling Porfirio Diaz to verify the necessary 
evolution, fearing as we did the effects of a revo- 
lution. 

We thought, inexperienced sociologists, that It 
was possible to conquer a tyrant by persuasion, so 

io6 




MODESTO C. ROLLAND 

Engineer, School Teacher, Member of the Cabinet 



Investigation Work 107 

as to permit the democratic practices necessary to 
choose the President. We made a mistake, and 
the anti-re-electionists had to combat a revolution. 
Madero expounded the doctrines which were spread 
over the country, and was at the head of the revo- 
lution that imperiously triumphed. 

Many of us Mexicans thinking it was time to 
take part in public affairs, united and formed an 
Engineers' Club with a view to studying national 
problems. In a word, we worked for the national- 
ization of the National Railways, and for the es- 
tablishment of postal savings. Nearly all of our 
efforts were shattered by reason of the inertia dis- 
played by the Secretary of the Treasury, headed by 
Messrs. Ernesto Madero and Jaime Gurza. 

The Catholic party, seeing the approach of an 
epoch of social reforms which they could not admit, 
conspired with the army and taking advantage 
through Huerta, for Felix Diaz turned out to be 
weak, finally assassinated Madero and grasped the 
power. 

Then they enjoyed their clerical rule and their 
laws regarding public instruction. The army 
served them to kill the people and to defend their 
great estates. The war was kindled with more 
fury, headed by Venustiano Carranza. We in the 
capital suffered day by day from the insults of the 
soldiery. All persons who did not favor the gov- 
ernment were known to the authorities, and at any 
moment were likely to be detained. 



lo8 Carranza and Mexico 

After the ten days' tragedy, I went to the Mili- 
tary College, where I was a professor, with the 
intention of speaking for the last time to my pupils. 
I explained to them the course that the army would 
pursue, and that they would be the instrument of a 
traitor to shed the blood of Mexicans. That same 
afternoon I was dismissed from my charge. From 
that time on I was persecuted. 

Being independent and my ideas being known, I 
could not long remain free. The idea contrary to 
the dictatorial system was what they persecuted 
most. At length one day they took me out of my 
office and conveyed me to the penitentiary where 
they held me in a dark dungeon for a month in 
solitary confinement. 

My friends arranged for Minister Garza Aldape 
to speak with me. I explained to him frankly why 
I could not be with the Huertistas for I could not 
conform with the politics of the outbreak, and the 
consequences of the same. I made him understand 
that I was not an active conspirator, for having to 
keep in favor with two parties is truly crazy and 
like throwing oneself into the wolf's mouth. 

He permitted me to go out into the street, but 
it was impossible for me to work. My business 
affairs were shattered; every move was constantly 
watched, and at any time I might be sent back to 
the penitentiary, as were many others. 

I decided to get out of the country. I went to 
Vera Cruz and with some difficulty boarded a boat 



Investigation Work 109 

as a contraband, and it was in the position of table- 
steward that I finally arrived in this country. 

This is the history of thousands of men in Mex- 
ico. Thousands of families remained until they 
had nothing left to live on, and even the women 
were in danger of being put in jail, as many were. 

With great eagerness I went toward the north 
of the republic with a view to putting myself in con- 
tact with the revolution. There I met many friends 
who had travelled the path ahead of me, and under 
various conditions were serving the cause. There 
I could speak with Carranza, first chief of the revo- 
lution. It was in Juarez City where I was pre- 
sented by the Hon. Mr. Zulara, Minister of Com- 
munications. Mr. Carranza spoke with me of the 
reconstruction of Mexico. At that period of the 
struggle so much confidence was felt in the triumph 
of the revolution that the first chief looked ahead 
to prepare the era of reconstruction. 

He talked with me of the agrarian problem, as 
a touchstone of all the social unbalance of our peo- 
ple, and I was convinced that that serene man, 
economist by experience and liberal by conviction 
ought to be the personification of the national unity. 

He spoke to me above all else of the schools. 
The great desire of Mr. Carranza is to develop a 
school system in Mexico. He expressed himself 
with the enthusiasm of the man who has long been 
in contact with the needs of the people, and I was 
convinced still further of the necessity of working 



no Carranza and Mexico 

without hesitation under the influence of such a man. 
The supreme chief being convinced that another sol- 
dier was not needed in the battlefield, and taking 
advantage of my experience as a schoolmaster and 
as an engineer, he arranged for me to go to the 
United States with a view to studying municipal and 
school systems. In this way I joined a body of 
students of Administrative service, which Mr. Car- 
ranza had been forming In this country and in 
Europe. I have put my heart In my work, and hap- 
pily I have found in this nation the greatest facili- 
ties for attaining our object. I have visited the 
principal cities of the East. New York particu- 
larly has served me practically. 

^ SCHOOLS 

^ The Department of Education furnished me with 
all the methods for studying the schools, and In this 
manner I obtained most interesting information re- 
garding the organization and educative systems of 
these schools, where from the first step a child takes, 
he is taught something about democracy. The im- 
pression which this spirit of the American schools 
made upon me will never be forgotten. The con- 
tinued effort of the teachers to form the free will 
of the child is excellent. The soul of this nation 
palpitates in Its schools. There the body and the 
mind are fortified, intensifying the customs of soci- 
ability. These things are facts, not theories, In the 
American schools. The way in which all this edu- 



Investigation Work iii 

catlve labor is consummated with ingenuity and 
honesty, was what impressed me above everything. 

Regarding the material organization it is already 
known how able Americans are. Organization is 
nearly always the secret of success, and that is above 
all what the Latins need to learn. 

The organization of the Department of Educa- 
tion is notable, which makes possible the co-ordina- 
tion of an infinity of data, so as to see schematically 
the working of the mechanism. I can judge at sight 
of the weak point so that the same may be perfected. 
The weak spot in the Mexican school system being 
the rural school system, I was asked by Carranza 
to investigate especially that phase in the United 
States. The result of my inquiries brought forth 
the fact that the States of Wisconsin and Massa- 
chusetts have the best organized rural system for 
schools in America. These two States are going to 
be the pattern which will be used for Mexico's Min- 
ister of Education to work from. 

It is well-known that the scholastic family is ami- 
able over the entire world, but I believe that the 
American teacher especially is a model of courtesy. 
Wherever I went I was treated with such kindness 
that I shall always remember my visits with 
pleasure. 

MUNICIPAL SERVICES 

The revolution was eager to change the social 
state of Mexico and that naturally comprised the 



1 1 2 Carranza and Mexico 

sanitary condition of the people. In Mexico it is 
necessary to change the hygienic state of the people 
who have been always treated with a spirit of ex- 
ploitation by the privileged castes. 

We know that sunshine on the earth does away 
with the services of the doctor, for which we shall 
work so that the sewers called casus de vecindad 
may be dispensed with; In these tuberculosis pros- 
pers, while the rich owner assisted through the 
lenity of the laws is occupied only In collecting the 
rents. Pure water, air and light, — the people 
need these and Mexico will give them. 

New York has given me great experience and has 
furnished a wide field of observation, In respect to 
the Municipal services; and I wish to set forth my 
report so as to profit by the many good subjects I 
have studied. Naturally, here as In other places 
there are many matters which have not yet been sat- 
isfactorily settled, as for example that relative to 
the " casas de vecindad," but anyway the efforts of 
this people, so materially progressive will help us 
In a high degree. 

The resolution of the problem of the " casas de 
vecindad " as It Is understood In Glasgow, Is our 
ideal and we shall feel proud on the day that we 
can present a city with comfort for the poor. 

In the conscience of all the revolutionaries is 
the profound conviction that to guarantee the tri- 
umph of the revolution it Is necessary to change the 
social status of Mexico, and for that reason they 



Investigation Work 113 

will not hesitate to pass laws affecting the land to 
further works of irrigation, to establish schools and 
to contribute to hygienic homes. 

The example of this nation Is valuable for us and 
we shall not fail to utilize the same. We are anx- 
ious to push our people forward through more demo- 
cratic paths, and are certain that this nation knows 
how to appreciate our efforts. 

In Mexico, where It may be said that humanity 
is making a trial of adaptation, we shall make a 
trial of what this country has shown us, and if I 
myself put Into practice what I have learned here 
I shall consider myself happy, welcoming all the 
annoying details, for nothing is worth more than 
the esteem of a nation. 



CHAPTER XI 

GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
HUERTA 

** I "'O get a clear conception of the strategic work 
"*■ achieved by the three divisions of the East, 
North and West, it is advisable to look at the map 
of Mexico. 

Mexico is broadest at the American border and 
tapers exactly like a cornucopia at the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec. Mexico City lies in a valley 7,400 
feet high, within twelve hours' ride from Vera Cruz, 
and being the centre of all the railroads of Mexico, 
is therefore of the utmost strategical importance. 

Huerta, from Mexico City, could reach all his 
troops anywhere in Mexico, either by rail or water. 
The Constitutionalists in Sonora were separated 
from the Northern division by a high range of 
mountains, and the Northern division from the 
Eastern division by another range. Zapata could 
not communicate very easily with the three north- 
ern divisions, and was not able to assist them di- 
rectly. 

Huerta's strategy consisted in keeping his sol- 
diers in the large cities, at the border towns, always 
hugging the railroad lines. The federals very sel- 

114 






. o 



-----s.., 



■'5, 



^ t. 






A>L 




a. 

or 

Z 

< 



LU 



Outline of Campaign Against Hiierta 115 

dom attacked in the open, as the lack of horses de- 
tracted from their mobihty. 

The Western division had for its object the con- 
trol of the railroad, starting from Nogales, through 
Hermosillo to Guaymas in Sonora, then to Culia- 
can, Mazatlan in Sinaloa, through San Bias, Tepic 
into the State of Jalisco, to the capital Guadalajara. 
Once Guadalajara was captured, the aim of the 
campaign was achieved, and Obregon had only to 
wait for the arrival and junction of the Northern 
and Eastern division near Celaya, to march to Mex- 
ico City. The difficulties encountered by the West- 
ern and Eastern divisions were trebled by a condi- 
tion which did not exist In the case of the Northern 
division under Villa, the fact that the seaports on 
the Pacific and Atlantic which were always at the 
mercy of the federals, could feed and supply and 
augment the contingent of soldiers in the ports. 

On the Pacific side, the Federals controlled 
Guaymas, Topolobampo, Altata, Mazatlan, San 
Bias and Manzanillo, — and on the Atlantic side 
they controlled Matamoros, Tampico, Tuxpan, 
Vera Cruz and Puerto Mexico. 

The Western division, under Obregon, captured 
one by one all the border towns, and later most of 
the seaports, — and in spite of the fact that Guay- 
mas stuck to the last, the Western division had so 
effectively cooped up the Federals In that port, that 
they were not interfering with their downward 
course towards Quadalajara. General Gonzalez 



Ii6 Carranza and Mexico 

acted on the same principle. He first captured the 
border tow/is, and then Victoria the capital of Ta- 
maulipas. With the fall of Tampico, the Federals 
in San Luis Potosi were outflanked. 

General Villa did the same. After he controlled 
the border cities, he concentrated all his energies 
on the capture of Torreon. 

The three chiefs of divisions, East, North and 
West, co-operated with one another under the di- 
rection of Carranza. They were supplied with 
money, arms and ammunition by the organization 
created by Carranza in the different States, and di- 
rected by the efforts of the members of the provi- 
sional cabinet. 

Zapata by his activity, aided by that of Genovevo 
de la O and several other chiefs in the South, forced 
Huerta to keep about forty thousand soldiers in the 
South. 

The railroads created new strategic lines — 

ist. From Nogales at the border, the railroad 
goes almost uninterruptedly through Sonora, Sina- 
loa and Tepic, with the exception of a gap between 
Tepic and Guadalajara. 

2d. From Juarez the railroad runs through Chi- 
huahua, Durango and Zacatecas into Aguascalien- 
tes. 

3d. From Ciudad Porfirio Diaz through Coa- 
huila into Nuevo Leon, and to San Luis Potosi, and 
from Monterrey to Tampico. 

They represent the lines which had to be con- 



Outline of Campaign Against Huerta 117 

trolled by the three divisions. Then there were 
lines connecting Torreon with Saltillo and Mon- 
terrey, — and Aguascalientes with San Luis Potosi. 

The assertion that either one of the three chiefs 
of the divisions was solely responsible for the suc- 
cess of the revolution Is absurd and Inexact. 

Let us admit for Instance, that Obregon had 
reached Guadalajara, and tried to march through 
Celaya to Mexico City alone, before Villa had 
taken Aguascalientes, or General Gutierrez taken 
San Luis Potosi. He would then have been at- 
tacked In the rear by the Federals. 

In Villa's case, if he had captured Aguascalientes 
and tried to march south to Mexico City, without 
waiting for Obregon to take Guadalajara, or Gen- 
eral Gutierrez, San Luis Potosi, he would have also 
been attacked in the rear. 

General Gonzalez in his turn, could not march 
south as long as San Luis Potosi was In the posses- 
sion of Federals. 

The three chiefs had to work together, and the 
utter defeat of either of the three separately, spelled 
disaster for the rest. It is fortunate for Mexico 
that this campaign should have created four strong 
soldiers " on horseback " for the danger to Mexico's 
liberties always appeared with one man as the hero, 
who subsequently turned to be the " villain." When 
there is more than one savior or liberator, they are 
apt to be so busy watching one another, that Mex- 
ico's liberties are more likely to be respected. 



CHAPTER XII 

CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL OBREGON IN THE WEST 
BY COL. I. C. ENRIQUEZ 

pERHAPS the most interesting chapter of the 
■■■ Constitutionalist revolt against the dictator 
Huerta is the campaign of rebellion led by the brave 
citizens of the State of Sonora. When they de- 
cided to fight the bloody dictator and resist his 
murderous deeds, they were confronted by a very 
strong and well organized army. The Federal 
troops were well equipped with ammunition and 
guns. Their positions were well established, while 
the Constitutionalists had nothing more than desire 
of justice, backed by reckless bravery. They had 
neither guns nor ammunition, and certainly no 
trained army, and In spite of all this, they were the 
victors. 

After the assassination of Seiior Francisco I. 
Madero and Serior Jose Maria Pino Suarez, a 
dreadful feeling of fear spread through the country. 
This was especially evident among the civilians. 
What but death had they to expect from such a 
brutal dictator as Huerta? For this reason alone, 
there were at the beginning very few men who were 

ii8 




\ 



J 



^^' 




GENERAL ALVARO OBREGON 
Chief of the Western Division 



Campaign of General Ohregon in the West 119 

willing to take up arms against him. Even among 
the governors, twenty-seven in number, only one 
dared to throw down the glove of challenge to the 
assassin. He was Don Venustiano Carranza, at 
that time governor of the State of Coahuila. Half 
an hour after the news of the assassination reached 
him, he called the state legislature into session, de- 
nounced the dictator Huerta and demanded that they 
should not recognize Huerta's authority. He was 
the only man with sufficient moral courage to openly 
revolt against Huerta. 

At that time, Carranza was not the only one who 
had the historic opportunity of coming out as a de- 
fender of his country's honor. The same message 
was transmitted to Sefior Jose M. Maytorena, then 
the governor of the State of Sonora, but unlike Car- 
ranza, he did not take up the cause of his down- 
trodden countrymen. He saw at a glance the dan- 
ger of such a move, and realized that the struggle 
against Huerta would be a very unequal one. 
Thinking of his own safety first, he left Deputy 
Ignacio L. Pesqueira as acting governor, and fled to 
the United States. 

At that time, in Hermosillo, capital of Sonora, 
there were five hundred men under the command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Obregon, who later in the cam- 
paign became a famous general under Carranza. 
Major Salvador Alvarado, now general, had com- 
mand of four hundred troops of the Yaqui region, 
while in the southern part of the State, five hundred 



I20 Carranza and Mexico 

men were under the command of Generals Juan 
Cabral, Benjamin Hil and Sosa. Many of the of- 
ficers and soldiers of this army had participated in 
the revolution of 1910, consequently they were op- 
posed to the dictatorship of Huerta. This marked 
the beginning of the Sonora revolution. 

Even before the assassination of Madero, there 
were a number of chiefs who waged a relentless 
war. They were Col. Pedro F. Bracamonte, Col. 
Plutarco Elias Calles, and Major Campos. They 
began to recruit people on their own authority in the 
northern part of the State, and the cutting of railway 
communication. They also began an open attack 
on the Federals in many places. When the Sonora 
revolution was started, the chiefs became united, 
and opened hostilities. 

At the beginning of the Sonora revolution, the 
Federals had a force of 2,650 troops distributed 
throughout the State, from the frontier to the coast. 
Bearing this in mind, the Constitutionalists mapped 
out a careful campaign. General Obregon was ap- 
pointed to direct the military operations, as he had 
distinguished himself in the campaign of 19 12 
against the Orozquistas. 

The difficult task that the Constitutionalists were 
confronted with, was the prevention of the concen- 
tration and the union of the entire Federal army. 
They knew that as long as the Federal army was 
divided and spread throughout the State, their 
chances were more than equal. Thus they had a 



Campaign of General Ohregon in the West 121 

double task: first, to prevent the union of the Fede- 
ral troops, and secondly to fight them in small 
groups. The main object of the Constitutionalists 
was to secure the border positions of the State. 

As the revolution progressed and the fighting con- 
tinued, the Constitutionalists found their plans per- 
fectly suited to their needs. They marched from 
one city to the next, sometimes under terrible diffi- 
culties, but always victorious. All those in com- 
mand, and also the troops, fulfilled their duties ad- 
mirably. Soon, however, they were confronted with 
new and unexpected troubles. 

The taking of Naco, as also the greater part of the 
towns on the frontier, involved many unnecessary 
dangers. As it was situated on the international 
line, it could only be attacked from the east and 
west,— if it was assailed from the south many pro- 
jectiles would pass over to the American side. The 
Constitutionalist chiefs were always careful to re- 
spect the rights of the American people, and avoided 
as much as possible the damage and troubles that a 
war waged at such close quarters, would be likely to 
occasion them. The Federal generals, realizing the 
position of the Constitutionals, took advantage of 
their noble Intentions and stuck close to the Inter- 
national line. The Constitutionalists did not wish 
to attack them In the town — but were anxious to 
meet them in the open country, where there would be 
no danger of inflicting suffering to families, espec- 
ially those of American citizens. 



122 Carranza and Mexico 

Knowing that the Federals intended to join their 
comrades of Chihuahua, the Constitutionalists de- 
cided to lay In wait for them. For more than a 
week, they lay concealed behind ridges and in the 
mountains, but the blow they had suffered a few days 
before was a lesson General Ojeda could not forget, 
and all the attempts of the Constitutionals to lure 
them out in the open country failed. 

The chiefs of the Constitutionalists then decided 
not to wait any longer. They demanded of Gen- 
eral Ojeda, who was In charge of the Huerta troops, 
that he come out of the city. They explained to 
him the injustice of fighting near a town, where many 
innocent people and non-combatants might be In- 
jured, but Ojeda's reply was characteristic of all the 
Huerta generals. As long as he was safe. General 
Ojeda said, the whole human race might be slaugh- 
tered. Furthermore, he would not come out of 
his fortified town position — the Constitutionals 
could attack him there if they wanted to. 

The Constitutionals, realizing that they would 
have to attack, although he was entrenched in a 
position very disadvantageous to such action on their 
part, began preparations for the battle. The Fed- 
erals were located in a position occupying a semi- 
circle. Their six hundred men, cannon and rapid- 
fire guns, could easily defend their positions. They 
could sweep the open country with a deadly fire, 
there being no protection for the assailants. 

After a few days of reconnoitring, during which 



Campaign of General Ohregon in the West 123 

small skirmishes took place, the final decisive bat- 
tle took place, on the night of the ist of April. It 
lasted more than twenty-four hours, after which the 
Federals were forced to their barracks for protec- 
tion, while General Ojeda fled to the American side. 
The remaining troops surrendered, and the fighting 
stopped. This victory gave the Constitutionals 
complete control of the frontier towns, assuring 
them a base of operations. ^ 

One of the remarkable features of the Sonora 
Campaign was the wonderful manner in which the 
Federals after each battle, left behind ammunition, 
guns and equipment which the Constitutionalists so 
badly needed. The reply of the Constitutional 
chiefs to their complaining soldiers usually was: 
" Never mind, boys, Huerta himself will give us 
arms and ammunition to fight him with." This 
statement has proved true all through the revolt. 

Before the Constitutionals had a chance to re- 
cover from the hardships of the Naco victory, a still 
greater danger threatened them. A strong force of 
Federals, four thousand in number, well-equipped, 
was coming from the south by way of the Pacific 
coast, General Luis Medina Barron was In charge 
of them. Before leaving Guaymas, he pledged on 
his " military honor " that he would be In Hermo- 
sillo In fifteen days. He said he would have the 
head of Obregon stuck upon the point of his sword 
and that he would banquet at the Hotel Arcadia. 
But the Constitutional chiefs were not frustrated by 



124 Carranza and Mexico 

the boastings of General Barron, and quickly reor- 
ganizing their army, they took, positions between 
Ortiz and Guaymas at Santa Rosa, a flag station 
on the Southern Pacific Railroad of Mexico. 

Confident of their ultimate victory, the Federals 
marched towards the Constitutionalists. Early in 
the morning of the 9th of May they opened a vigor- 
ous fire. The attack lasted three days. 

The Constitutionalists realizing the value of the 
springs and wells in that torrid zone, fought desper- 
ately for their possession. Once the water supply 
was captured, it meant the defeat of the Federals. 
On the second day of the battle, this was accom- 
plished and the Federals were forced back to the 
Railroad tanks, which could supply them with water 
no longer than one day. After the third day's fight- 
ing, the Federals, worn out with thirst, retired, leav- 
ing a large number of dead and wounded. In their 
hasty retreat they left behind a great quantity of 
armaments and provisions. The boasting General 
Barron escaped to Guaymas, wounded by the 
enemy, while many of his chiefs were taken to Her- 
mosillo as prisoners of war. 

While Obregon was fighting against General 
Barron, General Hill had not remained idle. He 
was appointed to carry on operations in the south- 
ern part of the State. This he accomplished ad- 
mirably, especially the wiping out of the " Battalion 
of Death." This battalion carried a black flag, with 
a skull and cross bones upon it and their method was 



Campaign of General Ohregon in the West 125 

to terrorize the townspeople by killing innocent 
women and children. When they met General Hill 
In open battle they were completely wiped out. 

Later General Hill drove 450 from the town of 
Torin, forcing them back to Guaymas, thus clear- 
ing the southern part of the State. After his suc- 
cesses in this locality, he joined General Obregon, 
in the hope of attacking Generals Qjeda and Barron; 
The following move of the Constitutionalists is one 
of the most effective of the whole campaign. It 
was a decisive battle for the main water supply, 
which the troops were badly in need of and took 
place at Santa Maria. 

The plans of Generals Obregon, Alvarado and 
Dieguez once more proved very effective. The Fed- 
erals, finding the water supply taken, were forced to 
assume the offensive. They felt confident of success, 
and burdened themselves with all kinds of unneces- 
sary impediments. But the Constitutionalists were 
not to be taken by surprise; instead of waiting for 
the Federals to advance, they went out to meet 
them: by this manoeuvre the Federals found them- 
selves face to face with the Constitutionalists much 
sooner than they had expected. 

For the Federals, It was a fight for existence. 
They were face to face with death from thirst, and 
felt that unless they regained the wells a miserable 
death would be their lot. With them, it was not a 
fight for the honor of Huerta — they fought from 
sheer desperation. Under such conditions, the bat- 



126 Carranza and Me:^ico 

tie could not last long. Four desperate assaults 
were made upon the Constitutionalists' positions, 
and were repulsed. One of these assaults lasted 
more than twenty-four hours, resulting in a hand to 
hand fight. In those hand to hand frays one could 
not help admiring the remarkable way in which the 
Yaquis handled their daggers. The Federal army 
was wiped out completely in a very short time. 

While much credit is due to the soldiers who 
fought in the ranks of the Constitutionalists, many 
of their victories are due to the remarkable strategy 
of the generals. One instance will illustrate this. 
General Alvarado, realizing the terrible thirst of the 
Federal soldiers, drove them into a watermelon 
field. He knew fully well the result of such a move. 
No sooner had they reached the watermelon field, 
when all the fighting on their part ceased. The 
Federal officers had to force them to fight at the 
point of their bayonets, but even that did little good. 
Once they had entered the melon field, they were the 
easy victims of the Constitutional fire. At the close 
of the battle. General Ojeda fled from the scene, 
abandoning his officers and soldiers. He was fol- 
lowed by the officers, while a small group of sol- 
diers, braver than their chiefs, kept on fighting till 
they reached Guaymas. 

The Constitutionals did not realize how great a 
victory they really had won, and waited a whole 
day thinking that the retreat of the Federals was 
nothing but a trap set for them. But when they 



Campaign of General Obregon in the West 127 

marched forward they found nothing but dead and 
wounded, and a great quantity of ammunition and 
supplies. They had left behind all the cannons, 
twelve rapid-firing guns and sixteen hundred rifles, 
also a large number of horses and trappings. But 
the Constitutionalists had no time to lose, and they 
immediately went in pursuit of the enemy. 

While I was overjoyed at our tremendous victory, 
pity and sorrow embittered the cup of joy. The 
scenes of horror and misery which I saw are still 
engraved in my memory. I saw the disastrous re- 
sults brought about by a tyrannical dictator who, in 
his effort to perpetuate himself in absolute power, 
was willing to sacrifice everything and everybody. 
It was dreadful to see the battlefield littered with 
the dead and wounded, men who meant well but who 
understood little. 

On the other hand there were the patriotic, well- 
intentioned men, full of self-sacrifice, willing to die 
for liberty and the prosperity of their native country. 
Alongside these sturdy young fighters were also the 
poor women and children, innocent sufferers in the 
great strife. They were the greatest sufferers, — 
they bore the greater burden. 

The campaign of General Obregon through the 
State of Sonora, marks only the beginning of the 
great struggle which led him victoriously to the city 
of Mexico. This campaign, although never men- 
tioned by the newspaper correspondents, was never- 



128 Carranza and Mexico 

theless as important as the campaign of General 
Villa. General Obregon not only had to fight an 
army much larger than his own, but the geograph- 
ical location of his territory constantly endangered 
his rear wings. Unlike Villa, he was constantly 
compelled to guard from rear attacks, as well as 
from frontal attacks. This ever existing danger 
made the campaign much more difficult, multiplying 
the dangers which constantly confronted him. 

The remark of General Obregon to Don Venus- 
tiano Carranza when the First Chief marked out 
the three lines of struggle, illustrates the nature of 
the fighting General Obregon. When Carranza 
was about to depart from Nogales, in February, 
1 9 14, Obregon said to him: "First Chief, tell 
Generals Villa and Gonzales to hurry up in their 
march, for I am going to get busy and get to Mex- 
ico." And true to his word, several months later, 
although beset by many more difficulties than the 
other generals, he reached Mexico City before any 
of them. After the Federal troops were routed and 
driven back in great disorder to Guaymas, the State 
of Sonora was practically cleared from Huerta 
troops. But that only meant the beginning of the 
great fight. 

During the months of July and August, General 
Obregon was preparing for his advance South. He 
had little time to waste, for even before he was 
through with his preparations, he was forced to 



Campaign of General Ohregon in the West 129 

advance on San Bias, Sinaloa. A strong detach- 
ment of Federals were sent up from Mexico City 
to reinforce the defeated Huerta troops who landed 
at Topolobampo. But General Obregon was not 
taken by surprise. Having assigned Generals Hill 
and Iturbe to proceed against the Federals, he him- 
self continued his march further south. His ob- 
jective point was the city of Sinaloa. In the mean- 
time Generals Hill and Iturbe had succeeded in de- 
feating the Federal troops which landed in Topolo- 
bampo, and joined General Obregon in his attack 
upon the city of Sinaloa. 

The storming of Sinaloa was one of the fiercest 
battles of the entire campaign. It lasted nearly five 
days and again, as In all the previous battles, the 
Federals retreated so hastily that they did not have 
time to take their guns and ammunition with them. 
A great quantity of ammunition and provisions were 
left behind by them, of which the Constitutionalists 
were much In need. 

One of the great difficulties which constantly con- 
fronted General Obregon was the guarding of the 
frontier and the positions all along the coast. The 
slightest error in the guarding of those positions 
might have caused the annihilation of his entire 
army by a rear attack. So that, whenever he took a 
city from the Federals, he was confronted with the 
question of protecting that point. He was forced 
to always leave troops behind him, to guard those 



130 Carranza and Mexico 

conquered cities. Had he not done so, the Federals 
might have sent up new forces by way of the Pacific 
and re-taken the conquered posts. 

The most important of all the battles of the en- 
tire campaign was the storming of Culiacan. The 
Federals, realizing the dangers of Obregon's swift 
march, massed a strong force of troops in that city, 
numbering about seven thousand. Needless to say, 
they were much better equipped than the Consti- 
tutionals, who always had more men than rifles and 
guns. When General Obregon, who personally con- 
ducted the battle, reached the city, the Federals were 
well fortified in their positions. The fight lasted a 
whole week, and fighting continued day and night, 
almost without cessation. At the end of that time, 
the Federals were badly beaten and were forced to 
retire to Mazatlan. The taking of Culiacan meant 
to the Constitutionalists more than just an ordinary 
victory. It meant the success of the operations to- 
wards their goal, and the weakening and disintegra- 
tion of the Huerta troops. The winning of this 
battle enabled the Constitutional forces to move 
further south to the Territory of Tepic, where Gen- 
eral Obregon took the city of Acaponeta and San 
Bias by storm. 

The rapidity with which he moved and the per- 
sistency of his attacks won him most of his battles. 
He lost no time, — he did not wait. As soon as he 
had taken San Bias, he did not even wait long 
enough to give his tired soldiers a good rest. He 



Campaign of General Ohregon in the West 131 

moved on to his destination immediately. With his 
characteristic rapid fire action, he moved towards 
Guadalajara In the State of Jalisco. The most in- 
teresting thing about the storming of that city was 
the; capture of fifty-six train loads of supplies. 
Never before had they had such luck. The trains 
were packed with all kinds of provisions, guns, 
rifles, cannon and ammunition. It was one of the 
richest hauls they ever made. 

The conclusion of his march towards the capital 
was marked by a series of successful battles, in spite 
of the difliculties he had in guarding his base of sup- 
plies and the frontier towns. After his victory at 
Guadalajara, he marched on towards Irapuato, 
where he again succeeded in routing the Federal 
troops, and thence proceeded to the city of Mexico. 



CHAPTER XIII 

VILLA AND HIS CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH 

OO much has been written about Francisco Villa 
*^ that only a few preliminary remarks are neces- 
sary to describe the personality of the famous gen- 
eral. The enemies of Villa made the accusation 
that the rebel chief was not respectable because he 
had been an outlaw under the Diaz regime. 

Those who have studied the Diaz rule with a 
mind unbiased by profits and Interests, will have dis- 
covered that If Villa was a bandit under the Diaz 
reign, he certainly must have been an honest one; 
for almost without exception all the officials from 
the President down to the lowest Jefe Politico, were 
robbers, cut-throats and grafters. 

Villa Is not better nor worse than the average 
Mexican, but his weaknesses are those of his un- 
fortunate countrymen, and his strength Is the latent 
strength of his people. 

Villa, although directly responsible for the mutiny 
at Juarez in 19 ii, when with Orozco he almost suc- 
ceeded In eliminating F. I. Madero, discovered that 
the three clentlfico agents In El Paso were the in- 
stigators of the plot. Ever since then Villa re- 

132 




GENERAL S. ALVARADO 
Second in Command under General Obregon 



Villa and His Campaign in the North 133 

mained loyal to Madero and continued to fight 
against Huerta, in memory of Madero. 

All the biographers of Villa spoke of him as a 
Napoleon, who had created an army out of nothing. 
It must not be forgotten that out of one hundred 
and thirty thousand soldiers who fought against the 
military dictatorship, there were at least forty gen- 
erals who created armies out of nothing. They, 
too, were without money, ammunition, arms and 
with even less experience than Villa. 

During his ten or more years as an outlaw. Villa 
was roammg all over the States of Chihuahua and 
Durango, as a leader of lesser outlaws, and his guer- 
rilla experience was invaluable to him later. 

In the case of most other Generals, like Obregon, 
Gonzales, Gutierrez, Natera, Herrera, Chao, Cal- 
les. Hill, Caballero, their experience was insignifi- 
cant. Most of the chiefs who fought the Federals 
were either farmers, lawyers, engineers, clerks who 
had never before handled a gun in their lives till 
the last revolution. 

When Villa crossed the American border into 
Mexico in the spring of 1913, he marched up and 
down the States of Chihuahua, Coahuila and Dur- 
ango. He gathered men, attacking small cities and 
doing very much the same as other revolutionists 
did -— surprising small detachments of Federals in 
outlying districts, and capturing the arms, ammuni- 
tion, and horses which were so badly needed. With 
him were co-operating the Herrera brothers, Chao, 



134 Carranza and Mexico 

Rosallo Hernandez, and in Durango, the Arrieta 
brothers, Contreras, Triana, Carrillo and Urblna. 
They looted the banks to buy arms and ammunition 
from the United States, and stole horses and saddles 
to creat a mobile force and killed cattle to feed them- 
selves. 

The first important battle won by Villa was fought 
In San Andres with eight hundred men against 
fourteen hundred Federals, who were defeated on 
October 4th, 19 13. He attacked, captured and 
sacked Torreon. Near Chihuahua he again de- 
feated the Federals, but as Juarez was still in their 
power, he had to take the border towns before at- 
tempting to fight towards the south. 

How he outwitted the commander of Juarez by 
stealing a ride north of Chihuahua on a train loaded 
with coal, and surprised and drove the commander 
across the border, has been told before. 

The battle of Tierra Blanca, when he defeated 
five thousand Federals who came from Chihuahua 
to relieve Juarez, was his first important strategical 
battle, and as far as the campaign is concerned, is 
the most important, even without excepting the bat- 
tle of Torreon, In April, 19 14. Without the battle 
of Tierra Blanca, no other successes could have had 
any decisive value. In Torreon, Villa had all the 
men, arms and ammunition he wanted, and with 
great recklessness, he sacrificed his men, counting 
only upon results. 

After the capture of Torreon, Saltlllo and Mon- 



Villa and His Campaign in the North 135 

terrey automatically fell into his power, for Torreon 
was the strategic key which opened the way south 
to his army, i. e., the Northern division. 

In another chapter, the causes and details of the 
Carranza-Villa quarrel will be discussed. The 
character of General Villa must be studied, in order 
to understand the underlying causes of the quar- 
rel. 

Villa, like Zapata, Is a man of the peasant class. 
Physically strong, with great will power and a good 
deal of horse sense. In men of this type, due to 
their utter lack of education, and Inexperience in 
politics, they are an easy prey to their secretaries, 
friends, advisers and hangers-on. Being funda- 
mentally honest, they take it for granted that their 
entourage Is likewise, and being unable to read or 
write, they are constantly deceived by their secre- 
taries. In the case of the other generals, like Ob- 
regon, Gonzales, etc., their education and political 
experience put them on their guard against petty, 
scheming politicians, and unscrupulous tools of the 
reactionaries. 

Villa's Ideas outside of stratagems, spoils and 
the game of war, are primitive, and not always clear. 
His appetites and his contempt for human life is 
equal to that of the Apaches and Comanches; his atti- 
tude toward life Is anarchistic, rebellious. Towards 
people he Is cunning, suspicious, ostensibly good- 
natured and at times tyrannical. An uncontrollable 
temper is softened by a keen sense of humor, and a 



136 Carranza and Mexico 

lavish generosity is encouraged by a propensity to 
acquisitiveness. 

Villa is so terribly suspicious of everything and 
everybody, that he has been accused of being not 
quite so brave as he wants to appear. General 
Maclovio Herrera is admired for his courage and 
is nicknamed " the Lion ": Villa has an unbounded 
respect for him, tinged with a little envy. Villa's 
enemies claim that he went to Aguascahentes escorted 
by eighteen thousand soldiers, because he was afraid, 
— although the other generals had none but body- 
guards. 

When Obregon was sent by Carranza to join 
Villa In a solution of the Sonora controversy between 
Maytorena and Hill, he went alone. Villa soon 
lost his temper and had Obregon arrested, and 
threatened to have him shot by his soldiers unless 
he acceded to his demands. Obregon, calm and 

cool, answered : " My life belongs to Mexico, If 

you believe that my death is necessary to the solution 
of the question, I am ready to sacrifice it. I came 
here to meet Villa the patriot: I find a savage 
Villa who calls himself the savior of Mexico." The 
manly and courageous attitude of Obregon con- 
quered Villa, who instead of ordering an execution, 
gave a ball in his honor. 

When Carranza was in Chihuahua with Villa 
after the fall of Torreon, he heard that Villa had 
ordered the execution of General Chao, Governor 
of Chihuahua. Villa was asked to appear before 



Villa and His Campaign in the North 137 

Carranza, who demanded an explanation. " I have 
shot Cfiao," grinned Villa. Carranza was very in- 
dignant, and protested vehemently. Then Villa 
laughed, and admitted that the order had not been 
carried out. Carranza ordered him to free Chao 
immediately, and said to him : " You have no right 
to arrest and shoot an official not under your im- 
mediate command, without my authority, especially 
a governor who is under my jurisdiction. Am I 
the chief of the revolution or am I not? " Villa 
was impressed and he ordered the release of Chao. 
He excused himself by saying that Chao had 
grafted. Later it was discovered that Villa's secre- 
tary had sent orders to Chao, Villa not being able to 
read what he had signed, and the whole scheme was 
engineered by Villa's secretary to get rid of Chao, 
who was his personal enemy. Villa embraced Chao 
as a result. 

One of Villa's many wives was enterprising 
enough to induce Villa to let her sign some treasury 
notes, which were honored by the officials, who did 
not dare refuse. 

Once, Villa gave an order for the exportation 
through Juarez of $5000 worth of material. The 
Secretary changed the order from five, to fifty thou- 
sand, which without his knowledge had been tele- 
graphed to the official in charge of the Custom 
House in Juarez. The honest official refused to let 
the goods pass the border, and the irate Villa almost 
shot him for disobedience. Finally the matter was 



138 Carranza and Mexico 

cleared up, and Villa declared that he had ordered 
five, and not fifty, thousand dollars' worth. " But 
here is the order signed by you," said the official. 
Villa had been deceived again, as he has been all 
along by his secretaries. The two following tele- 
grams, one from Villa, and the answer of the Ar- 
rieta Brothers, will throw a very clear light on the 
attitude of Villa toward Carranza. It will also 
prove that the majority of the generals do not sym- 
pathize with Villa, as he is making a personal ques- 
tion, or better said, an alleged insult to his division, 
a pretext to overthrow Carranza, and become the 
political dictator of Mexico. 

TELEGRAM. 

Chihuahua, General Headquarters, 

Sept. 23d, 1914. 
Urgent. 

Generals Mariano and Domingo Arrieta. 

Durango, Dgo. 

Venustiano Carranza having deeply offended the honor 
and dignity of the Northern Division under my command, 
and not being able to tolerate any longer his whims and 
inconsequences, which would have sunk our country in 
ruins, disseminating anarchy, while creating distrust with 
foreign nations, — since yesterday, all my generals and 
myself have decided to repudiate him as Chief of the Na- 
tion. 

For we are convinced that because of his alliance with the 
cientificos and his noted tendencies to favor a certain per- 
sonal group which surrounded him, and prevented the solu- 



Villa and His Campaign in the North 139 

tion of the real revolutionists, and to fulfil the promises 
made to the people. 

As a consequence we have decided to fight only against 
the personality of Venustiano Carranza, and to drive him 
out of the country, without antagonizing or molesting the 
other chiefs who have fought to overthrow the usurping 
government which has just fallen. Therefore we repeat 
that our movement is solely against the personality of 
Venustiano Carranza. 

As we have always understood that you have been ani- 
mated by patriotic sentiments, like ourselves, we address 
ourselves to you, showing you the matter clearly, and we 
hope that in view of the right which is on our side, you will 
be with us, and will help by offering your services to the 
cause of the people. 

Already the Governor of the State of Sonora and his 
forces, have repudiated Venustiano Carranza, and we hope 
that you will act likewise and will define your position in- 
forming us if you are with us or with Carranza. 

JVVe beg you to answer as soon as possible. Greetings. 

The General in Chief, 

Francisco Villa. 

Answer to the above telegram. 

DuRANGo TO Chihuahua, Sept. 24th, 1914. 
Senor General Don Francisco Villa, 
Chihuahua. 
We are in receipt of your telegram, in which you declare 
that the division under your command has repudiated the 
authority as Provisional President, of Don Venustiano Car- 
ranza, because of insults to the dignity of said Division and 
for not having fulfilled the promises made to the people. 



140 Carranza and Mexico 

We discover in your telegram a certain ambiguity, as 
we have no knowledge of the insults to which you refer. 

Concerning the promises made to the people, we con- 
I sider your pretentions premature, as a convention has been 
named to meet on the first of October, in which clearly and 
explicitly the programme of the government will be dis- 
cussed and studied, so as to solve the various problems which 
will benefit the proletariat. 

Therefore we would be grateful, if you would communi- 
cate to us the nature of the insults to which you refer, and 
the cause of the people which has been frustrated, so that we 
can intelligently come to a decision. 

And lastly we appeal to your patriotism and the interest 
of the country which through this break would be more 
weakened, and be at the mercy of the American nation, 
which has not retired its troops from Vera Cruz. We beg 
of you if you are a real patriot, to calm your temper and 
meditate on the evils which would befall our country with 
this civil war — which would bring about as a consequence 
a foreign war. 

1st. We are of the opinion that you should sacrifice 
your self-love for the good of the country, and you should 
not take notice of said insults, even if they existed. 

Secondly. That we hope that the Convention which is 
to take place on the first of October, when all the Consti- 
tutionalist forces will be represented, to solve the great 
problems of our country, will put them into effect with the 
assistance of the arms which we will not relinquish until 
our ideals have been fulfilled. 

Hoping for an answer to give our definite resolution, we 

salute you affectionately, r^ t>. \ 

General Domingo Arrieta, 

General Mariano Arrieta. 



Villa and His Campaign ifi the North 141 

As an answer, Villa sent General Urbina against 
the Arrieta Brothers. Urbina and his forces were 
defeated, and the general badly wounded. Inno- 
cent, well-meaning, but utterly deceived Villa! If 
he only knew that the Cientificos whom he accuses 
of having aiSiliated with Carranza, are really pull- 
ing their wires from New York, and using him 
(Villa) as the tool to eliminate Carranza, and this 
because the first chief intends to carry out all the 
radical reforms of the revolution. 



CHAPTER XIV 

CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL GONZALEZ IN THE EAST 

LIKE most of the campaigns in the north of Mex- 
ico, where the strategic objectives are the 
border towns, so the campaign of General Gonzalez 
was fought, first for the possession of Piedras Ne- 
gras (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz), Nuevo Laredo, Ca- 
margo and Matamoros, and later for the control 
of Tamaulipas. 

The first battle of the revolution against Huerta 
was fought at Anhelo and ended in a defeat. Then 
Venustiano Carranza, with his brother Jesus Car- 
ranza, and Pablo Gonzalez, took Piedras Negras. 

Huerta, as well as his generals, were of the opin- 
ion that if Carranza was captured and shot, it would 
end the constitutionalist revolution then and there. 
Therefore, they concentrated all their efforts upon 
Piedras Negras, which was defended by four hun- 
dred men. More than 9,000 Federals were sent 
against them, and although the revolutionists were 
forced to leave, the enemy did not succeed In cap- 
turing the leaders. 

Then Pablo Gonzalez, with the help of Jesus 
Carranza, roamed all over the States of Coahuila 

142 




GENERAL PABLO GONZALEZ 

Chief of the Eastern Division 



Campaign of General Gonzalez in the East 143 

and Nuevo Leon defeating over twenty Federal gar- 
risons and capturing the much needed arms and am- 
munition, which were so scarce and hard to get at 
the beginning of the struggle. 

It Is a fact worth noticing that, in the three cam- 
paigns in the North, Centre and South, the revo- 
lutionists captured many cities, and then departed. 
To the lay mind it seems absurd to fight so hard 
to capture a city, and then to let it go almost im- 
mediately without even waiting for the Federals to 
retake it. Nevertheless, it was good tactics. The 
Federal garrisons offered big stores of war material, 
while the cities supplied them with food, clothing 
and money. 

Monterrey was attacked twice without success, 
and there was no chance of victory until Torreon, 
Piedras Negras, Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros and 
Tampico were in the hands of Pablo Gonzalez. 
When that was done, Monterrey was automatically 
evacuated by the Federals. 

Tampico was attacked several times and besieged 
by Caballero. The Federals had a great advan- 
tage, as they controlled the city with their gunboats. 
Another drawback was the presence of foreign war 
ships, of foreign Consuls and representatives of 
the great oil corporations. The Dutch, English and 
American Oil Companies protested most vigorously 
against the attack on Tampico, and the Federals 
took good care to use this protection to great ad- 
vantage. 



144 Carranza and Mexico 

When Pablo Gonzalez was ordered to take Tam- 
pico at all costs, he did so after only four days' bat- 
tle. When the Federals began their retreat, they 
threatened to burn and destroy all the oil tanks and 
property of the foreigners, if they were followed by 
the Revolutionists. 

Like many of the important moves in the cam- 
paign against Huerta, the great significance of the 
capture of Tampico was pointed out by a civilian. 
In this instance, the Secretary of the Interior in Car- 
ranza's revolutionary Cabinet, Don Rafael Zu- 
baran, was the wise counsellor. 

The first reason given was that Huerta had prac- 
tically given away many very valuable oil conces- 
sions to an English company, in return for cash. 
That the export tax on each barrel of oil was 
doubled from sixty cents to $1.20 and calculating 
that over half a million barrels of oil were exported 
daily, it will be seen what a rich source of income 
would have been taken away from Huerta. 

The second reason was that the seizure of Tam- 
pico would eliminate a great source of friction be- 
tween the foreign powers and the revolutionary 
government, besides relieving the anxiety felt in 
Washington as to the constant danger of foreign 
marines landing in Tampico to protect the interests 
of their countrymen. 

The third reason was that Tampico, besides be- 
ing the most important seaport in Mexico after 
Vera Cruz, was also a great strategic point. It cut 



Campaign of General Gonzalez in the East 145 

off Monterrey and Saltillo from the coast, and 
endangered and flanked their communications. 
Huerta considered the possession of Tampico of 
such value that when it was threatened by the rebels, 
and he knew that it was lost to him, he decided to 
force American intervention by arresting some ma- 
rines who had landed at the Tampico wharf on 
routine business. The action was deliberate and 
was meant to concentrate the attention of the revo- 
lutionists on American aggression, so that they 
would discontinue their attacks. The State and 
Navy Department very wisely kept the American 
warship outside of the Panuco River so as to offer 
as few pretexts as possible for attacks. It can be 
asserted that the fall of Tampico sounded the end 
of Huerta's rule in Mexico. 



CHAPTER XV 

ZAPATA AND HIS CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH 

TTNDOUBTEDLY there Is no Mexican who 
^^ has been talked about, described, praised and 
vilified more than Emiliano Zapata, in the last four 
years. Now everybody can pronounce his name In 
America, for it has become a byword of the revo- 
lution In Mexico. 

Innumerable articles have been written In Amer- 
ica on Zapata but I have only met two men who had 
seen him, — one was a Mexican newspaperman and 
the other was a federal major who slept in the same 
room with him, unconscious of the fact that a few 
feet from his bed there was the man he was sup- 
posed to capture dead or alive for Huerta, with 
three thousand soldiers. When he did discover this 
interesting fact, Zapata was miles away. This In- 
cident proved conclusively that the southern chief 
could not be caught by force, and that the Indians 
in Morelos would as sogn think of committing sui- 
cide as to betray him. 

The nature of the volcanic country in the State 
of Morelos makes It very hard for a body of sol- 
diers to march through It without danger of being 

146 



Zapata and His Campaign in the South 147 

surprised and ambushed almost every hundred 
yards. Every peon in Morelos and many other 
southern States is a Zapatista. 

No man could have held such power as Zapata 
over the population of almost three States, by offer- 
ing in return only the spoils of war or brigandage. 
No bandit ever controlled thirty thousand men on 
the mere results or promise of loot or theft. The 
Zapatistas, with few exceptions, are all for the 
abolition of all forms of slavery and for the distri- 
bution of lands. Although Zapata is not the intel- 
lectual leader of the. Zapatistas, his name has be- 
come a legend. Many people claim that he never 
existed, others claim that Genovevo de la O was 
the braver and more intelligent of the two, and the 
real leader. 

There were several leaders who fought Diaz be- 
fore Zapata became prominent, but the Morelian 
chief represented the deepest yearnings, the most 
profound aspirations and all the unspoken desires 
of a miserable, downtrodden, but patient, long-suf- 
fering and kindly race. Any one who has visited 
that Garden of Eden of Mexico, the State of More- 
los, will bear testimony to the simplicity, morality 
and patience of the Morelian Indians, their love of 
the soil which is almost a passion, their sterling 
qualities. 

The injustices, robberies and cruelties perpetrated 
on the Indians are almost incredible, and almost un- 
believable in our century. Until the European war 



148 Carranza and Mexico 

started, civilized people did not believe that sol- 
diers could be so cruel, reckless and ruthless against 
an enemy. 

Zapata's and Villa's wholesale shooting of pris- 
oners, the looting of haciendas, banks and stores in 
captured cities, their retaliation against federal of- 
ficers, now seem like kid-glove, pink-tea affairs, after 
the stories of German atrocities. In the light of 
these atrocities. Villa might be a Mexican Chester- 
field, and Zapata a scrupulous Morelian hidalgo of 
the most fastidious tastes. Strange to relate, the 
most virulent attacks against Mexican civilization, 
methods of warfare and revolutionary barbarities, 
were written by German editorialists. The Mex- 
icans had no Treitschkes, Nietzsches, von Bern- 
hardis to sing the pasans of war, of the destruction 
and annihilation of enemies, and inoffensive non- 
combatants in the name of a higher culture and a 
greater civilization. 

The precedents of cruelties and wanton destruc- 
tion were created by the federal officers under Diaz 
and Huerta. W^here the Federals passed, they left 
a trail of death and desolation. To prove that they 
had fought valiantly the Federals killed peaceful 
peons and sent the ears of the Indians as vouchers 
to the War Department. 

Whole villages passed through fire and sword — 
in others all the men were impressed into the army, 
and the women and children concentrated In the 
cities. Thousands of fruit trees that had been 



Zapata and His Campaign in the South 149 

growing for years, bearing fruit, and which were 
the sole source of Income of families of peons, were 
ruthlessly cut down to be sold for firewood by 
greedy Jefes Politlcos. A whole population was 
decimated because it would not stay under the leash 
of the slave driver on the sugar and tobacco plan- 
tations owned by half a dozen rich families. 

Their day of reckoning has almost arrived, and 
no matter what Zapata or any other leader may do 
politically, the peons of Morelos know that the lands 
are theirs for the taking. 

Morelos is one of the smallest States in Mexico, 
and one of the richest, and has an area of 2,734 
square miles and a population of 179,114. As 
many as thirty thousand soldiers with machine guns 
and cannon were sent to conquer Zapata and his 
army, but Zapata remained unconquered. All the 
generals, including Huerta, who had won laurels In 
many battlefields, invariably lost them in Morelos. 
The Federals fought according to book-strategy, 
while Zapata and his chiefs fought with the same 
fabian tactics which defeated Hannibal in Italy and 
Napoleon in Spain. When the patient. Ignorant, 
but physically powerful Indians discovered that they 
could shoot and fight as well as the trained Fed- 
erals, and that a few thousand Indians banded to- 
gether could keep at bay a whole army of Federals, 
the struggle for land was won. 

But there Is the reverse of the medal. As all 
strong people have their compensation in some flaw, 



150 Carranza and Mexico 

so has Zapata a great weakness which prevents him 
from becoming the greatest factor for good in his 
country. His illiteracy, coupled with a lack of 
knowledge of politicians of the middle and higher 
class, make him an easy prey to all sorts of schemers 
and intriguers. 

For years Zapata kept up his guerrilla warfare, 
accompanied by a staff of officers and several secre- 
taries. One of the most famous was a certain Mon- 
tano, a school-teacher who wrote the first plan which 
Zapata endorsed. The second plan, which was 
written by a certain Palafox, another secretary, and 
was named the Plan of Ayala, which acknowledged 
Orozco as the provisional president, when he re- 
belled against Madero, assisted by Clentifico money. 

After Madero's murder, Orozco joined the stand- 
ard of Huerta, who, true to his usual methods, tried 
to use Orozco's influence with Zapata, to eliminate 
him. Orozco went to Morelos for the purpose of 
conferring with Zapata, but the wily Morelian had 
discovered that the meeting was not meant to bring 
peace, but to facilitate his capture and murder. As 
Orozco was not very brave, and his conscience not 
very clear, instead of going personally to the meet- 
ing, he sent Instead his father and two other agents. 
As an answer to the contemplated plot, Zapata took 
Orozco's father and his two agents as prisoners. 
Later they were found dead, after an attack by the 
Federals. 

Orozco vowed vengeance, but he left Cuernavaca 



Zapata and His Campaign In the South 151 

in great haste under the pretext of going North to 
fight the Constitutionalists, where he was defeated 
at every encounter. Any one who had read Mex- 
ican newspapers would have known how discredited 
Orozco's personality was, but Zapata's secretaries 
wanted a continuation of conditions wherein they 
would run the Morelian chief for their own benefit. 
When Carranza arrived in Mexico City with the 
constitutionalist government, he sent two agents to 
Zapata, with power to settle the agrarian question 
in Morelos, once for all. The following letter by 
Gen. A. I. Villareal will show how Zapata's secre- 
taries spoiled the settlement. 

Mexico, Sept. 5th, 1914. 
General Emiliano Zapata: 

Cuernavaca, Mor. 
Esteemed General: 

I had the pleasure of receiving the last letter, which 
you were kind enough to send through Mr. Reyes and 
in which you express the fact that you were to blame for 
the incident at Huitzilac. I must advise you that this 
matter was not one of much importance, and it seems that 
they gave you exaggerated reports of the same. What we 
consider a grave affair, and was really a sad one regard- 
ing which we went to consult you with the object of arriv- 
ing at an agreement between the revolutionary elements of 
the North and the South, was the unjustified conduct and 
belligerent attitude of your secretary, Mr. Manuel Palafox, 
in respect to whom I intend to speak in this letter with the 
most absolute and honest frankness; believing in this way 



152 Carranza and Mexico 

that I may do you a good turn, not alone yourself person- 
ally but also the cause of the well-being of the public which 
we must all defend and also the peace of the nation. 

If you critically analyze the happenings which occurred 
during our visit in this city, and to which I beg to call 
your attention, you will discover in a moment that all the 
difficulties, all the petty misunderstandings, all the threats 
of war, emanated principally from Mr. Palafox supported 
by Mr. Serratos, who also in our opinion is carrying on 
work right in your office that is very far from being patriotic 
and loyal. 

It Is always the case that when various people come to- 
gether to settle great or small diflferences which may exist 
between them, it is understood if they work in good faith 
and the matters treated of are thoroughly talked over, that 
some points are ceded by one party and some by the other 
party; there must be reciprocity in the arrangements, and 
a definite conclusion reached regarding the subject under 
discussion. To continue, conferences held with regard to 
any matter must not be reduced to the party on one side 
imposing a settlement and the parties on the other side 
accepting the same without discussing the propositions for 
and against and coming to a mutual agreement. 

Unfortunately, in our case this which was the rational 
and just method of procedure did not take place, because 
as you will remember Mr. Palafox, who was the spokesman 
during the discussions almost prevented us from setting 
forth our side of the subject, and attempted to Impose upon 
us certain conditions which would have to be accepted un- 
conditionally as preliminaries before arriving at a resolu- 
tion. 

You will recollect that Mr. Palafox demanded as a first 



Za-pata and His Campaign in the South 153 

condition that as revolutionaries of the North we should 
accept without discussion the Plan of Ayala as the Supreme 
Law of the Republic, declaring that otherwise it would be 
impossible to treat of other matters. 

This is in direct contradiction to your declarations, that 
you had no ambition for power; for in one of the clauses 
of the Plan of Ayala it states that General Pascual Orozco 
is recognized as leader of the revolution, and in case he is 
not able to discharge that task, you will be eligible; and as 
our complete submission to the Plan of Ayala is demanded 
it would intimate that we ought to place you in the posi- 
tion of the Supreme Chief of the Nation and in a more 
or less covert manner, you would be Provisional President 
of the Republic. 

I believe in the sincerity of your words when you say 
that you have no ambition to command, that all you want 
is the settlement of the agrarian question and the economic 
betterment of the lower classes for which you have struggled 
so bravely. But back of this is Mr. Palafox, who has the 
ambition to rule, and who is desirous to see you raised to 
supreme power so that he may enjoy a privileged position 
in your office in his character of Secretary and Councillor. 
The same object animated Mr. Serratos more or less who 
also enjoys a certain amount of influence regarding your 
affairs, and doubtless awaits the auspicious moment of utiliz- 
ing the same for his own benefit. 

You will remember that Don Luis Cabrera and I set 
forth very clearly that we were authorized to accept es- 
sentially the Plan of Ayala; that is, the land question, the 
satisfaction of the popular needs, the betterment of the 
poor. We hereby declare that we agree fully with the 
principles set forth in the Plan of Ayala, and only desire 



154 Carrajiza and Mexico 

that its form may be modified, and that there may be added to 
the gubernatorial programme which we might draw up some 
clauses relative to the needs of the Northern States and the 
States in the centre of the Republic, which are not in the 
same condition as those of the south. Messrs. Palafox and 
Serratos refused to accept our cordial and just propositions, 
and insisted in a blind, unquestionable, despotic manner 
that the Plan of Ayala be accepted, without the change of a 
word or a comma. 

Convinced that the influence of Messrs. Palafox and 
Serratos over you would make sterile all our efforts for 
coming to an agreement in the form which we proposed, we 
declined to start a discussion which only might have served 
to embitter our souls and to give rise to more ill-feeling 
than what we suffered in the course of our conversation with 
you. For our part we found ourselves in a visibly hostile 
atmosphere, and we lacked the liberty necessary for the 
free expression of our opinions. 

When Mr. Sarabia spoke with you for the first time, he 
wrote me stating that your attitude was cordial and that he 
saw that your propositions of peace were sincere. On the 
occasion of our meeting with you our surprise was great 
to find you different from what Mr. Sarabia had represented. 
This may be easily explained that the first time you 
spoke with Mr. Sarabia you were guided by your own im- 
pulses and by your good intentions, and the second time 
you were under the influence of the unhealthy machinations 
of Mr. Palafox. 

The question then is reduced to the following facts: 
On our part the greatest and most sincere cordiality, the 
recognition of the justice of your cause, the acceptance of the 
principles of the plan of Ayala relating to the division of 



Zapata and His Campaign in the South 155 

lands and the social betterment; on your part, good impulses, 
no ambition for power, and the exclusive desire for the 
welfare of the public; and on the part of Mr. Palafox and 
Mr. Serratos a spirit of intrigue that distorts the best in- 
tentions, ambitions for power in your hands with a view 
to thriving in your shadow, and a decided object of pro- 
voking war if their ambitions should not be satisfied. 

Is not this sad, General Zapata? Is it not deeply to be 
lamented that all the patriotic efforts of honorable men 
shall go to pieces before the caprices of two intriguers? 
Is it not bitter and even shameful that a movement as great 
and unselfish as yours after four years of struggle should 
degenerate by reason of an instrument of vile ambition and 
in an ignoble weapon for bringing war a second time on a 
country already exhausted in its struggle for independence? 

I make a supreme appeal to your honor, to your patriot- 
ism, to your love of the people, who would be in the last 
analysis those who would suffer most from a war, that you 
take into consideration what we said when we were with 
you, and which I again repeat in this letter, that we may 
arrive at a good understanding with the revolutionaries of 
the north and the south, who in reality are brothers. 

We know that we have done all in our power to arrive 
at a peaceful solution, and if at length it might be found 
impossible to reach it, it will not be through our fault. 

God grant that to-morrow I may not have to tell you 
that through attending to the intrigues of an ambitious party 
more than to the dictates of patriotism, you may be to 
blame for the beginning of a war which would be thoroughly 
unjustifiable, which no one wants and which would do no 
one any good! 

I believe that after what I have said it is only necessary 



156 Carranza and Mexico 

to add the following: That while Palafox continues at 
your side enjoying the influence that he does, it will be 
impossible for us to return to see you at Cuernavaca, nor 
for us to send other representatives, for we consider that we 
would not have, as we did not, the necessary liberty to treat 
with frankness and amplitude the transcendental subject 
which is under our discussion. 

We would be very thankful to know that you had re- 
solved to act independently of your harmful counsellor; and 
in such a case we consider that it would be easy enough to 
arrive at a settlement. 

In place of Mr, Palafox you should be able to consult 
your principal chiefs, who have struggled faithfully for the 
cause, and you will surely find among them better standards 
and better counsel than from your ancient secretary. 

I know that the majority of your chieftains hold Mr. 
Palafox in scant esteem and do not care for him ; and if they 
have not so expressed themselves to you it has been perhaps 
through lack of opportunity or excess of discipline. Now 
it would be convenient that you consult them regarding this 
matter. 

I trust, Mr. General, in your good judgment and sense 
of right, to kindly bear in mind with a spirit of serenity and 
justice what we have set before you, and unite your efforts 
to ours with a view to realizing the peace which our Re- 
public needs so much, without lessening the agrarian ideals 
for which you have struggled for so long a time. 

I am happy to sign myself. 

Yours affectionate and loyal friend, 

Antonio I. Villarreal. 



CHAPTER XVI 

ONE HUNDRED YEARS' STRUGGLE FOR LAND AND 
DEMOCRACY, AGAINST CLERICALISM 

TN August, 152 1, Cortez consummated the con- 
■*• quest of New Spain and in August, 1821, under 
Iturbide, the independence of Mexico was wrested 
from the mother country. 

For exactly three hundred years Spain governed 
Mexico with soldiers and priests. Ten prelates of 
the Dominican order, out of a list of sixty-two vice- 
roys, had ruled New Spain, which was surrounded 
with a ring that was mightier than a Chinese wall. 

Education, outside of religious teaching, was dis- 
couraged. Communication with the outside world 
was forbidden. Spain fed New Spain commercially, 
politically and intellectually. 

The Mexican born was allowed no privileges, no 
rights. The Spaniards, soldiers, priests and aris- 
tocrats monopolized everything; all the offices, the 
commerce, the property, were theirs. Four-fifths 
of the lands were in the hands of the Church. 

In 181 1 an ex-priest, Hidalgo, unfurled the ban- 
ner of the revolution by the shouts of: " Long live 
Religion! Death to bad Government! Death to 
the Gachupines ! " (Spaniards). 

157 



158 Carranza and Mexico 

The revolution for freedom from Spanish rule 
was initiated by an ex-priest. Morelos, Mata- 
moros, Dr. Cos, and Navarrete, who continued the 
struggle, were all ex-priests. Great personalities 
appeared In the ten years' revolution, such as Al- 
varez, Guerrero, Bravo, Victoria. The Mexican 
revolutionists were battling for political liberty and 
land. 

When the Church realized that Mexico was lost 
to Spain, It put forward a Spanish officer, Iturbide, 
as the Liberator. Iturbide betrayed his own king, 
and after accepting the first Constitution, betrayed 
the revolution and became emperor by means of a 
military " cuartelazo " (mutiny). 

The Mexican liberals fought continuously the en- 
croachments of the Church, which used the army 
to support it politically. The military strength cre- 
ated by the Church and landowners was maintained, 
not to protect the nation from foreign aggression, 
but to guard the government from the assaults of 
the people. 

The climax of the struggle took place during the 
three years' war, 1 857-1 860, when the liberal lead- 
ers enforced the laws of the reform, which entitled 
the nation to possess all the properties of the clergy, 
both religious and secular, and the Church was de- 
nied the right to own real estate. 

Religious orders as contrary to public welfare 
were dissolved. Church and State were absolutely 



One Hundred Years' Struggle 159 

separated, and religious freedom was fully and 
firmly established. 

Benito Juarez, a pure-blooded Indian, continued 
the strife of the Liberals, initiated by Gomez Farias, 
Melchior Ocampo and other martyrs of the cause. 
After the three years' war, the Church was osten- 
sibly eliminated as a political power. The land 
which had been absorbed by the Church from the 
Indians, and known as " egidos," communal lands, 
reverted to them, and over three million Indians be- 
came small landowners. 

Defeated but not discouraged, the clericals then 
brought about French intervention and placed on 
the throne of Mexico a clerical, Emperor Maxi- 
milian, who met his defeat and death in Queretaro 
in 1867. 

Porfirio Diaz came into power as a liberal 
through a revolution, and ended as a clerical. Under 
his regime of spoliation, all the lands which belonged 
to the Indians were taken away from them by trick- 
ery and legal frauds, and distributed among Diaz* 
generals and political supporters. Government land 
was sold to foreigners. 

Through the influence of Carmelita Diaz, the 
wife of General Diaz, the religious orders, foreign 
priests, friars and nuns, came back to Mexico and 
acquired property, and the clericals began reorgan- 
izing themselves and taking breath for another 
struggle which they knew was coming soon. When 



i6o Carranza and Mexico 

Diaz was tottering to his fall, the Church placed the 
clerical, De la Barra, in the provisional presidency. 
The Madero cabinet was composed of clericals and 
neo-Cientificos who sat tight in a passive policy of 
non-intervention in Mexican internal affairs, as if 
the government reforms were none of their business. 

Meanwhile, the clericals were very active polit- 
ically and financially; they contributed millions of 
dollars to the downfall of the Madero government. 
As usual, the clericals corrupted the army chiefs, 
and succeeded in having the reform government 
overthrown. 

Dr. Urrutia, a pupil of the Jesuit College, was 
the instigator and chief plotter. He picked out 
Huerta as the most convenient tool for the Church. 
Huerta, although a Catholic, was a most unscrupu- 
lous and ambitious man, and used the Church as a 
stepping-stone. He received millions of dollars 
from the clergy, from the landowners, and the for- 
eigners, such as bankers and mining and oil Inter- 
ests. During Huerta's regime. Dr. Urrutia was the 
Mephisto and lago of Huerta. 

As soon as Huerta was in power and the higher 
clergy began to notice the unpopularity of the dic- 
tator, they began plotting his assassination or over- 
throw. Huerta, who trusted Dr. Urrutia more 
than any other man in Mexico except General Blan- 
quet, made him Minister of the Interior, and upon 
his shoulders fell the responsibility of the murder 



One Hundred Years' Struggle i6i 

of scores, nay, hundreds, of political enemies of the 
Huerta regime. 

As long as Dr. Urrutia and his friends, Mora 
the Archbishop of Mexico, Jenaro Mendez, Arch- 
bishop of Michoacan, Eulogio G. Gillow, Arch- 
bishop of Oaxaca, Ramon, Archbishop of Puebla — 
in fact, almost all the archbishops of Mexico, were 
plotting with Dr. Urrutia for the elimination of 
the enemies of the dictatorship, Huerta seems to 
have made no objection. The following letter, ad- 
dressed to Dr. Urrutia, Minister of the Interior, by 
the Archbishop of Mexico City, silences the state- 
ments made by Catholics in America and Mexico, 
that the Church was neutral and did not play 
politics. 

LETTER FROM ARCHBISHOP MORA TO URRUTIA 

Mexico, July nth, 1913. 
My dear Minister and friend : 

Thanking you for the kind terms of your favor of the 
9th inst. which I received yesterday, I beg to assure you 
once more that all the curates and priests under 
MY jurisdiction, in compliance with their duty, will make 
every efFort in order to bring about as soon as possible, the 
fulfilment of the aspirations of all the good people in this 
republic, who desire the peace and tranquillity of the be- 
loved country. 

I say that they do so in compliance with their duty be- 
cause the Church desires peace, and to avoid bloodshed, and 
that all co-operate to the ultimate object of society, which is 
the well-being of all its members. 



1 62 Carranza and Mexico 

In this sense, I shall continue to animate them to lose no 
opportunity to exhort their parishioners to help to obtain 
this great boon. 

In order to proceed in all justice, I would like, if you have 
no objection, to know the name of the person who is work- 
ing against the government. One word from you on the 
subject will be sufficient. 

I enclose a Memo, of something which may be of use to 
you, and which has come to my knowledge from trust- 
worthy sources. 

With kindest greetings, and assuring you of my thank- 
fulness, friendship and respect, I beg to remain, 
Very respectfully, 

Jose, Archbishop of Mexico. 

Dr. Urruita, emboldened by his success in elim- 
inating so many enemies by assassination, and in his 
formidable and terror-inspiring position as official 
executioner of Huerta, became ambitious. The 
high clergy of Mexico encouraged his pretentions, 
and began sending out feelers to discover If he 
would be willing and ready to oust Huerta and place 
himself In Huerta's stead as dictator. But Huerta 
was wide-awake, and as soon as he discovered the 
plot, he gave orders to have Urrutia arrested. 
Urrutia escaped by the skin of his teeth; disguised 
as an Indian peon he crossed the American lines to 
Vera Cruz, where he was almost lynched by the In- 
furiated Mexicans. 

The following letter from the Archbishop of 
Michoacan proves irrefutably that the Mexican 



One Hundred Years' Struggle 163 

clergy had plotted to place one of the most das- 
tardly, cruel and infamous men in Mexico, in the 
culminating position of Chief Executive of the Re- 
public, as a protege and tool of the Church in 
Mexico. 

LETTER OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF MICHOACAN TO 
MINISTER URRUTIA 

September nth, 191 3. 
My dear compadre: 

The timely measures taken by you saved this city from 
being ravaged by the rebel gangs which have been concen- 
trating in these localities to the number of over a thou- 
sand strong, but now, I think I can assure you that if the 
detachment which has just arrived, pursues them, this part 
of the State will soon be pacified. 

The principal object of this letter is to ask you to relieve 
me of a great anxiety under which I am laboring, and which 
has been caused by the aggressive and almost scandalous 
attitude taken in public by Mr. Calero and a small group 
of porristas, against your good self. I can well see that their 
object is to tarnish the glory which you have so justly won, 
and to alienate your adherents all over the republic. 

But they will not accomplish anything, because all the 
sensible men know very well the envy and intrigues that 
animate these degraded people. Although I am at ease 
on that score, my profound sympathy and affection for you 
make me fear that these men's intrigues might put obstacles 
on the path that Our Lord and His Blessed Mother have 

PUT BEFORE YOU TO CLIMB TO THE CULMINATING POSITION 
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE REPUBLIC, which position 



164 Carranza and Mexico 

will require of you the greatest sacrifice, but will at the 
same time lay before you a vast field in which to exercise 
your activity for the glory and honor of God, and for the 
benefit of our beloved country. 

In the meantime I beg of you to tell me confidentially if 
this threat of Calero is to be feared, or whether you think it 
will be easy for you to humiliate the efforts of these up- 
starts. 

Your compadre etc., 

Jenaro Mendez, 
Archbishop of Michoacan. 

The flight of several archbishops from Mexico 
was not due so much to their fear of the persecu- 
tions of the Constitutionalists but more to the terror 
of the retaliations of General Huerta. The Mex- 
ican clergy enlisted the sympathy of the American 
Catholics and of the Pope In Rome, in their ap- 
peals for protection. The Impression has been 
given that the Mexican clergy Is a victim of the 
persecutions of the Constitutionalists, who want to 
destroy religion. 

What the Mexican liberals, as well as the leaders 
among the Indians, are after, Is the elimination of 
the clergy from the political arena. The political 
activities of the clericals will only result In disas- 
trous effects — their abstention from It will only en- 
hance their spiritual supremacy. 

At Aguascallentes, one of the delegates of Za- 
pata, Paulino Martinez, said before the assembled 
generals : " The Indian, the peon, the worklngman 



One Hundred Years' Struggle 165 

of all the factories, the artisans in the cities, were 
all exploited by that odious trinity formed by the 
cacique, the military man and the priest. 

Carranza never said a more profound truth, than 
when he stated, at the beginning of the revolution 
against Huerta — " We are fighting the 
Three Years' War all over again." 

The religious question In Mexico has to be set- 
tled once for all by the Mexicans themselves, and 
the pernicious Interferences by the Mexican clergy, 
which tries to enlist the sympathy, influence and in- 
tervention of the American or foreign Catholics, will 
only revert to the disadvantage of all the fair think- 
ing, just Catholics, who, if they are sincere in their 
claims that they do not mix In politics, will find that 
the safest and most practical thing to do is to keep 
neutral in a family quarrel. Otherwise they might 
burn their fingers. 



CHAPTER XVII 

ATTEMPTS AT THE SOLUTION OF THE LAND 
QUESTION 

QEVERAL attempts have been made during the 
*^ last four years to solve the land p;*oblem in the 
States of Morelos, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua. Other 
States have followed in the wake in a more or less 
radical manner according to the conditions of the 
peons and the necessity for cultivating the land to 
feed the population. 

The most Interesting of all attempts was initiated 
by Gen. Lucio Blanco who was fighting under Gen. 
Pablo Gonzalez in the division of the East. Any 
one taking the trouble to look up the map of Mex- 
ico will observe that the State of Tamaulipas 
touches the border of the United States from the 
mouth of the Rio Grande (Matamoros) to Nuevo 
Laredo. Along the line of that strip, on the most 
fertile parts which can be irrigated by the waters 
of the Rio Grande, were lands which belonged to 
small tenants and in many cases were communal 
lands " egidos " belonging to Indians. 

Under the Diaz regime in the last ten years of 
his rule, Felix Diaz, the nephew of the dictator, 

i66 



Attempts at Solution of the Land Question 167 

was able to expropriate most of those lands with 
the assistance of the governor and the jefes politi- 
cos of Tamaullpas. The company which expropri- 
ated the lands and paid the expenses was under the 
patronage of Felix Diaz. Roughly speaking there 
were about 75,000 acres under the control of that 
company. 

As soon as Gonzalez's and Blanco's troops had 
driven the Federals and the jefes politicos from the 
border, Lucio Blanco originated the idea of selling 
the lands of Felix Diaz to the peons of Tamauli- 
pas. 

He asked the engineers fighting under him to 
survey the land in question and divide it into small 
lots from ten to sixty acres. Then he offered them 
at public auction, giving the preference to the sol- 
diers under his command. The effect was surpris- 
ing; peons came from everywhere to watch the pro- 
ceedings. Most of the land was sold to the highest 
bidder at a very low price, on the installment plan, 
with a small sum to be paid in cash. The most as- 
tonishing and significant result of the experiment 
was that over 400 peons bought the land besides a 
great many soldiers who, having acquired small 
lots, refused to continue fighting. Their logic was 
irrefutable : they had taken up arms to get back 
the land and now that they were in possession of 
it, why fight any longer? ♦, 

The problem was perplexing in the extreme. If 
all the generals in the revolution acted on the same 



1 68 Carranza and Mexico 

principle as Lucio Blanco then all the Constitution- 
alist soldiers would stop fighting. 

This incident proves quite conclusively that the 
revolution in Mexico is an economic more than a 
political upheaval. 

Carranza was informed of this land distribution 
and its disastrous results in as far as it touched the 
military question and the result was that Gen. Lucio 
Blanco had to shift his command to the western 
division under General Obregon. 

In the State of Chihuahua General Villa began 
a distribution of lands. Unlike General Blanco, 
he went at the problem in a haphazard, personal 
way. 

As the Terrazas were personal enemies of his 
and owners of almost one-third of the State of Chi- 
huahua, he proclaimed the Terrazas estates confis- 
cated. The distribution was made among some of 
his officers, civilians on his staff and personal friends. 

In Mexico wherever there is cultivation of any 
kind there will be found a farmhouse (hacienda) 
built like a fortress. The hacienda proper is a 
small village, sometimes a small city in itself, con- 
taining the house of the proprietor, the manager, 
the servants and the peons, a church, buildings for 
gathering the crops, often a factory, enclosures or 
stables for horses, cattle, sheep. The whole is 
surrounded by a high and very thick wall which can 
stand a prolonged siege and can defy capture by 
armed forces. Everything for its protection is 



Attempts at Solution of the Land Question 169 

found within its walls : gatling guns, rifles, ammuni- 
tion, food, clothing, and even wells of water. 

Formerly some of the haciendados were able to 
arm and organize as many as 30,000 men under 
their command from their haciendas. 

Most of the haciendas are now in the hands of 
the Revolutionists, generals, officers and peons who 
work the farms for their own benefit. 

Land without a farmhouse has not the same 
value, as the farmer coming Into a piece of land 
would have to build a house, unless the land al- 
lotted to him happened to be near his abode. Be- 
sides, the haciendas contain everything needed for 
the cultivation, such as plows, agricultural Imple- 
ments, seeds, horses, cattle. 

When Villa gave land away he Incorporated with 
it a farmhouse. In that sense he was creating an- 
other landed aristocracy to take the place of the 
old one. Another factor which is Important in the 
land question is the climatic condition of the State. 
In Chihuahua with the exception of the western part 
the rest Is dry and needs artificial Irrigation to bring 
satisfactory results. Artificial Irrigation has to be 
done by the State or the federal government and 
cannot be carried on by private Individuals unless 
they are very rich or backed by capitalists or cor- 
porations. 

Most of the Terrazas estates thereupon fell Into 
the hands of a few scores of Individuals instead of 
one single family. 



170 Carranza and Mexico 

When it is taken into account that the population 
of Chihuahua is about 405,500, it will be found that 
the distribution of the land by Villa only touched 
an infinitesimal percentage of the population. Even 
if it is calculated that it is necessary that one-third 
of the population of Chihuahua may be needed to 
sustain the State by agriculture, then 135,000 peo- 
ple or a third of the State would have to come 
into possession of land. Admitting that Villa 
should succeed in giving away land to all the sol- 
diers and officers who have fought under him or 
about 25,000 men, still there would be left over 
110,000 landless peons who very likely would have 
to go to work for the fortunate soldiers of the north- 
ern division. The peons could justly claim that the 
revolution was fought for all the Mexicans and 
especially for the peons and not solely for the sol- 
diers of the northern division. 

The solution of the land question by Villa is 
therefore unequitable and is likely to bring further 
trouble. 

Zapata on the other side solved the problem in 
the most drastic and so far in the most practical 
manner. 

The State of Morelos is a very small State and 
has a population of about 180,000 inhabitants. The 
land is very fertile, needing no irrigation, as the 
periodical rainy season and the rivers irrigating 
the whole State makes the growth of every kind 
of fruit trees, vegetables, coffee, sugar cane, to- 



Attempts at Solution of the Land Question 171 

bacco, corn, etc., luxuriant in the highest degree. 
In fact several crops can be gathered every year. 

Zapata did not only include the officers of his 
staff and army In the land distribution but every sol- 
dier who had fought for him and every peon and 
every family of peons in the State of Morelos. 

In the case of the big sugar plantations Zapata 
levied a ransom which was calculated on a certain 
percentage of the profits; to feed, clothe and arm 
his soldiers. The salaries of the workers were In- 
creased and the proprietor of the plantation was 
protected against depredations and destruction. If 
the sugar planter refused to pay, then his machinery, 
the buildings and the crops were burned. The 
constant threat of and fear of Zapata's army elim- 
inated the worst form of slavery: peonage. 

The rest of the population was empowered to 
appropriate and cultivate the land surrounding the 
villages or near their dwellings. 

In this fashion Zapata's soldiers were fed, 
clothed and armed — every ablebodied man, every 
peon had his rifle and his ammunition and was al- 
ways ready to fight the aggressions of the federal 
army. Practically the whole male population be- 
tween the ages of twenty and thirty was under 
arms; when the Federals were away It attended to 
the crops; when soldiers Invaded Its territory they 
were driven out of It or forced to keep within the 
limits of the cities. 

Without having any knowledge of French history 



iy2 Carranza and Mexico 

the Zapatistas followed In the footsteps of the 
French revolutionists. 

While the leaders Marat, Danton, Robespierre 
were fighting their and their parties' supremacy and 
eliminating one another with the assistance of the 
guillotine; while the French armies were fighting 
the foreign invaders, the French peasants after 
burning a few chateaux and driving away the aris- 
tocratic landowners settled down to work the land 
for their own profits. As long as the aristocrat 
could not come back to claim the land, the peasant 
cared not who ran the government. Napoleon was 
able to become Emperor because he wisely left the 
peasants in possession of lands which they had con- 
fiscated from the aristocrats. 

In Mexico the identical thing has happened and 
continues and will continue until some sort of gov- 
ernment will be created to satisfy the needs of the 
country. The basis of future democracy in Mexico 
will be founded on municipal self rule in all the 
cities and rural settlements. 

When that is a fact there will be little trouble 
with the other branches of the government. The 
landowners in most of the States have been driven 
out and meanwhile the peons are working on the 
land in Morelos as well as in most of the other 
States. The rich haciendados have left and the 
poor peons have stayed behind. 

We hear only about battles, the capture of cities, 
the ambitions of leaders, the quarrels among the 



Attempts at Solution of the Land Question 173 

generals, but we hear nothing at all of the peons 
working to feed the 15,000,000 inhabitants in Mex- 
ico, of the thousands of artisans and workingmen 
who help to complete the work of the farmer. 

There may be 140,000 or 150,000 men under 
arms in Mexico, but what is that in comparison to 
the 15,000,000 people who continue to live with- 
out fighting, who have to be fed, clothed and even 
amused? The longer the revolution lasts the hap- 
pier will be the lot of the average peons, for every 
added day will decrease the chances of the reaction- 
ary landowner to come back and through legal 
means deprive the Indian of this land. 

The French revolution lasted almost ten years. 
When the Bastille was stormed about 25,000 aris- 
tocrats and prelates owned all the land in France. 
When Napoleon came into power as Emperor over 
half a million people owned land in France. 

In Mexico over 65,000 haciendados are in pos- 
session of the country, but a great majority of them 
are not on their haciendas, many are in exile. The 
revolution has lasted about four years. The longer 
it lasts the more chances there are that the original 
proprietors will stay away and the latifundiae will 
be divided automatically. The peons are more in- 
terested in the ownership of the land than the ques- 
tion of peace, the ballot, or who is going to be presi- 
dent or governor; they are indifferent as to who 
will loan or will not loan money to the Mexican 
government; if the Mexican consols are rising or 



174 Carranza and Mexico 

dropping in value, as long as the haciendados keep 
away long enough to give him a chance to claim 
the land as his own. A little cultivation will give 
him all the food he needs, what he does not need he 
will sell and buy with it a few necessities. 

For the success of the revolution it is vital that 
it should continue until every reactionary element, 
the clergy, the landowner, the army chiefs have 
been so thoroughly beaten that they will have no 
opportunity to come back and play a political game 
of which they know all the tricks. The reaction- 
ary elements must be so fearful of the wrath of 
the revolutionists, must be made so poor, that they 
will never come back again. 

Carranza Is right and so is Cabrera when they 
say that the land must be taken wherever it can be 
found; that the revolutionists must carry out the 
reforms with the power of their bayonets or they 
will never be consummated. That those who speak 
of a constitutional government and of elections are 
the reactionaries who want to play the game and 
arrest the triumphant march of the revolution. 

Madero was elected constitutionally, so was a 
congress, so were the senators and the governors. 
The ministers sat in council. What happened to 
the reforms of the plan of San Luis Potosi? Re- 
actionaries like Ernesto Madero and Rafael Her- 
nandez who sat In the cabinet for two years, very 
effectively canned all the reforms. The revolution 
had to be fought all over again. 



Attempts at Solution of the Land Question ^175 

If Villa backed by the reactionary elements 
should control the destinies of Mexico, then it would 
be only a question of a few months until a new 
revolution would overthrow his regime. 

Revolutions are the maladies of nations, they can- 
not be arrested in their course with impunity, for 
then the disease will crop out in a more virulent 
form. 

Mexico at the end of the Diaz regime was as 
feudal as France under Louis XVI. Mexico had 
the aristocratic landowner, the political clergy and 
the military chiefs as well as in France. They will 
have to be eradicated as thoroughly as noxious 
weeds from a field before cultivation. After a 
while order will come out of chaos. Meanwhile 
the peon is slawly coming into his own. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE CARRANZA-VILLA 
IMBROGLIO 

'TT^O make the story very short we could say that 
"*■ Mexican and American reactionary interests 
were behind Villa, in an endeavor to exclude Car- 
ranza as a factor in Mexican politics. But the 
story will be more interesting and revealing if we 
point out some of the methods used to engineer the 
conspiracy. 

During the first six months of the revolution 
against Huerta (1913), few authentic stories were 
published about the revolution. Most of the news 
came from Mexico City. There was no other po- 
litical personage who could get more space In the 
first page of the newspapers than Victorlano 
Huerta. 

In Europe, the oil interests very effectively si- 
lenced the press as to the progress of the revolu- 
tion; in Paris the press was bought outright. 

Although the American press cannot be bought, 
there are ways of circumventing It and cheating It 
of the truth. The Huertista press agents knowing 
the curiosity of the American people, fed them with 

176 



I 




GENERAL BENJAMIN HILL 
(Defender of Naco), under General Obregon 



Behind the Scenes 177 

stones about Huerta, and with details of his of- 
ficial and unofficial actions, and more than once his 
very thoughts were reported and published. The 
refrain was always: No matter how bad Huerta 
may be, he is nevertheless President de facto, — he 
is the strongest man in Mexico and he should be 
recognized. A Mexican and a foreign newspaper- 
man spent four thousand dollars a week on pub- 
licity work, while another supporter of Huerta is 
known to have spent ten thousand dollars for the 
same purpose. 

The Huerta agents came in contact with the 
felicista and cientifico agents, and they put their 
heads together to devise a means of breaking up 
the successful revolution. The reactionary junta 
watched the events with keen interest. As soon as 
Villa had proved his ability as a general, he was 
chosen at once as the easiest and most convenient 
tool to break up the harmony between the revolu- 
tionists. 

All the efforts were concentrated on Villa. He 
was furnished with money, ammunition, friends 
and advisers. Villa's sincerity, impulsiveness, his 
violent temper and cruelty, his utter lack of 
scruples and his ignorance, were splendid instru- 
ments in the hands of the past masters of intrigue. 
On May 13th, 191 1, during a mutiny, Pascual 
Orozco and Villa almost succeeded in murdering 
Francisco I. Madero. This incident pointed out 
to the cientifico element, the man who might be in- 



1^8 Carranza and Mexico 

duced to repeat, more successfully, the elimination 
of another leader of the new revolution. 

The Villa press agents began to fill the maga- 
zines and Sunday papers with romantic stories 
about the bandit general, the Napoleon bandit, the 
Washington, the Lincoln of Mexico. The life rec- 
ord of Villa, his personality and ignorance, forbade 
his ever becoming a presidential possibility. That 
just suited the junta, as Villa's presidency would 
have been fraught with too many dangers for the 
cientifico element. Huerta worked very hard to 
bring about a break between Villa and Carranza, 
while he was in power, but he did not succeed. 
Nevertheless, the work of corrosion and strife was 
continued by the exiled huertlstas, felicistas and 
cientificos. 

During the summer of 19 13, the Villa publicity 
reached Its zenith. As much as two hundred dol- 
lars was paid to a writer to get a story on Villa 
into a New York Sunday paper. At about that 
time everybody began to suspect that Huerta would 
resign. Carranza was approached by the interests 
which had loaned money to Huerta, to discover if 
he would recognize the loan, and as Carranza 
would not countenance such a proposition, the for- 
eign interests united with the Huerta, fellclsta and 
cientifico exiles, with the addition of some of the 
Madero clan, to work together, against the Con- 
stitutionalists. 

Villa, with all his ability as a guerrilla general, 



Behind the Scenes 179 

became a marionette in the hands of politicians who 
pulled the strings. Even the Aguascalientes Con- 
vention became a Punch & Judy show managed 
from New York, and it was used as a convenient 
lever to oust Carranza and place a puppet in his 
stead. The original suggestion to acclaim Don F. 
Iglesias Calderon as provisional president missed 
fire, because of the refusal of that very fine and in- 
tegral personality to take orders from a single mili- 
tary division. Suggestions were telegraphed from 
New York to the junta's representatives in Aguas- 
calientes, who, under the guise of radical counsel- 
lors, were really dictating what Villa should do. 

In fact, all the interviews passed through the 
hands of an American press agent of Villa, and his 
manifestos, proclamations and letters were written 
by the agents, and signed by Villa, who was abso- 
lutely ignorant of the contents of the documents. 

The Aguascalientes convention was to be repre- 
sented by all the generals who had fought in the 
revolution. Only one civilian was present: Luis 
Cabrera. No soldiers outside of the personal 
staffs of the generals were supposed to come near 
Aguascalientes. 

Nevertheless, Villa sent ten thousand soldiers to 
the city and had it surrounded by troops, while he 
sat in a caboose on a railroad track at the outskirts. 
For all practical and illegitimate purposes, the Con- 
vention was imprisoned — the deliberations were 
not free and independent, and were not meant to be 



l8o Carranza and Mexico 

so. Many generals who tried to escape outside 
of the ring formed by Villa's soldiers were sent 
back to the city; while others managed to slip 
through and joined their commands. 

A perusal of the cabinet members supposed to 
be named by E. Gutierrez, shows that the list was 
drawn up in New York. F. Iglesias Calderon, al- 
though perfectly honest and independent, stands 
very high among the members of the Cientifico 
Junta. He refused the honor of a portfolio. 
Jose Vasconcelos is known to the American public 
through the stolen Hopkins letters, where his name 
was mentioned as a recipient of American oil money, 
E. C. Llorente, who is to represent Gutierrez in 
Washington, was a porfirista who plotted against 
the Madero regime at the border. 

One of the most Important reasons for Villa's 
caution in not rushing Into a fight against Carran- 
za's generals, Is that he did not feel strong enough 
to cope against the constitutionalist forces. Fight- 
ing veteran Constitutionalists Is a different propo- 
sition from fighting Huerta's raw recruits and ex- 
convicts, or boys. The defection of Villa's best 
generals, Generals Luis and Maclovio Herrera, and 
the Arrieta brothers, could not be supplanted by 
the support of J. M. Maytorena. 

In his anxiety to fight Carranza, General Villa 
went so far as to enlist many federal Huerta gen- 
erals, whom he had fought so bitterly and de- 
nounced so roundly, and who had escaped from 



Behind the Scenes i8i 

Mexico In fear of Villa's wrath. Poor Villa 
seemed unconscious of the fact that he was slowly 
being surrounded by all the reactionary elements in 
Mexico — the same element of which he was a con- 
spicuous victim during the Diaz regime. When 
these Interests that now surround him have achieved 
their purpose, they will try to corrupt him, and if 
they cannot buy him they will assassinate him. 

Villa's blindness could not go any farther. No 
reasoning, no arguments, no sense of patriotism or 
decency can rouse such an Innocent fool, and there- 
fore, force will have to decide once more the ques- 
tion of supremacy. 

As Luis Cabrera said In a speech before the Con- 
vention, " In all probability, the only solution at 
which the Aguascalientes Convention will arrive, 
will be another war, another military action," the 
name of Aguascalientes (hot waters). Is very sig- 
nificant as to the trouble which the Convention has 
brought Mexico face to face with. 

The Clentifico-Huerta-Madero junta In New 
York decided a few months ago that If Carranza 
could not be eliminated through the Convention, he 
could be forced out by another revolution within the 
revolution proper. 

When It was discovered that the appeal Villa had 
sent out to the revolutionary generals on September 
23d before the Convention, had not succeeded In 
bringing about the desired result, It was decided to 
Induce the doubtful element In the Convention to 



1 82 Carranza and Mexico 

join In a supposedly legal procedure. After Car- 
ranza's resignation had been refused at the Conven- 
tion in Mexico, the delegates suggested the Aguas- 
calientes meeting as a means of settling all the ques- 
tions of reform. Villa's supporters, instead of 
keeping to the business on hand, jammed through 
the Gutierrez election, published the list of the Cab- 
inet members, and sent Carranza an ultimatum. 

In this way they expected to give a legal appear- 
ance to their action, and thus accelerate the secession, 
throwing the loyal Constitutionalists on the side of 
the Villa contingent. 

Neither Villa nor Zapata ever harbored the in- 
tention of handing over their forces to the generals 
designated by the convention — their hope was that 
Carranza might resign, and then they would con- 
trol the situation by the mere threat of force, backed 
by their success. 

It can be safely asserted that If Villa should suc- 
ceed, he would be the president maker, the virtual 
dictator of Mexico. Then Villa and the clentifico 
faction would fight for supremacy . . . and de- 
stroy each other. 

However, no matter what the result of the strug- 
gle may be, the Mexican people are tired of 
" strong men on horseback " and the succession of 
a Villa tyranny would not be much more advan- 
tageous than a Huerta or Diaz dictatorship. 

The Mexican people, the 15,000,000 who have 
suffered so much from military liberators, will very 



Behind the Scenes 183 

effectively overthrow the pretorlan rule of one or 
more guerrilla czars, when they discover that the 
strings are managed by Mexican and foreign reac- 
tionary interests. 

Villa will only repeat Orozco's treachery and de- 
fection, and he will pay the price of his fooHshness 
and ignorance with the contempt and ostracism of 
the real revolutionary element. 



CHAPTER XIX 

THE NEED OF A DEMOCRATIC FINANCE IN MEXICO 
BY CHARLES FERGUSON 

During the summer of 19 14, while Mr. M. C. Rolland 
was studying the financial system of the United States for 
Carranza, he came in contact with Mr. Charles Ferguson, 
who had devoted a year to investigating financial conditions 
in Europe. Mr. Rolland suggested the need of a democratic 
finance in Mexico, so as to liberate it from the financial 
system left over by J. Y. Limantour. The Mexican and 
the American investigators exchanged their views, and as 
both were on mutual and sympathetic ground with a perfect 
understanding of the subject, Mr. M. C. Rolland begged 
Mr. Ferguson to crystallize his ideas into an article. The 
following chapter is a simple outline of the idea which is 
behind the revolutionary reforms of all vital questions in 
Mexico. 

Mr. Charles Ferguson was for a time one of the leading 
editorial writers of a well known Metropolitan paper. He 
was sent abroad by President Wilson to investigate the 
banking system of Europe. Mr. Ferguson is considered one 
of the greatest authorities on the subject of finance and 
banking in the United States. 

TTNDER the conditions of capitalistic and cor- 
^^ porate organization and of universal banking 
and exchange that have spread throughout the 

184 



Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico 185 

world during the last two or three generations, the 
problem of democratic politics has become an en- 
tirely new problem. The old solutions, the ideas 
of Rousseau, Jefferson, Juarez, have become, in 
large part, inapplicable. 

The change is mainly due to the strength of the 
modern business organization. The business organ- 
ization tends to become stronger than the demo- 
cratic state, because it deals more directly with the 
forces of nature and with the every day interests 
of ordinary men. 

Everywhere in Europe, in the modern States of 
Asia and Africa, and in North and South America, 
there is a struggle going on between the business 
organization and the economic rights of the peo- 
ple. 

This world-wide struggle has shown its acutest 
phases in Mexico. 

The Mexican problem cannot be solved merely 
by the establishment of land reform, a wide suf- 
frage and a representative parliament. These 
things are good and necessary, but they are not 
enough. If the banking and credit system of Mex- 
ico is left to settle back into the general lines ap- 
proved by Diaz and Limantour, or by the orthodox 
financial opinion of Europe, the banks of Mexico 
will contravene the work of the political revolution. 

And since the revolution cannot be wholly 
crushed, Mexico will continue to be a house divided 
against itself, and will utterly exhaust itself in a con- 



1 86 Carranza and Mexico 

tlnulng series of revolutions and counter-revolu- 
tions. 

The modern business system centres in the bank. 
If the democratic revolution is to prevail and stand 
fast, the business system of Mexico must be de- 
mocratized. It is impossible to make business 
democratic otherwise than by making the bank 
democratic. 

The leaders of the Mexican revolution shall seize 
upon the control of the capitalistic forces of the 
country. This can be done by improvising — per- 
haps by executive decree, perhaps otherwise — a 
central bank and a banking system that shall mo- 
nopolize the banking function. 

The existing banking systems of the world are in 
general based upon public debts and are motived 
in their operation by the interest of a creditor class. 
Mexico should have a banking system based first, 
upon the property rights of the nation — the sum 
of the material values that belong not to individuals 
but to the Commonwealth; second, upon a capital- 
ization of the productive powers of the people to 
the extent that these can be developed by the civiliz- 
ing projects of the bank. 

Under existing banking systems the National es- 
tate is either not represented at all or else stands 
as debtor or claimant on a footing no higher than 
that of private estates. But the bank of the revo- 
lution should be the responsible legal trustee of the 
public estate, exclusively devoted to the improve- 



Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico 187 

ment of that estate — i.e., to the betterment of the 
material status of common citizenship. 

Under most banking systems the bankers have 
no direct interest or concern with the development 
of the natural and creative resources of a country. 
Their interest in the processes of production is at 
best indirect and incidental. What the bankers aim 
at is the accumulation of certificates of indebtedness 
against society at large. They are indeed con- 
cerned that the assets of Society at large shall equal 
its liabihties. But they make no effort and take no 
risk for the enrichment of society beyond bare 
solvency. 

The general tendency of their finance is to load 
the working organization of the world with as heavy 
a weight of bond and mortgage as it will stand, and 
to vest the ownership of the securities in a compara- 
tively small class of creditors. 

The unsocial and unscientific character of the 
world's banking systems is the main cause of that 
universal conflict between the business organization 
and the democratic state, which has reached its most 
poignant crisis in Mexico. If Mexico can work out 
a congruity between modern business organization 
and the economic rights of the people, it will solve 
the essential social problem of our times. It will 
win economic leadership in the family of nations. 
It will achieve unparalleled wealth and power. 

The bank of the revolution should be governed 
by a board of directors, got together with a mini- 



1 88 Carranza and 'Mexico 

mum of racial bias in the spirit — let us say — of 
the university — that is, of the arts and sciences. 

There should be a dozen men, more or less, hav- 
ing the highest reputation and credit as engineers, 
agriculturists, sanitarians, administrators, and so on. 
They should be paid perhaps on the scale of Cab- 
inet Ministers, but should derive no other income 
from Mexican sources. Their control of the bank 
should be disinterested and impersonal — like that 
of men in high public office. 

Every detail of the banking business will undergo 
a marked change because of this change of motive. 
Yet there need be no serious division of opinion as 
to the financial technique that will best promote the 
new purpose. 

The changes of practice concerning discount rates, 
note issues, metallic reserves, etc., will follow log- 
ically and obviously from the conception that the 
business of the bank is not the accumulation of en- 
forceable claim against the public, but rather the 
husbanding of the public estate. 

Banking, under any and all systems, is chiefly 
a matter of exchanging specific personal claims for 
general social claims. The bank receives personal 
debt-certificates and gives back certificates of social- 
debt or documentary claims against society at large. 
Personal credits at the bank are, in effect, charges 
against the public. Sound banking consists in not 
overcharging the public. 

The mystery that shrouds all banking problems 



Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico 189 

is due to the obscuring of the fundamental fact that 
banking has become, under modern conditions, the 
most vital social function; it determines the obliga- 
tions owed by society to the individual and so fixes 
every man's status and power.. 

It is absurd that such a social function should be 
performed without social responsibility and solely 
for the sake of a speculative private profit. The 
proposal is, therefore, that the revolution shall es- 
tablish in Mexico the first banking system in the 
world deserving to be called modern. For no ex- 
cellence of banking machinery can atone for the 
fact that throughout the whole circle of commerce, 
private credits and the corresponding public obliga- 
tions are being measured and registered by men 
whose interest is quite separate from that of the 
public. 

The proposed Identification of the banking In- 
terest with the public interest does not necessarily 
Imply that banks should be administered by political 
ofiicials. It is indeed necessary, as an exigency of the 
revolution, that the new bank of Mexico should be 
backed by the highest pohtical authority. But the 
real point is that modern banking will reach a nor- 
mal development only when banking has become a 
responsible profession — In the analogy of law and 
medicine at their highest level. In the long run it 
will be found that a sound, democratic, financial sys- 
tem is to be regarded as the creator rather than the 
creature of democratic government. 



190 Carranza and Mexico 

The new Mexican governnnent should take its 
bank managers from any quarter — as one might 
choose; world-famous engineers or physicians to con- 
quer a devastating plague, or to accomplish a con- 
structive public work of extraordinary difficulty. 
These men should be chartered as directors of a 
corporation to set up a central banking institution 
in the City of Mexico and a system of branch banks 
in provincial towns. The basic capital of the bank 
should be a trust deed executed by the Mexican 
Government and conveying to the banking corpora- 
tion such portions of the national estate as are not 
needed for the administrative uses of the govern- 
ment. The State would, of course, retain its right 
to annul If necessary the bank charter and trust 
deed — after reasonable notice and with due adjust- 
ment of the equities involved. 

The Bank should be the general fiscal and eco- 
nomic agent of the Government for the enhancement 
of Its revenues, the funding and amortizing of out- 
standing public debts and the development of the 
wealth of the country. 

Through the bank, the government should take 
good care of the soldiers of the revolution — giving 
them possession of lands on easy terms and assist- 
ance In capitalizing farms and small business under- 
takings. 

Legal means should be taken to cancel or com- 
pound uneconomic commercial concessions made to 
foreigners and other private persons by reactionary 



Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico 191 

governments In the past. The Inordinate foreign 
profits derivable from such concessions might be 
scaled down by a system of export duties. 

It should be understood that the new bank In all 
its branches Is not to be regarded as a passive or 
merely regulative factor In the economics of Mex- 
ico. It should, on the contrary, embody the highest 
possible organization of intelligence and will for 
the expansion of the productive life of the people. 
Much may be learned for this purpose from a study 
of the working methods of the Deutsche Bank of 
Berlin. 



CHAPTER XX 

carranza's foreign policy representative of 
the national spirit 

T?ROM the beginning of the Constitutionalist revo- 
-■- lution the attitude of Carranza as the first 
Chief toward the Foreign Powers, was very bitterly 
criticised. His uncompromising stand as regards 
the European nations was corroborated by inter- 
views given out to the press. Several reasons can 
be given for Carranza's conduct as well as for the 
criticisms. The first one is that Foreign Cabinets, 
Ministers and Consuls have been so used to the 
servile, cowardly and undignified behavior of Diaz 
and his Ministers toward Foreign Representatives 
that the proud. Independent behavior of Carranza 
and his Ministers was a shock to European courts. 
The foreign policy of the Great Powers towards 
small and weak nations, with the exception of the 
United States, has been as a rule, that of polite bul- 
lies and buccaneers. Great nations committed po- 
litical acts, which private individuals would not dare 
perpetrate. If the average standard of the indi- 
vidual has been raised, that of the nations In their 
international policy, has advanced very little from 
the times of the cave dwellers. 

192 



Carranza's Foreign Policy 193 

Mexico being weak and torn by civil war since 
the inception of her independence, has always suf- 
fered as much, if not more, from foreigners, than 
from her own enemies. The French in the thirties 
and sixties, the Americans in the forties, the Span- 
iards intermittently, have brought trouble to Mex- 
ico. The Mexicans are always suspicious of the 
international policy of the European powers. 

When Huerta committed murder in the persons 
of the President and Vice-President of Mexico, 
France, England, Germany and Spain rushed to 
recognize him, so anxious were they to get in at the 
trough of concessions. It was this conscienceless, 
greedy, sordid behavior which disgusted Carranza 
in particular, and Mexicans in general. No action 
in the history of the United States has created more 
sympathy for the feared Yankees in Mexico and 
South America, than the refusal of the recognition 
of Huerta on moral grounds. Carranza's refusal 
to give an account or to allow Villa to permit an 
investigation into the murders of Benton and 
Bauche, was correct from an international stand- 
point. England, who had so hastily recognized the 
murderer of a Mexican President and Vice-Presi- 
dent, became very indignant at the murder of a nat- 
uralized Britisher who got into trouble through his 
own fault, and expected the United States to de- 
mand satisfaction for it. Carranza, as the first 
Chief, insisted that England should protest to him, 
as the representative of the revolution, not to Villa 



194 Carranza and Mexico 

or the United States. The attitude of England, 
France, Germany and Spain towards Mexico, was 
very arrogant and Insulting; their protests to the 
United States were quite expressive of their anx- 
iety to have the United States intervene and police 
Mexico in the same manner as had been done in 
Cuba. 

The European powers were quite too busy watch- 
ing their own frontiers to embark on a foolish expe- 
dition like the threatened march and occupation of 
Mexico City by the allied powers. The American 
papers came out time after time announcing the land- 
ing of European marines in Mexico, In case that the 
United States should not deem it expedient to pro- 
tect their Interests. Any one familiar with Eu- 
ropean politics could have guessed that the alarmist's 
warning came either from the Innermost circles of 
the American military clique which had been itching 
for intervention for the last four years, or from for- 
eign chancellorshlps who wanted to frighten the 
United States Into a war with Mexico. 

The European powers foreboded a general con- 
flagration at the end of 19 14. Some of them felt 
that the northern republic should do their police 
work in Mexico while they would be busy fighting 
for their own existence in Europe ; others more char- 
itably inclined, hoped that the United States might 
easily get Into a wasps' nest, by Intervening In Mex- 
ico, — especially as Japan stood on the other side of 
the Pacific, as a warning of the brown peril, and as 



Carranza's Foreign Policy 195 

a sympathetic, though selfish supporter of Mexican 
integrity. In spite of contrary assertions, Mexican 
statesmen and level-headed thinkers dread an Amer- 
ican invasion into their country; be it for the pur- 
pose of conquest or an unselfish police-work. 

A military offensive or defensive alliance with 
Japan is much more dreaded by the Mexicans than 
an American intervention. The American Colos- 
sus, as the United States is called, does not represent 
the brutal, military, imperialistic methods of the 
Japanese, but a danger of elimination by military 
conquest or absorption by political, commercial, and 
financial attrition and suction. 

All the Mexican politicians, writers and states- 
men fear American meddling in their internal af- 
fairs, and although their admiration for the United 
States and its greatness is unbounded, nevertheless, 
their patriotism is still greater than their neighborly 
love. The whole spirit of South America, south of 
the Rio Grande, is not Spanish nor Indian — the 
spirit is essentially latin and gallic. The mental at- 
titude of the Zapotec Indian Juarez was neither 
Iberian nor Aztec, but essentially of the roman type 
of the republic. 

The intellectual radicalism of the liberals, Gomez 
Farias, Melchior Ocampo, Leandro del Valle, was 
of the same pattern as that of the French revolu- 
tionary Jacobins — the clearest, most advanced and 
progressive ideas In pohtics have been absorbed from 
Gallic and Latin sources. The French revolution. 



196 Carranza and Mexico 

the Napoleonic epos, are the text books of the lib- 
erals and the ambitious politicians. Roman and 
French history was admired and unconsciously imi- 
tated. The one for the civic virtues, courage and 
greatness of its citizens, — the other for the daring, 
patriotism and Intellectual clearness of its most 
prominent men. 

Spanish history and philosophy is a closed book to 
Mexican thinkers — for Spanish thought was always 
in the rear guard of intellectual Europe. The 
Spanish spirit Is found in reactionary types, like Lu- 
cas Alaman, — the Don Quixotic characteristic in a 
Lopez de Santa Ana, — the Castllian cruelty in a 
Miguel Marquez. As a Mexican writer once said: 
" Spain has brought us only priests, money-lenders, 
bull-fighters and dancers." 

Americans were astonished at the outburst of 
hatred made manifest in the persecution of Spanish 
priests in Mexico, and Spaniards In general, espe- 
cially in the State of Morelos, by Zapata, and the 
deportation of Spaniards in Chihuahua by Villa. 
They do not know that the Spaniards have always 
been on the side of the dictators, the oppressors, 
never with the liberators, and that the active co-op- 
eration of Spaniards In politics has outlawed them. 
After the assassination of Madero and Suarez, the 
Spaniards In Vera Cruz gave a banquet in honor of 
the tragedy. The Mexicans are not likely to forget 
this incident. The Mexicans of the middle class and 
the Indians despise the Spaniards. On the other 



Carranza's Foreign Policy 197 

hand, they do not dislike the Americans, but they 
dread the proximity of the Colossus, and the con- 
stant threats of American armed invasion. 

The American public was shocked by the reported 
cruelties of the revolutionists in Durango, and other 
captured cities. Many reports were exaggerated, 
but the Durango stories were utterly false. Several 
Americans who came to New York after the capture 
of Durango declared that they had witnessed the 
entry of the Constitutionalist soldiers, and their be- 
havior in Durango, and could vouch for the inac- 
curacy of the news — not only in the general outline, 
but in all its details. 

The American public, as well as the editors in the 
American press, did not suspect then that Huerta 
had press agents in New York, who made it a point 
of disseminating false reports about the revolution- 
ists, so as to discredit the movement and pave the 
way for recognition of Huerta. Governor Hunt, of 
Arizona, wrote a letter to the first Chief, protesting 
against the alleged cruelties. Venustlano Car- 
ranza answered, and the following letter is quoted 
as a fair example of the attitude of the Chief and the 
Mexican revolutionists on the question of retaliations 
and shooting of prisoners. 

Hermosillo, November 27th, 1913. 
Governor George W. P. Hunt, 

Phoenix, Arizona. 
Esteemed Sir and Friend: 

I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your interesting 



198 Carranza and Mexico 

letter of the 17th inst., written on account of the occupation 
of Ciudad Juarez by the Constitutional forces under the 
immediate command of General Francisco Villa, — and to 
manifest to you my gratitude for the kind phrases which 
you express in same, regarding myself. 

Recognizing with pleasure in the spirit of frank friend- 
ship which animated your letter, the personal sympathy of 
yourself and of the people of the United States for the strug- 
gle of civilization and justice, which we are sustaining, I 
can only lament that a not entirely perfect knowledge of 
the peculiar conditions of the Mexican problems may be 
propitious in certain cases (and in spite of that excellent 
disposition) to a bad intelligence of some of our acts. 

This is probably due to the fact that the criminal acts 
with which the struggle was initiated, and the cruel proceed- 
ings employed to sustain it, have been forgotten. When 
Mexico had realized the highest democratic prerogative to 
elect its mandataries, and we had the right to expect in the 
midst of peace and tranquillity, the periodical renovation of 
the public powers, for the expression of the national will 
only, the most corrupt balance of the conquerfed classes have 
tried to destroy our political institutions for all time and 
by violence or force only have they disposed of the life, the 
rights and interests of our countrymen. They have perpe- 
trated bloody executions without subjection to any law; they 
assassinate the Constitutionalists who fall wounded, bat- 
tling with arms for the liberty of the people, — and depu- 
ties and senators who defend our democratic institutions by 
word, they drag peaceful men and even children from their 
homes, obliging them to take up arms against us, and instil 
terror throughout, burning entire towns. It has been crimes 
of this nature which have made the cause that I represent, 
constitute not only a corrective political revolution but also 



Carranza's Foreign Policy 199 

that it should have the character of an act of peace, and 
severe justice vi^hich will chastise the guilty, and provide for 
the salvation of the Mexican family. 

To fill these purposes, within the spirit of our Constitu- 
tion, without any sentiment of passion, but meditating with 
reflection up to what point clemency and magnanimity can 
arrive, before an imperious duty of justice and the high neces- 
sity of assuring peace and the future of the nation, I have 
determined that the law of Juarez of January 25th, 1862, 
which defines and chastises crimes against the public peace, 
shall be put into force. 

With strict subjection to that pre-existent law, the Huerta 
officials were tried and executed, among whom were some 
who had been apprehended in Torreon by the same General 
Villa who, in addition to pardoning them, then acceded to 
the fact that they should become incorporated in our forces, 
in which they tried later, but in vain, to make the men 
whose command was entrusted to them, desert — they finally 
running away, in order to relapse into their crimes. 

It is true that the principles established in international 
wars agree to give pardon and immunity to the prisoners, 
but in civil struggles the most civilized nations in all epochs 
have employed proceedings still more rigorous and bloody 
than those which we have been obliged to adopt. In the 
case of executions of officials in Ciudad Juarez, the chastise- 
ment according to the law, of delinquents against peace and 
public security must be viewed, as a just punishment, rather 
than a cruelty to prisoners of war. 

The Mexican people, exhausted in the first phase of this 
civil war, headed by Francisco I. Madero, all their clem- 
ency and all their pardon, experiencing as only fruits of this 
magnanimity, tyranny in the interior and the loss of pres- 
tige in the exterior. To-day it wishes to assure the opera- 



200 Carranza and Mexico 

tion of its institutions and re-establish peace for all time, 
by means of a definite and official guarantee of a national 
organism. 

The events of Ciudad Juarez have been very far from 
revesting the individual importance which the intemperance 
of our enemies have wished to give it, in the same manner 
as was calumnious the statement published by them, that in 
Durango more than forty women and young girls commit- 
ted suicide, for fear of the excesses of the Constitutionalists, 
as I could personally verify that in Durango, as in all parts, 
our forces have been disciplined and respectable, giving guar- 
antees to the towns which have fallen into their power. 

Before concluding, it gives me great satisfaction to advise 
you that I am animated by the same sentiments of humanity 
that you possess, and that if I have placed the law of Juarez 
in force, in respect to an exigency of national sentiment, of 
justice, of public convenience, and the necessity of bringing 
peace to my country, — I have at the same time tried to have 
this law applied to unscrupulous enemies within the limits of 
the most absolute necessity, always authorizing pardon and 
Jmmunity to the unconscious ones. 

I hope the preceding declarations will be sufficient to es- 
tablish the attitude of the well understood justice and hu- 
manity of the Constitutionalists, in order not to detract the 
per^«mal sympathy and favorable opinion of the North Amer- 
ican people from our cause, and you may be sure that I shall 
take into consideration your noble ideas, in order to recom- 
mend greater clemency toward our enemies, always within 
the respect of the law. 

Assuring you of my highest estimation and respect, and 
asking that you will consider me an affectionate and sincere 
friend, I remain, 

(Signed) V. Carranza. 



Carranza's Foreign Policy 201 

It would be too much to have asked of the revolu- 
tionists to pardon and release the federal officers 
captured by them. The experiment was tried, and 
every time they repeated their treacheries, cruelties 
and infamies. They were trained in the school of 
Diaz and Huerta — with few exceptions they were 
men without conscience, honor or patriotism. They 
represented militarism in its lowest, most despicable 
and sordid form. A federal officer who had been 
fighting in Morelos against Zapata was interviewed 
on his arrival in New York. He asserted candidly 
that the only manner to eradicate the land problem 
in Morelos consisted in killing the whole male pop- 
ulation of the State and that any other solution was 
Utopian. 

When the American marines landed in Vera Cruz, 
the news caused a sensation in Mexico. A gentle- 
man who was present at the headquarters of Car- 
ranza describes the excitement of all the Mexican 
civilians as well as the soldiers in the camp. With- 
out a doubt it was the most critical moment of the 
revolution; everybody was discussing the news and 
the agitation was intense. The only calm and cool 
person was Carranza; he was sitting immobile and 
silent, looking straight ahead, without seeing any- 
body or paying attention to the noise, bustle, gesticu- 
lations and the shouts of the people. 

He was thinking very hard and the only gesture 
which gave a clue to his agitation was a slow move- 
ment of the hand, stroking his beard in a mechanical 



1 



202 Carranza and Mexico 

fashion. When the Carranza protest was published 
there was like an universal sigh of relief after a tense 
situation. 

The Mexicans felt that Carranza had embodied 
in his protest their outraged sense of national dignity 
and pride. 

The protest was a safety valve which prevented a 
dangerous national explosion. Huerta, who had 
cunningly contrived to bring about American inter- 
vention, worked feverishly to use this patriotic 
wave, and to attract it under his guidance in a for- 
eign war, which would save him and his army from 
annihilation. 

In the United States many persons were disgusted 
at what they called the ingratitude of Carranza. 
They forgot to enquire If Carranza had asked for in- 
tervention, and that an unbidden gift is an unwelcome 
gift. They should have demanded the thanks of 
Huerta Instead. Subsequent events have proven the 
assertion of Mexican observers that the occupation 
of Vera Cruz by the Americans, instead of helping 
the revolution, assisted in keeping Huerta several 
months longer in power. 

Vera Cruz could easily have been captured by the 
revolutionists, and Huerta would have hastened to 
flee by the way of Puerto Mexico. The occupation 
of Vera Cruz by the Americans prevented the revo- 
lutionists from attacking the railroad connecting 
Mexico City with Puerto Mexico, — as Vera Cruz 
had to be used as a base. If the occupation of Vera 



Carranza's Foreign Policy 203 

Cruz was achieved to prevent the cargo of war ma- 
terial of the Ypiranga from reaching Huerta, then it 
failed in the purpose. It did not accelerate the res- 
ignation of the dictator, nor did it calm the Mexican 
troubled waters. 

If, as It is claimed, the occupation of Vera Cruz 
was the climax or punishment for a series of insults 
to Americans, and the upholding of national honor, 
would It not have been more in keeping with mili- 
tary traditions to capture or sink Mexican gunboats 
In the Atlantic and Pacific without attempting to land 
marines In any port, and to blockade both coasts of 
Mexico ? 

The ABC Peace Commission would have ar- 
rived at Niagara Falls by the same road and 
achieved the same results. The meddling in Mex- 
ico would not have cost the American tax payers five 
million dollars. The most charitable description of 
the incident is that It was a hasty and costly blunder 
of the Navy Department. 

Let us put ourselves in the place of the Mexicans 
themselves. The touchiness of their national pride 
and their dignity is well known, as well as that their 
patriotism and love of country Is as great as that of 
the greatest nation. Why criticise a characteristic 
of a weak nation which Is considered a virtue In a 
strong one? 

Consider for Instance the question as applied to 
the United States. If during the Civil War British 
marines had landed and occupied New Orleans for 



204 Carranza and Mexico 

some reason or other, what would have happened? 
Would the northerners have protested against Brit- 
ish intervention, or acclaimed it? Would not the 
northerners as well as the southerners have fought 
British occupation? 

If it is a question of the Monroe Doctrine, we beg 
to differ — the Monroe Doctrine, to reach its high- 
est value as a political tenet, should work both ways, 
— in the interests of the United States as well as 
Central and South America. If the Monroe Doc- 
trine is expedient, in the case of the United States, 
it should be acceptable to Latin America. Latin 
America rebels against a one-sided view of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine. 

When Villa gave out his interview on the occu- 
pation of Vera Cruz, he was evidently inspired by 
his American adviser and Mephisto. He was giv- 
ing out the American side of the question, — not the 
Mexican. Unconsciously Villa acted as Porfirio 
Diaz or any other Cientificos would have done, if 
they had been in his place. Carranza represents the 
Mexican people, although Carranza has never been 
anything but a friend and admirer of the United 
States. It must be considered that no true friend- 
ship can exist without self-respect on Mexico's side 
and mutual respect on both sides. 

The occupation of Vera Cruz has been a source 
of irritation for the Mexican and American, and a 
constant element of danger. It was a mistake which 
turned into a costly blunder. 



CHAPTER XXI 

PRESIDENT Wilson's Mexican policy 

nr^HE attitude of President Wilson towards the 
-■■ Huerta regime was attacked not only In the 
European press but likewise in the American news- 
papers. The French, German, English and Span- 
ish dally and weekly papers sneered at what they 
dubbed the moral policy of a puritan school teacher. 

The American papers were divided in their opin- 
ion; the Republican organs laughed at the reversal 
of their beloved " dollar diplomacy," and many so- 
called Democratic papers attempted to uphold the 
blustering " big stick " policy. With the exception 
of the labor and socialistic press there was a great 
deal of doubt and misgivings expressed as to the out- 
come of the new diplomacy. 

Even the average American, who is always on the 
side of justice and fair play, was rather taken back 
by this radical departure In American and foreign 
relations. For American diplomacy, although usu- 
ally equitable, always took Into consideration the In- 
terests of the Americans in a foreign country first 
and last, even If they clashed with the fundamental 
rights of the natives. 

In the case of American Interests in Mexico, it 
205 



2o6 Carranza and Mexico 

was long suspected they had been playing politics 
and throwing their all powerful influence in favor 
of the government which could give them the best 
advantages in a business way, which were in oppo- 
site relation to the liberal principles and the welfare 
of the majority of the Mexicans. 

The great corporations have always received ex- 
traordinary favors from dishonest governments. 
The mining and oil syndicates, the railroad and land 
concessionaires, acquired great privileges and gave 
very little in return for them. For example, an 
American oil company in Mexico made as high 
as 450 per cent, profit on its original investment 
and doubled the selling price of oil and gaso- 
line. As soon as an English company invaded the 
field they fought each other for a while, then realiz- 
ing that it was an expensive affair which redounded 
to the benefit of the Mexican consumer, they came 
to an agreement by dividing the territory among 
themselves and right away the price of oil and gaso- 
line went up again. 

Scores of cases can be cited to prove that all the 
advantages are in favor of foreign investors. The 
salaries of the Mexican workingman or peons are 
not raised, but the prices of commodities are never 
lowered. The great Orizaba cotton mills, all the 
factories, the great mining corporations have always 
paid the lowest salaries. Whenever there was a 
strike for higher wages or for better conditions, the 
Diaz and Huerta regimes always protected the for- 



President Wilson's Mexican Policy 207 

elgners and at the slightest pretext massacred the 
strikers. In the rare cases when the government was 
fair to the strikers, as happened under Madero and 
Carranza, then the foreign Investors protested to 
their governments that their Interests were In danger 
of destruction. 

With the Mexican laborer and peons It has be- 
come a conviction that foreign interests are always 
on the side of dictators as against the Mexican peo- 
ple. In Central and South America the new demo- 
cratic policy was watched with keen interest; the 
Latin Americans shrewdly guessed that the attitude 
of the Democratic administration would be a test 
stone of their relations with the State Department. 

So much had been written about the famous MonT 
roe Doctrine by successive American statesmen that 
the original meaning of this doctrine had been en- 
tirely lost to view. 

The original Monroe doctrine was uttered as a 
warning to the Holy Alliance in Its well known de- 
signs to attempt the reconquest of the provinces lost 
by Spain. 

The Monroe doctrine was never meant to be an 
excuse to collect debts for American or foreigners 
or a pretext to police unruly republics. 

With the exception of some Central American 
States there has never been a case In a hundred years 
when South America and Mexico could not cope suc- 
cessfully against foreign invaders. 

As far back as 1806-07 England attempted to 



2o8 Carranza and Mexico 

conquer Argentina and Uruguay when they were still 
under Spanish rule. The Spaniards and the natives 
fought very bravely and repelled the invaders, who 
had already occupied Buenos-Ayres. The native 
South Americans did not intend to exchange masters 
and soon afterwards they overthrew the Spaniards. 

In the early forties France fought the Argentinian 
dictator Rozas, but after a two years' war she was 
defeated. Later, in 1845, France and England pre- 
tended that Rozas should open the interior rivers to 
international navigation. Buenos-Ayres was block- 
aded and the war lasted for five years; but England 
and France were defeated. 

Brazil and Argentina tried to conquer the little 
republic of Paraguay. The war lasted five years 
(1865-70). The result was that forty-five per cent, 
of the male population was killed in battle, but 
Paraguay was not conquered. 

The Latin American republics feel that they can 
take care of themselves, and their nationality against 
their neighbors as well as against Europe. No mat- 
ter what the ambitions, intentions or plans of con- 
quests of certain European powers may be they know 
fully well that there is not the slightest chance for a 
permanent occupation by European armies, and that 
any conquest by any Asiatic or European nation Is 
an absurd dream. 

It is understood that the Monroe doctrine was 
once a very useful moral protection, but It did 
not prevent attacks and occupation of South Ameri- 



President Wilson's Mexican Policy 209 

can territory by Spain, France and England. The 
only reason which interfered with the territorial de- 
signs of European powers was not the help of the 
United States, when it was most needed, but the 
heroic resistance of the Latin American nations 
themselves. The fear is rampant that the Monroe 
doctrine might be used as a pretext for aggression by 
the United States. 

Latin Americans follow this line of argument ; the 
great American corporations can invest a great deal 
of money in South America. They can very easily 
send agents to foment revolutions which necessarily 
would destroy American property and then a pre- 
text would be found for American intervention, as 
happened in Nicaragua. 

There is a very short step from temporary to 
permanent occupation, tending to create a very dan- 
gerous precedent in favor of American occupation 
in any country where there is a great deal of invested 
American capital. 

The thought was expressed by a great many South 
American statesmen that President Wilson's Mexi- 
can policy would be a good illustration of the future 
policy towards South America. At the beginning 
the expressions of neutrality and non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of Mexico were considered rather 
suspiciously. 

Had the President of the United States declared 
war on Mexico and sent troops to Mexico City on 
any pretext whatsoever, the Latin American nations 



210 Cananza and Mexico 

would have closed their doors to American capital, 
commerce, and would have boycotted American 
goods. The thought would have always been pres- 
ent that the Americans would always use their in- 
terests as a wedge for interference in their national 
affairs. 

The entrance of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in 
a solution of the Mexican-American incident at Tam- 
pico was a characteristic move exemplifying the new 
trend of thought on statesmanship in Washington. 

Under a republican administration, England, 
France and Germany would have been asked to set- 
tle the question with the United States instead of the 
ABC powers. Without fear of contradiction it 
can be stated that Argentina, Brazil and Chile's en- 
trance into Pan American affairs with the co-opera- 
tion of the United States proves that the State De- 
partment has finally learned the A B C of Pan Amer- 
ican statesmanship. Likewise, that the Monroe 
doctrine can only reach Its highest efficiency in co- 
operation with the whole of America from Pata- 
gonia to Canada. 

When the Americans create a Pan American doc- 
trine, then there is no doubt that Europe will not 
dare to challenge It. 

At present a challenge to the Monroe doctrine 
Is In reality a challenge to the American navy. With 
a new Pan American doctrine the challenge would 
Include all Latin American countries, with the United 
States and Canada in an offensive and defensive al- 



President Wilson's Mexican Policy 2ii 

llance against one or more European powers. At 
present it appears as if the defence of the territorial 
integrity of all America was shouldered upon the 
United States alone. The Latin Americans feel that 
they should have a share of this responsibility, for 
they believe themselves capable and ready to do 
so. 

There was a great deal of excitement and indigna- 
tion In South America when the American marines 
landed In Vera Cruz. Huerta was not made more 
popular by this incident, but the national instinct of 
preservation of the Latin races made them uncon- 
sciously understand that the landing of American 
blue jackets was only a wedge to achieve American 
occupation and that as long as Vera Cruz was occu- 
pied, it was only a question of time until American 
soldiers would march to Mexico City. 

When Roosevelt was in South America he was 
feted and banqueted by the most prominent men In 
the ABC republics. They were too polite to in- 
form him what they thought of his speeches on the 
Monroe doctrine. The articles and editorials com- 
menting Roosevelt's theories were very plain If 
courteous: that either Mr. Roosevelt had forgotten 
the original meaning of the Monroe doctrine or that 
he was deceiving himself into an imperialistic mean- 
ing of the doctrine. 

The Latin Americans and Mexico hope fervently 
that the unselfish, humanitarian and democratic 
diplomacy of President Wilson will bear the brunt 



2 1 2 Carranza and Mexico 

of the tremendous influences that are brought to 
bear upon it. 

It is a well known platitude that certain American 
mining, railroad and oil interests are subterraneously 
working against this Idealistic policy; that the War 
Department has been Itching for a war of conquest 
or police work in Mexico. An officer of the United 
States army In an expansive moment volunteered 
the information that Intervention In Mexico would 
mean an increase from 80 to 350,000 men In the 
American army and make it possible to organize It 
more in proportion with its population. That there 
being always a danger of a war with Japan, and the 
United States not being ready for it, a war with 
Mexico would prepare the army for that eventu- 
ality. 

President Wilson has more admirers in Mexico 
and South America than any other President or 
statesman In the whole history of the United States 
has ever had, not even excepting the martyr Presi- 
dent Lincoln, or Washington. 

The popular thought has been deeply Imbedded 
with the conviction that if the dictator Huerta could 
not exasperate and inveigle President Wilson Into a 
war with Mexico, that no power for evil can achieve 
the purpose in the future. 

Far seeing Mexicans did not expect a prompt so- 
lution of the vital problems after the elimination of 
Huerta. The dictator was only the greatest Im- 
pedimenta to a realization of liberal ideals; once 



President Wilson's Mexican Policy 213 

Huerta eliminated the work was a little less ardu- 
ous, but still of tremendous purport. 

The participation of England, France and Ger- 
many In a struggle for life in Europe has luckily re- 
lieved Mexico of three great mischief makers. The 
great and sombre powers which have kept Mexico in 
a turmoil for a hundred years are still at work: the 
clericals, the landowners and the militarists; in the 
last twenty years the American interests have been 
added to the list. 

A Mexican thinker concreted the thought thus: 
" The great powers for evil in Mexico are : The 
Church, the Latifundlae and the Trusts; their great 
victims will be President Wilson, Carranza and the 
Mexican people." 



REFLECTIONS 

In the beginning of the revolution against Diaz, 
as public opinion seemed to be favorable to what 
was called " The Great Constructive Work of 
Diaz," there was a vague and superficial impression 
that the United States should repeat the policy which 
had been inaugurated toward Cuba; a sort of po- 
litical tutelage which left the independence of the 
island in the hands of the natives. 

Subsequent events have revealed to the Americans 
that although the Mexicans were still groping for 
a Constitution more in keeping with their racial char- 
acteristics, that they had had, in opposition to Cuba, 
which gained its independence from Spain in 1908, 
a national history for one hundred years, with great 
national heroes, martyrs and political ideals which 
could not be infringed and trespassed upon by an 
uncalled for intervention in their Internal affairs. 

Thoughtful and well-informed statesmen and poli- 
ticians have come to the conclusion that a political 
tutelage as in Cuba will never be tolerated in Mex- 
ico, any more than military aggression for the sake 
of conquest, or under the hypocritical name of peace. 

The average American knows that a Mexican war 
would be a war without heroes or glory for Amer- 
ican arms. 

ai4 



Re.flections 215 

The Mexicans are Intensely grateful to President 
Wilson for Insisting on keeping hands off In Mexico. 
The Internal struggle of the liberals fighting against 
the reactionary powers in Mexico must be settled by 
the Mexicans themselves, or It will have to be set- 
tled all over again. 

The impression of a great many Americans is 
that Mexico Is going towards political disruption, 
that is to say, a secession into three entitles: the 
North, the Centre and the South. 

Northern secession Is encouraged by the great min- 
ing, oil, railroad, and land interests In the United 
States and by the reactionaries In Mexico. South- 
ern secession Is not only encouraged, but fomented, 
by the ambitious and able dictator of Guatemala. 

The northern republic would comprise the bor- 
der states, as well as Lower California, which, even 
if Independent, would be more friendly to the United 
States than a united Mexico. That Is the convic- 
tion of those interested In a Northern secession. 

A Southern republic would mean the absorption 
of the States of Yucatan, Campeche, Tabasco, Chia- 
pas, and the Territory of Quintana Roo, under the 
leadership and hegemony of Guatemala. 

Working towards that end, and in co-operation 
with the Guatemalan dictator, is a gentleman in the 
State Department, who was once U. S. representa- 
tive in Guatemala. 

American Interests are allied with the Mexican in- 



2i6 Carranza and Mexico 

terests, whereas, the American radicals, socialists 
and the labor party are in sympathy with the Mex- 
ican liberals. The American and Mexican capital- 
ists are opposed to the American and Mexican mid- 
dle class and proletariat. 

The same class trouble Is going on in the Church 
in Mexico. The native Mexican clergy is opposed 
to the high or foreign clergy. All the oppressions, 
cruelties, and treacheries in the fight of the clericals 
against the liberals have emanated from the foreign 
or high clergy, which used the military element for 
that purpose. The unselfish, libertarian struggle on 
the other hand, was always actively assisted by the 
native priests; by men like Morelos and Hidalgo. 
The poor Mexican priest, or better said, the low 
Mexican clergy. Is first a Mexican, and if that agrees 
with his belief, he will be a good Catholic; but if 
his faith Is pitted against the welfare of his country, 
then he will invariably prefer to be a good Mexican 
and a poor Catholic, to being a poor Mexican and 
an obedient Catholic. 

The higher clergy In the United States, by attack- 
ing the liberal policies In Mexico, and waging an ac- 
tive campaign against the Mexican revolutionists, 
Is placing itself In direct opposition to the lower 
Mexican clergy. 

From the Mexican point of view, three principles 
have been laid down to face and combat American 



Reflections 217 

aggression, or absorption. The elimination of 
predatory American capital, the curtailment of Amer- 
ican immigration schemes, and the advancement of 
European immigration. American methods, on the 
other hand, will be encouraged in all the active ex- 
pressions of life, such as business organizations, 
farming and school methods. 

There is no doubt that ten years of a complete 
and practical rural school system in Mexico will 
change the whole social and political character of the 
republic. The advancement of woman in life will 
also gain a decided advantage for the Mexican, for 
no nation can be greater or better than its women. 

Oriental Immigration cannot be encouraged, as 
being dangerous to the best interests of Mexico, not 
because of the inferiority of the Orientals, but be- 
cause of their superiority, which would tend to segre- 
gate them Into colonies. 

A Mexican engineer suggested a plan to cut a 
canal in Lower California, - from Ensefiada to the 
Rio Colorado, a distance of ninety miles. By this 
method Lower California would be made into an 
Island, and the passage of ships from the Pacific 
Ocean at Ensefiada, through the Canal into the Gulf 
of California would double the importance, com- 
mercially and politically, of the States of Sonora, 
Sinaloa and the Eastern side of Lower California. 



2i8 Carranza and Mexico 

Irrigation, and later immigration, in Lower Cal- 
ifornia, would change the barren island into a garden. 

The Mexican revolutionists are socialists without 
knowing it; their actions in the economical and po- 
litical field have proven it; the Marxian theorists In 
Europe showed by their attitude in the war, that they 
were not socialists, but political trimmers. 

The French revolution is being repeated in Mex- 
ico. Bare feet are pattering up on one side of the 
stairway, while patent leathers are descending on 
the opposite side. 

The Mexican problem is like a sand-bar In the 
path of the American Ship of State. 



APPENDIX 

THE PLAN OF SAN LUIS POTOSI 

By F. I. Madero. 
DECLARATION TO THE NATION 

The people, in their constant effort to bring about the 
triumph of their ideals of liberty and justice, have deemed it 
necessary at certain historical moments to make the greatest 
sacrifices. 

Our dear country has arrived at one of these times; a 
tyranny vi^hich the Mexicans had not been accustomed to en- 
dure, since w^e gained our independence, oppresses us in such 
a manner that it has become intolerable. In exchange for 
that tyranny, peace has been offered us, but a shameful peace 
for the Mexican people, as it is not based on right but on 
might; for it does not have as an object the advancement 
and prosperity of the country, but only the enrichment of 
a small group who, abusing their influence, have converted 
the public positions into fountains of benefit exclusively per- 
sonal, exploiting without scruples all the concessions and 
lucrative contracts. 

The legislative power as well as the judicial are com- 
pletely under the executive; the division of power, the State 
sovereignty, the liberty of the municipal government and the 
rights of the citizen only exist as they are written in our 
Magna Charta; but as a fact, in Mexico it can almost be 
said that martial law reigns constantly; justice instead of 

219 



220 Carranza and Mexico 

imparting protection to the weak, only serves to legalize 
the plundering committed by the strong; the judges instead 
of being the representatives of justice are agents of the ex- 
ecutive, whose interests they serve faithfully ; the House of 
Congress of the Union has no other will than that of the 
dictator; the State Governors are appointed by him, and 
they in their turn appoint and tax in the same way the mu- 
nicipal authorities. 

From this it results that the administrative gear, judicial 
and legislative, obeys with one will the caprice of Gen. 
Porfirlo Diaz, who during his long administration has dem- 
onstrated that the principal motive that guides him is to main- 
tain himself in power at all costs. 

For many years deep uneasiness has been felt throughout 
the republic, due to the above form of management of the 
Government, but General Diaz, with great astuteness and 
perseverance, had well-nigh crushed out all independent ele- 
ments, so that it was impossible to organize any kind of a 
movement to deprive him of the power, which he had so mis- 
used. The mischief was constantly aggravated, and the 
decided eagerness of General Diaz to impose on the nation 
a successor in the person of Mr. Ramon Corral, brought 
matters to a crisis and determined many Mexicans, although 
lacking political affiliations because it had been impossible to 
form them during the thirty-six j^ears of dictatorship, to 
throw themselves into a struggle, intending to regain the 
sovereignty of the people and their purely democratic right 
to the land. 

Among other parties which had the same object, the Na- 
tional Anti-Re-electionist Party was organized, proclaiming 
the principles of effective suffrage and no re-elec- 
tion as the only ones capable of saving the republic from 
the imminent danger which menaced from the prolongation 



Appendix 221 

of a dictatorship each day becoming more and more onerous, 
more despotic and more immoral. 

The Mexican people actively seconded that party and re- 
sponded to the call which was made, sending its represen- 
tatives to a convention, in which also was represented the 
National Democratic Party, which also interpreted the pop- 
ular desires. The said convention appointed its candidates 
for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the republic, those 
nominations devolving upon Dr. Francisco Vasquez Gomez 
and on me, for the respective charges of Vice-President and 
President of the republic. 

Although our situation was extremely disadvantageous 
owing to the fact that our adversaries received the sanction 
of all the official element, on which they did not hesitate to 
rely, we believe it our duty to accept an honorable appoint- 
ment like this in order to best serve the cause of the people. 
In imitation of the wise customs of republican countries, I 
travelled over a portion of the republic, calling upon my 
compatriots. My passing from one town to another was 
like a real triumphal march, for everywhere the people, elec- 
trified by the magic words Effective Suffrage and No Re- 
election, gave evident proofs of their irrevocable resolution 
to obtain the conquest of such secure principles. At length, 
the moment arrived when General Diaz began to notice the 
true situation of the republic, and understood that he could 
not advantageously struggle with me in the field of democ- 
racy, and sent me to prison before the elections, which were 
consummated while excluding the public from the primaries 
through violence, filling the prisons with independent citi- 
zens and committing the most shameful frauds. 

In Mexico, as a democratic republic, the public power 
cannot have any other origin or base than the national will, 



222 Carranza and Mexico 

and this cannot be subordinated to formulas consummated 
in a fraudulent manner. 

For this reason the Mexican people have protested against 
the illegality of the last elections, and wishing to employ 
successively all the recourses which the laws of the republic 
offer, in due form they requested the annulment of the elec- 
tions before the Chamber of Deputies, notwithstanding the 
fact that in that body a legitimate origin was not recognized, 
and it being known beforehand that the members of the same 
were not representatives of the people and only respected 
the will of General Diaz, to whom exclusively they owed 
their investiture. 

In such a state of affairs the people, who are the only 
sovereign, also protested in an energetic manner against the 
elections, in imposing manifestations consummated in differ- 
ent parts of the republic, and if these did not spread through 
all the national territory, it was due to the terrible pressure 
exercised by the government, which always smothers in blood 
any democratic demonstration, such as passed in Puebla, 
Vera Cruz, Tlaxcala, Mexico and other parts. 

But this situation so violent and illegal could not last 
long. 

I have understood very well that if the people have ap- 
pointed me as their candidate for President it is not because 
there may have been an opportunity of discovering in me the 
faculties of a statesman or a governor, but only the virility 
of a patriot resolved to sacrifice himself if necessary in the 
cause of liberty, and to help the public free itself from the 
odious tyranny which oppresses the nation. 

From the time when I threw myself into the democratic 
struggle I knew very well that General Diaz had no respect 
for the freewill of the nation and the noble Mexican people, 
and upon attending the primaries I knew also very well the 



Appendix 223 

attacks that awaited them; but notwithstanding these facts, 
the public gave to the cause of liberty a numerous contingent 
of martyrs when these were necessary, and with admirable 
stoicism met at the polls to receive all sorts of annoyances. 

But such conduct was indispensable to demonstrate to the 
world at large that the Mexican people are ready for de- 
mocracy, that they are thirsty for liberty, and that their 
present governors do not meet their aspirations. 

Besides, the attitude of the people before and during the 
elections, as well as after them, demonstrates clearly that 
they opposed with energy the government of General Diaz, 
and that if their electoral rights had been respected I might 
have been elected as President of the republic. 

Taking this into consideration and echoing the public 
sentiment, I declare illegal the past elections, and as the 
republic for that reason is without legitimate governors, I 
assume provisionally the Presidency of the republic, while 
the people appoint according to law their governors. To 
attain this object it is necessary to hurl from power the au- 
dacious usurpers, who for all the titles of legality boast a 
scandalous and immoral fraud. 

With all honor I declare that I would consider it a sign 
of weakness on my part and treason to the public who have 
confided in me, not to place myself in front of my fellow- 
citizens who anxiously call upon me from all parts of the 
country, to compel General Diaz by force of arms to respect 
the national will. 

The present Government, although it originated in vio- 
lence and fraud from the moment that it was tolerated by 
the people, yet can hold for foreign nations certain titles of 
legality up to the 30th of the coming month, in which their 
tenure expires; but as it is possible that the new government 
emanating from the last fraud, may not by that time be in 



224 Carranza and Mexico 

power, at least because the greater part of the nation is 
making an armed protest against that usurpation, I have 
appointed SUNDAY, the 20th of next November, from 6 
o'clock in the afternoon on, for all the towns and villages 
in the republic to take up arms against the government un- 
der the following 

PLAN. 

I St. The elections for President and Vice-President of 
the republic. Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice 
of the Nation and Deputies and Senators, held in June and 
July of the present year, are hereby declared null and void. 

2nd. The present government of General Diaz is not 
recognized, nor the power of any authority emanating from 
the popular vote, for not having been elected by the people, 
they have lost what little title they did have of legality, 
aiding and favoring for their own interests the most scan- 
dalous electoral fraud ever known in the history of Mexico, 
with the money placed at their disposal by the public. 

3d. To avoid as much as possible the upheavals incident 
to all revolutionary movements, all the laws promulgated by 
the present administration and the rules pertaining to the 
same, with the exception of those which are found to be 
decidedly opposed to the principles set forth by this plan, are 
declared to be in force, until such as require adjustment may 
be reformed according to constitutional methods. Also, ex- 
ception is made of laws, sentences of courts, and decrees 
which may have been sanctioned regarding the accounts and 
handling of funds of all the functionaries of the Porfirista 
administration, in all their branches. For as soon as the 
revolution triumphs the formation of commissions of investi- 
gation will be initiated to decide on the responsibilities which 



Appendix 225 

the functionaries of the State and city federations may be 
able to incur. 

In all cases the obligations contracted by the Porfirista ad- 
ministration with foreign governments and corporations be- 
fore the 20th of the coming month, will be respected. 

Abusing the law of waste land, numerous small proprietors, 
mostly all quite poor, have been despoiled of their posses- 
sions, through the connivance of the Secretary of Public 
Welfare, or by decrees of the courts of the republic. It 
being only just to restore to their former owners the lands 
of which they have been despoiled in such an arbitrary man- 
ner, such dispositions and decrees have been declared subject 
to revision, and there will be demanded of those who ac- 
quire them in such a lawless manner, or of their heirs, to 
make restitution to their former proprietors, who will also 
pay an indemnity for the injuries suffered. Only in cases 
where such lands have passed to a third person before the 
promulgation of this plan, the former owners will receive 
indemnity from those in whose benefit the spoliation was 
accomplished. 

4th. Besides the constitution and laws in force, the su- 
preme law of the republic is declared to be the principle of 
NO RE-ELECTION of the President and Vice-President of the 
republic. Governors of the States and Municipal Presidents, 
while the respective constitutional reforms may be made. 

5th. I assume the character of Provisional President of 
the United States of Mexico, with the necessary faculties 
to make war on the usurping government of General 
Diaz. 

As soon as the capital of the republic and half of the 
States of the Federation may be in the power of the army 
of the nation, the Provisional President will call for extra 
general elections for a month thereafter, and will deliver 



2 26 Carranza and Mexico 

the power to the President who may be elected, as soon as 
the result of such election may be known. 

6th. The Provisional President, before handing over the 
authority, will give account to the Congress of the Union 
of the use which has been made of the faculties which the 
present plan confers upon him. 

7th. The 20th day of the month of November, from the 
6th of the afternoon on, all the citizens of the republic will 
take up arms to hurl from power the authorities which at 
present govern them. (The towns which are situated away 
from the railway lines will take up arms from the even- 
ing on.) 

8th. When the authorities present armed resistance, they 
will be compelled by force of arms to respect the popular 
will; but in this case the laws of war will be rigorously ob- 
served, attention being specially called to the prohibitions 
relative to not using expansive balls, nor shooting prisoners. 
Also attention is called respecting the duty of all Mexicans 
to have consideration for all foreigners and their inter- 
ests. 

gth. The authorities who oppose resistance to this plan 
'•^ill be sent to prison so that they may be judged by the 
courts of the republic, when the revolution may be over. 
As soon as each city or town recovers Its liberty, there will 
be recognized as legitimate temporary authority the principal 
chief at arms, with the faculty of delegating his functions to 
any other citizen, who may be confirmed In his charge or 
removed by the Provisional Governor. 

One of the first measures of the provisional government 
will be to put at liberty all the political prisoners. 

loth. The nomination of Provisional Governor of each 
State that may have been occupied by revolutionary troops, 
will be made by the Provisional President. This Governor 



Appendix 227 

will be under strict obligation to convoke the elections for 
the Provisional Governor of the State, as soon as it may be 
possible to do so, according to the judgment of the Provis- 
ional President. There is excepted from these rulings the 
States that for tvi^o years have sustained democratic cam- 
paigns for a change of government, for in these the man who 
M^as the candidate of the people will be considered as Pro- 
visional Governor, of course it being understood that he 
is expected to adhere strictly to this plan. 

In case that the Provisional President has not made a 
nomination of Governor, or the nominee has not arrived to 
take charge of his position, or if the person so honored does 
not accept for any reason, then the Governor will appoint 
by vote among all the chiefs of the army who may operate 
in the territory of the respective State, with the understand- 
ing that his nomination may be ratified by the Provisional 
President as soon as it may be convenient. 

iith. The new authorities will dispose of all the funds 
that are found in the public offices for the ordinary expenses 
of the administration and for the expenses of the war, keep- 
ing account scrupulously. In case that these funds may not 
be sufficient to meet the expenses of the war, loans are to be 
contracted, either voluntary or forced. These last to be 
consummated only with citizens or national institutions. Ac- 
count will also be carefully kept of these loans, and receipts 
will be tendered in due form to the interested parties, with 
a view to making restitution to those who have loaned, the 
revolution having triumphed. 

Transitory. A. The chiefs of the volunteer army will 
hold the rank which may correspond to the numbers of forces 
on hand. In case of operating military forces and volun- 
teers together, the chief of the highest rank will take com- 
mand of them, because in the event of both chiefs holding 



228 Carranza and Mexico 

the same rank, the command will be for the military chief- 
tain. 

The civil heads will profit by said rank while the war lasts, 
and once terminated, these appointments on petition of the 
parties interested, will be revised by the Secretary of War, 
who will confirm the various ones in their charges, or re- 
move such as he may see fit. 

B. All the chiefs, civil as well as military, will keep their 
troops under the strictest discipline, as they will be held re- 
sponsible by the Provisional Government for any misbe- 
havior of which the soldiers under their command may be 
guilty; excepting in such cases where they may justify them- 
selves by proving that it was impossible to restrain the troops, 
and to have imposed on the offenders the merited punish- 
ment. 

The severest punishments will be inflicted on any soldiers 
who sack any town or kill defenceless prisoners, 

C. If the army and the authorities sustained by General 
Diaz shoot prisoners of war, the same procedure will not 
be observed with those who fall into our hands, as repris- 
als; but on the contrarj'', the civil or military authorities in 
the ser\'ice of General Diaz, who may, after the initiation 
of the revolution, have ordered, decreed in any form, sent 
an order, or shot any of our soldiers, will be shot within 
tAventy-four hours after a court-martial. 

From this sentence the highest functionaries will not be 
exempted; the only exception will be that of General Diaz 
and his ministers, who in case of their ordering shootings or 
permitting them, will receive the same punishment, though 
after having judged them In the courts of the republic, when 
the revolution may have terminated. 

In such cases where General Diaz may decree that the 
laws of war may be respected, and the prisoners who fall 



Appendix 229 

into his hands are treated with humanitj', his life will be 
safe, but he must explain in the courts as to how he has 
handled the funds of the nation, and as to how he has com- 
plied with the law. 

D. As it is an indispensable requisite of the laws of war 
that the belligerent troops rmy wear some uniform of dis- 
tinction, and as it would be difficult to imiform the numer- 
ous forces of the people who are going to take part in the 
contest, there will be adopted as distinctive of all the liber- 
ating army, whether they be volunteers or regular soldiers, 
a tricolored ribbon, in the cap or on the arm. 

Fellow Citizens. If we are called to take up arms 
and overturn the government of General Diaz, it is not only 
for the offence committed during the last elections, but only 
to save the country from the dark future which awaits her, 
if she continues under his dictatorship, and under the gov- 
ernment of the abominable scientific oligarchy, that unscru- 
pulously and with great rapidity are absorbing and wasting 
the national resources; and if we permit them to continue 
in power, within a very brief space of time they will have 
completed their work; they will have carried the nation to 
ignominy and degradation; they will have absorbed all of 
her riches and left her in total misery; they will have 
caused the bankruptcy of our finances and the dishonor 
of our countrj^ which, weak, impoverished and manacled, 
will find herself unable to defend her frontiers, her honor 
and her institutions. 

With respect to me, I have a tranquil conscience, and no 
one can accuse me of promoting the re\^olution for personal 
interests, for the whole nation understands that I did all 
that was possible to arrive at a peaceful arrangement, and 
was disposed even to renounce my candidacy if General Diaz 
would only have permitted the people to appoint the Vice- 



230 Carranza and Mexico 

President of the republic; but dominated b}' incomprehensi- 
ble pride and by unheard of haughtiness he was deaf to the 
voice of the country, and preferred to precipitate the nation 
in a revolution before conceding one jot toward returning 
to the people an atom of their rights, before executing, al- 
though it might be in the last stages of his life, a part of the 
promises he made in Noria and Tuxtepec. 

The present revolution was justified when he said : " That 
no citizen may be charged with and perpetuated in the ex- 
ercise of power, and this will be the last revolution." 

If in the mind of General Diaz there had been more at- 
tention paid to the interest of the country than the sordid 
interests of himself and his counsellors, this revolution might 
have been avoided by making some concessions to the people ; 
but it has not been so — so much the better ! The change 
will be rapid and more radical, for the Mexican public in 
place of lamenting like a coward, will accept the chal- 
lenge like a hero, and even if General Diaz pretends, to de- 
pend upon brute force to imposing his ignominious yoke, 
the public will rely on the same force for throwing aside 
this yoke, for hurling this dismal man from power and for 
reconquering liberty. 

Fellow Citizens. Do not hesitate a moment: Seize 
the arms, throw the usurpers from power, recover your 
rights as free men, and remember that our predecessors be- 
queathed us an inheritance of glory w^hich we must not 
stain. Remember how they acted: invincible in war, mag- 
nanimous in victory. 

EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE. NO RE-ELECTION. 

San Luis Potosi, October 5, 19 10. 
(Signed) Fco. I. Madero. 

Note. The present plan will circulate only among the 



Appendix 231 

co-religionists of the greatest confidence up to November 
15th, from which date it will be re-printed; the plan 
will be prudently divulged from the 1 8th and profusely 
from the 20th on. 

PROTEST AGAINST MEETING OF DIAZ AND 

TAFT 

(Reprinted from The Evening World, September 3, 1909.) 

To the President of the United States. 

Sir: The national press has lately startled thoughtful 
men with the most unusual of announcements. We are told 
we may shortly expect to witness the meeting of the popu- 
larly elected President of this great Republic with the un- 
crowned Czar of Mexico. Calculated to inspire enthusiasm 
in the minds of the ignorant or the falsely informed, this 
piece of news brings dismay to those who know the truth 
and honor American traditions. For the last thirty years 
the world has only heard unchallenged reports of the genius, 
the equity and the kindness of Porfirio Diaz. All this being 
true, it would only be fitting and proper that the two neigh- 
boring chiefs should exchange international courtesies. 

But as a matter of history Porfirio Diaz represents in 
Mexico what Abdul Hamid was to Turkey. On his white 
head rests the responsibility for the massacres of over 50,000 
Mexican Christians; the slavery of thousands of Yaqui and 
Maya Indians who escaped fire and sword; the destruction 
of all liberties, personal as well as public ; the corruption of 
the judiciary; the creation of a financial system which has 
mortgaged Mexico to European and American bankers; for 
the persecution of all the Mexican liberals in the United 
States, which reached a climax of brazenness and impudence 
when a Mexican liberal was kidnapped across the Rio 



232 Carranza and Mexico 

Grande from an American jail by the help of American 
detectives in the payroll of the Czar. 

Therefore, I protest in the name of humanity, common 
decency and national dignity as distinguished from political 
expediency and international courtesy against such an ex- 
change between the deeply trusted and patriotic President of 
the United States and the treacherous, unpopular and bloody- 
handed Nero of Mexico. 

You might retort that it is no business of mine to couple 
your name with an attack seemingly so unwarranted. 

My answer is that I speak no more than truth and not 
otherwise than I have spoken in a recent book on the real 
political conditions in Mexico. I am moved to repeat these 
truthful characterizations of Mexico's president and the 
rule he stands for, because this pamphlet has been suppressed 
by an indictment against me in an American court brought 
about by the Mexican Government, which used your own 
brother, Henry W. Taft, as their lawyer against me, trans- 
parently to gain for their case the weight of an implied con- 
nection between it and the Administration. 

You might reply that the American Government cares 
nothing about the internal policy of the Mexican govern- 
ment as long as it behaves and protects American interests. 

I answer that if a neighbor be a good neighbor it might 
be sufficient unto 3^ou; but if your neighbor should torture 
or attempt to kill his children would it not be your duty to 
protest ? 

If the excuse for meddling in another nation's affairs is 
only found in the destruction of American lives and their 
property, under what pretext did the American Government 
protest against the Armenian massacres? What brought 
about armed intervention in Cuba? Why did the State De- 



I 



Appendix 233 

partment undertake to refund the unjust Chinese Indemnity? 
And how are you to explain the wherefore of the tremendous 
struggle to stamp out slavery? 

The reason for this system of intervention lies deeper than 
in financial and political interests. It proves to the civilized 
world that the American nation is something mightier than 
a rich, powerful and progressive republic; that it is likewise 
a moral entity backed by the conscience of a people. 

The propaganda about Mexico has its source in the knowl- 
edge of the real history of Porfirio Diaz. At the beginning 
of his career he concealed his real political face, but the 
higher he rises in power and statecraft, the more he uncovers 
his fundamental lack of principle. 

Even as I write these lines the report is wired from 
Mexico that General Diaz has ordered the demission of the 
Governor of Coahuila as the latter showed a marked ten- 
dency in favor of General Reyes's candidacy. Imagine the 
Republican President of the United States asking for the 
resignation of Governor Johnson of Minnesota because of 
his Democratic leanings! 

Political evolution in Mexico will move faster in the next 
twelve months, inasmuch as the new generation is impelled 
by cleaner, more honest and patriotic motives than those of 
the malevolent Czar and his infamous camarilla. Porfirio 
Diaz is fashioning the tools of his own destruction and as 
a last resort is using the handshake across the Rio Grande 
to countenance in advance the arbitrary repressions and as- 
sassinations which are sure to take place in the false elec- 
tions of next year. 

When that period is passed the mask of this master 
Machiavelli will have been torn aside. The American peo- 
ple will then realize with humiliation that their honored 



234 Carranza and Mexico 

President has exchanged an intimate greeting with the basest 
slave-driver of modern times. 

Carlo de Fornaro, 
National Arts Club. 

Translation. 

LETTER FROM ARCHBISHOP GILLOW TO 
URRUTIA. 

Hacienda de Chautla, July nth, 1913. 
Sr. Dr. Aureliano Urrutia, 

Minister of the Interior, Mexico. 
Esteemed Sir and Friend: 

I returned to this hacienda yesterday and was informed 
that up around Huejotzingo, capital of this District, things 
are rather unsettled, due to a few disturbers who molest 
the authorities, and consequently disturb public peace. Hav- 
ing in mind the kind offers which you made to me during 
my recent visit in that city, I now take the liberty of ad- 
dressing you. 

The disturbers of Huejotzingo are a certain Luis Pinto 
and his brother. They own real estate and small houses 
to the amount of may be Three Thousand Dollars each, in 
that locality. They put on airs of caciques, and have for 
some time even gone so far as to pretend to subordinate 
the local authorities. They have become more overbearing 
since the time of Madero. 

While Mr. Alberto Garcia Granados was Minister of the 
Interior, the referred-to Pinto brothers attempted to over- 
throw Mr. Enrique Acevedo from his position as Governor 
of the Province. Mr. Acevedo has maintained the peace 
and well-being in this district ever since he came into of- 
fice. As Mr. Granados, owner of the Hacienda de Chagua, 



I 



Appendix 235 

near Huejotzingo, knows Mr. Acevedo, he maintained Mr. 
Acevedo as Governor, and the Pinto brothers did not molest 
him any more until Mr, Granados resigned the secretary- 
ship. 

As Mr. Acevedo is wtW acquainted with the intrigues of 
the Pinto brothers, he has kept them well watched, and 
they, resenting this, have hostilized him, to the degree of 
having trumped up false accusations against him before the 
municipality of Puebla. They did not however, obtain their 
end, for they were unable to obtain his removal, though he 
was for a time suspended from office, much to the regret 
of the honest contingent of Huejotzingo. The Mayor re- 
placed him during this time. 

On the other hand, Mr. Ramon Vargas, Judge of the 
Primary Court of Claims of Huejotzingo, has been for 
three months working unceasingly to put to date all pending 
cases, which had been accumulating, due to the fact that his 
predecessors, partly due to indifference and partly to fear 
of the Revolution, often absented themselves, abandoning 
their offices. Among those who most distinguished them- 
selves of these last mentioned, was a certain Felipe Ramirez, 
whose wife is a Huejotzingo woman, on which account he 
was of course interested in holding that position in Huejot- 
zingo. The mother of the lady in question also found a 
way to take advantage of the situation, and arranged things 
so that those who wished their cases attended to, had to 
have a recommendation from her, if they wanted a favor- 
able judgment. For this she was of course paid a certain 
sum, and she managed to derive quite a fine income. 

This by-play came to the knowledge of Mr. Garcia 
Granados, and he managed to obtain the Puebla Munici- 
pality to offer the Judge Felipe Ramirez to transfer him 
to Matamoros, which offer he declined, staying in Huejot- 



236 Carranza and Mexico 

zingo and exercising his profession of lawyer. TTiis Mr. 
Ramirez works in harmony with the Pinto brothers, and 
the three of them, openly antagonize Acevedo the Governor, 
Ramon Vargas, the Judge and Sidronio Primo, Commis- 
sioner of the Ministry, who is an old employe in this locality 
and who works together with the other two last mentioned. 

With the foregoing details, and prompted by the desire 
to maintain order and peace in this district, I beg you to 
exert your good influence with the government of Puebla, 
to have Mr. Acevedo return to his post, and to have Mr. 
Ramon Vargas the present Judge, and also Mr. Sidronio 
Primo, stay in their positions. The presence of Mr. Felipe 
Ramirez, who still pretends to occupy the position of Judge 
in this District, is very harmful to public interests, as is also 
the presence of the Pinto brothers, so that although I har- 
bor no feelings of personal enmity towards them for I do 
not know them except from hearsay, I beg to suggest the ad- 
vantage of their being removed from this locality, in what- 
ever way you may deem most appropriate. 

Kindly forgive the length of this letter, but I feel justi- 
fied in giving you all these details, for the sake of the 
preservation of peace in this region, which has some impor- 
tance due to its relations to Puebla and Mexico. 

Thanking you in advance for whatever you may deem fit 
to do in the interests of the honest citizens who have given 
me the above information, and which I transmit to you con- 
fidentially, I beg to remain, 

Very respy., etc., etc., 

EULOGIO G. GiLLOW, 

Archbishop of Oaxaca. 



Appendix 237 

LETTER FROM MINISTER URRUTIA TO 
ARCHBISHOP MORA. 

Mexico, July 9th, 19 13. 
Very illustrious Sir — 

Kindly allow me to acquit myself of the pleasant duty of 
expressing, to you, very sincere thanks for the good assist- 
ance you have been lending to the Government in the re- 
establishment of peace, — a task the moje useful because 
accomplishing it, as you are doing, with intelligence and 
common sense, it might be able to effect a durable benefit 
to the country. 

In the name of the government to which I belong and 
with which you are happily connected, I earnestly beg of 
you to continue your good work, if possible, with more 
energy than before. 

In this connection and prompted by the confidence which 
your kindness invites, I take the liberty of telling you that 
some memorial services held in honor of the Madero 
brothers, made a bad impression in social circles, and es- 
pecially on the Government, and therefore I would ask of 
you to take such measures as you may deem necessary, to 
prevent a repetition of demonstrations of this nature, which 
might contribute to retard the success of the work under- 
taken by the Government in order to put an end to our 
internal wars. 

I also must call your attention to the necessity of stop- 
ping at all costs, a certain person in the clergy, from con- 
tinuing his propaganda against the Government, and this 
for the same reasons as above expressed. With your intel- 
ligence and tact, I am sure you will find an efficacious means 
to put a stop to the workings of the person in question. 

I remain, etc., etc., 

Urrutia. 



i 



GLOSSARY OF SPANISH WORDS. 



Carranzista 

Casas de 
Vecindad 

ClENTIFICO 



ClUDADELA 
COLORADOS 



compadre 

cuartelazo 
Don 



Political follower of Venustiano Car- 
ranza. 

Tenement houses. 

A group of politicians headed by J. I. 
Limantour, who took as a basis of 
their political party some of the Comte 
theories. They believed in a scien- 
tific government. The term cien- 
tifico is now applied to political 
exponents of graft in politics. 

Citadel. 

Reds, red-flaggers. Name given to the 
guerrilla troops under Orozco, be- 
cause besides carrying a red flag they 
carried destruction everywhere by fire 
and sword. 

Godfather, an expression which means 
protector, benefactor, — and implies 
great obligations and great sacrifices. 

A military mutiny. From cuartel, a 
military barrack. 

Title of courtesy given to people of the 
better class. Formerly in Spain, 
when addressing a person of aristo- 
cratic lineage, it was customary to 
write before the name, — De origen 
239 



240 



Carranza and Mexico 



Egidos 

Felicista 

Fiesta 

FOMENTO 



Gachupines 
Gringo 

Hacienda 

huertista 
Incomunicacion 



Jefe 

Jefe Politico 



Ley Fuga 



noble — (of noble origin). It was 
afterwards abbreviated to D. O. N. 
One should be careful to use the Don 
only before the first name, or together 
with first and second names, for in- 
stance — Don Porfirio Diaz, never 
Don Diaz, as it implies an insulting 
meaning. 

Communal lands surrounding villages 
and cities in Mexico. 

Political follower of Felix Diaz. 

Holiday, merry-making. 

Excite, encourage. Ministerio de Fo- 
mento: the department for the devel- 
opment of the country, industrially 
and commercially. 

Nickname given to Spaniards. 

Nickname used in Mexico and South 
America to designate Americans. 

Plantation, ranch, farm. 

Political follower of Victoriano Huerta. 

Incommunication. The position of a 
man in prison who is not permitted to 
communicate with his friends, law- 
yers or any one from the outside. 

Chief. 

Political chief. Head of a district 
under the jurisdiction of the Governor. 
Under Diaz they had almost unlim- 
ited power for mischief. 

The Runaway Law — which was re- 
sorted to for the purpose of doing 
away with obnoxious political ene- 



Glossary 



241 



Maderista 

MOCHO 

Neo-Cientifico 



Pacifico 

Pelado 

Peon 

Plan De Ayala 



Plan De 
Guadalupe 



mies or agitators; while they were 
taken from one prison to the other, 
they were shot from the back, and 
the pretext was that they had tried 
to run away. 

Political follower of F. I. Madero. 

Contemptible term to designate mem- 
bers of the clerical party in Mexico. 

New scientist. A political party which 
was a continuation of the old cien- 
tifico party. They came into power 
under Madero, and were headed by 
Ernesto Madero, uncle of Don F. I. 
Madero, and by Rafael Hernandez, a 
cousin of the president. 

A peaceful Indian, one that cultivates 
the land and does not carry arms. 

" Skinned." Term applied to a very 
poor Indian. 

Indian worker on plantation or mines. 

Written by a school-teacher, Montano, 
for Zapata. It was aimed against 
the neo-cientificos in the Madero cab- 
inet, — the provisional president was 
supposed to be P. Orozco, and in case 
of his absence Emiliano Zapata. The 
Plan was essentially an agrarian plan, 
local in its ideas of reforms. 

A Manifest written by V. Carranza to 
rally the Mexicans in the overthrow 
of the Huerta dictatorship. It did 
not attempt to bring about any re- 
forms, — only the elimination of 
Huerta and his supporters. 



242 Carranza and Mexico 

Plan De San Was the political plan written by F. I. 
Luis Poxosf Madero against the Diaz regime on 

October 5th, 1910. 

PoRFiRiSTA Political follower of Porfirio Diaz. 

PoRRiSTA A member of the Porra, a political club 

created by the friends of F. I. Madero, 
supposed to be headed by Gustavo 
Madero, to fight and intimidate the 
enemies of the Maderistas. 

Religion y Battle-cry of the clericals since the revo- 

FuEROS lution. " Religion & Privileges." 

The Church and the army under 
Spanish rule had special courts com- 
posed of either religious clerics or of 
soldiers, which judged members of 
the church or soldiers in criminal 
cases. The Clericals now demand a 
return of their old privileges. 

ViLLiSTA Political follower of F. Villa. 

Zapatista Political follower of Zapata. 



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